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“Taxes covered” – The Substantive Scope of Tax Treaties 
 
Patricia Brandstetter 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Tax treaty protection only goes as far as the treaty’s substantive scope. Nations worldwide have 
adopted the text of Art. 2 (“Taxes covered”) of the OECD Model Double Taxation Conventions in 
concluding bilateral treaties to prevent international double taxation in the area of taxes on income 
and capital, and taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts. 
 
The wording and structure of Art. 2 give rise to a host of ambiguities, creating uncertainty for 
taxpayers regarding the taxes that come within treaty scope. A research strategy that draws on historic 
materials documenting the development of Art. 2 throughout the League of Nations, OEEC and 
OECD seeks to shed light on a provision that has retained its basic format and wording since the 
1920s. Recent case law and academic literature are analysed to gain a clearer picture of the common 
international concepts expressed in tax treaties that use the formulations proposed in the OECD 
Model Conventions.  The research strategy, conceptual models and proposed results aim to contribute 
to the understanding of the “taxes covered” and to guide subsequent research and heighten awareness 
of problems in the interpretation and application of the provision on substantive scope in tax treaties. 
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PART I 
 
Introduction and Methodological Premises 
 
  
1. The scope and purpose of this thesis 
 
“Mundane though this Article may appear to be, it is in practice one of the key articles in any double 
taxation convention.”1      
 
Tax treaties aim to provide certainty to taxpayers as to their potential tax liability in foreign countries. 
To this end, they allocate taxing rights between treaty partners regarding the persons and taxes 
covered under the treaty. The avoidance of double taxation thus only goes as far as the scope of the 
applicable tax treaty. Tax treaties are “dual” in nature in that they are agreements under international 
law but also form part of the internal laws of the contracting nations. Determining the substantive 
scope of the treaty can be a weighty challenge due to differing tax systems and taxation concepts. 
 
The provision on substantive scope in Art. 2 of the OECD Model Tax Conventions on Income and 
Capital, and on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts is a fixture in any tax treaty. Together with the 
provision on persons covered,2 Art. 2 is the fundament to a sensitive balance struck by way of 
negotiations between the contracting parties. The substantive scope of a tax treaty determines its 
application by governmental authorities, courts and taxpayers. Other facets of the scope of application 
of a tax treaty are the provisions on its entry into force, termination3 and its territorial field of 
application.4  
 
Despite its relevance in practical treaty application, academic writings on the substantive scope of tax 
treaties are rare. Pioneer status can be attributed to the considerations of Franz Philipp Sutter and 
Michael Lang.5 The wording of Art. 2 in the OECD Model Conventions has been adopted in tax 
treaties around the globe. This thesis thus investigates the historical genesis, conceptual underpinnings 
and practical workings of the “Taxes covered” article in both the OECD Model Convention on 
Income and Capital, and the OECD Model Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts.6 The 
study takes into account official documents archived at OECD facilities in Florence and Paris. The 
materials documenting the drafting process of the OECD Model Conventions were in large part 
originally classified as “restricted” and thus inaccessible to the public for decades. As these 
documents bear testimony of the conceptual underpinnings of the form and substance of Art. 2, their 
analysis is an integral part in the quest of this thesis to provide a clearer picture of the “taxes covered” 
under the OECD Model Conventions and treaties modelled thereon.  
 
The outset of the thesis gives an introduction to the legal methodology forming the basis of all 
considerations and analyses to come. A basic thread throughout the study is the view that treaty terms 
                                                 
1 P. Baker, Double Taxation Conventions: A Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, editor’s 
Commentary on Art. 2, R.2 of March 2002, m.no. 2B.01. 
2 Art. 1 of the OECD Model Conventions (“Persons covered”). 
3 In the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, entry into force and termination are provided for in Arts. 30 and 
31, respectively; the OECD Model Tax Convention on Estates, Inheritances and on Gifts contains analogous provisions in Arts. 15 
and 16. Throughout the study, except where otherwise indicated, references are to the most recent versions of the aforementioned 
Model Conventions. 
4 Art. 29 of the Income and Capital MC; Art. 14 of the Estate, Inheritance and Gift MC. 
5 See Sutter, “Der sachliche Anwendungsbereich des ErbSt-Musterabkommens“, in Aigner et al. (eds.) Erbschaftssteuern und 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002), pp. 41 et seq., dealing with the substantive scope of treaties on estates, inheritances and gift 
taxes. See also M. Lang, “‘Taxes covered’ – What is a ‘tax’ according to Art. 2 OECD Model Convention?”, Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 2005, pp. 216 et seq.; id., “Der sachliche Anwendungsbereich der 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und vom Vermögen”, in Lang/Jirousek (eds.) Praxis 
des Internationalen Steuerrechts, liber amicorum Helmut Loukota, pp. 265 et seq. 
6 The current versions are: Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, adopted by the Council of the OECD on 15 July 2005; 
Model Tax Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts, adopted on 3 June 1982. Unless otherwise indicated, reference is 
always made to the most recent version of the respective OECD Model Convention. 
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constitute what has sometimes been called an “international tax language”, reflecting a common 
international consensus of the contracting parties. The description of the taxes covered in Art. 2 
epitomizes this global approach. As the international tax treaty network is largely based on the OECD 
Model Conventions, these texts are the focal point of analysis in the present study. While each treaty 
will necessarily be unique, as international tax law is a dynamic phenomenon of interaction between 
states, the common concepts expressed in the Model Conventions as well as the Commentaries serve 
as a sound basis in the process of treaty negotiation and thus play a major role in the interpretation of 
treaties that adopt the Model texts.  
 
The approach taken in evaluating the form and substance of Art. 2 takes into account the international 
context of this provision and is equally informed by textual, systematic, historical and teleological 
factors. With a reference to the Annexes contained in this study, the legislative history of Art. 2 is 
analysed to gain comparative insights in the process of interpretation. Moreover, documents from the 
OECD archives serve to relieve ambiguities in the determination of the substantive scope of tax 
treaties modelled on the OECD texts.  
 
The formulations of the current OECD Model Commentaries to Art. 2 can largely be traced back to 
the 1957 Reports and draft articles on substantive scope devised by the experts of WP No. 3 of the 
OEEC Fiscal Committee; special attention is thus given to these materials. 
 
The second part of the thesis takes a closer look at the functional build-up of Art. 2. In treaties 
corresponding to the OECD Model Conventions – and in fact in the overwhelming majority of treaties 
forming the current global tax treaty network – the “taxes covered” under the treaty are determined 
according to the framework provided by the OECD Model texts, outlined in brief in the following. 
 
Art. 2(1) defines the subject of the Convention, stipulating that the treaty applies respectively to 
“taxes on income and on capital” and “taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts” that are 
“imposed on behalf of a Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, 
irrespective of the manner in which they are levied”.  
 
Art. 2(2) gives a somewhat imprecise description of “taxes on income and capital”; it states: 
 
There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital all taxes imposed on total income, on total capital, or on 
elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of movable or immovable property, 
taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation.”  
A similarly broad description can be found in the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC: 
 
There shall be regarded as taxes on estates and inheritances taxes imposed by reason of death in the form of taxes 
on the corpus of the estate, of taxes on inheritances, of transfer duties, or of taxes on donationes mortis causa. 
There shall be regarded as taxes on gifts taxes imposed on transfers inter vivos only because such transfers are 
made for no, or less than full, consideration.  
 
Art. 2(3), providing that “The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are in particular …”, 
the contracting states list the taxes covered for each country and existing at the time of signature of 
the treaty. The term “in particular” clearly indicates that the list is not exhaustive. In contrast, Art. 
2(3) in the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC does not contain the phrase “in particular”; the list 
therein is thus exhaustive. Some treaties do not contain a general description of the taxes covered 
corresponding to paras. 1 and 2 and omit the phrase “in particular” in para. 3. In these cases, the 
enumeration is thus exclusive as to the taxes covered under the treaty. This option to exhaustively list 
the taxes covered is explicitly mentioned in the OECD Income and Capital MC.   
 
Art. 2(4) aims to prevent the treaty from instantly becoming inoperative in case changes are made to 
the taxation laws of a contracting party that may affect the taxes covered by the treaty. The text 
provides that the treaty will automatically apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes imposed 
after the date of signature of the treaty. However, no criteria are specified regarding the categorization 
of a tax as “identical or substantially similar”. 
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Art. 2(3) and (4) are interconnected in that both contain a temporal factor: while para. 3 lists the taxes 
existing at the time of signature of the treaty, para. 4 extends the substantive scope of the treaty to 
identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed after the treaty has been signed. The final 
sentence in Art. 2(4) provides that the competent authorities of the treaty partners shall notify each 
other of “any significant changes made in their taxation laws”.  
 
The thesis aims to shed light on how this framework can be implemented in practice. In this context, 
the 1969 Report of Working Party (“WP”) No. 30 of the OECD Fiscal Committee is of particular 
interest: the experts of this WP analysed the structure and wording of existing tax treaties and dealt 
with questions regarding practical treaty application. 
 
Contentious cases have arisen among contracting parties as to the meaning of the general description 
in paras. 1 and 2 in the light of the merely illustrative enumeration of taxes listed in para. 3 on the part 
of each contracting state. The decision of treaty partners to provide for an exhaustive listing of taxes 
covered, seemingly facilitating treaty application, has in equal measure given rise to unclear cases as 
to the scope of levies encompassed in Art. 2. Court cases in various nations have frequently dealt with 
issues involving the nature of “substantially similar” taxes covered at the time of conclusion of the 
treaty. In view of recurring unclarities in treaty application, the study seeks to elicit coherent guiding 
principles for the determination of the range of taxes covered. 
 
Following the analysis of practical implications of the formal structure of Art. 2, Part III of the study 
delves into the substance of this provision. Based on its methodological framework and the analysis of 
the functional workings of Art. 2, the study proceeds to lay out the constituent conceptual foundations 
of the OECD Model texts on substantive scope. The thesis evaluates documents obtained from OECD 
archives in Florence and Paris that provide insights into various stages of the drafting history of Art. 2 
in order to discover the concepts and understandings which led to the text in its present form. 
 
The substantive scope of tax treaties is based on – in fact dependent on – the concept of “tax”; 
therefore, in a first step, the characteristic features of payments that qualify as “taxes” in the sense of 
the basic common consensus expressed in Art. 2 are sought out. In accordance with the principles of 
international law, the mutual adoption of the text of the OECD Model Conventions warrants the 
presumption that the parties have agreed to key concepts underlying the Model texts and 
Commentaries. The thesis uses analyses provided by experts of the League of Nations as well as 
Working Parties of the OEEC/OECD in order to shed light on the conceptual bases underlying the 
Model texts so widely followed among nations. The study also presents findings as to the concept of 
“tax” for purposes of other provisions in the treaty and the implications for the substantive scope 
described in Art. 2.  
 
Premised on the findings with respect to the concept of “tax” in the OECD Model Conventions, the 
notion of taxes on “income and capital” and taxes on “estates, inheritances and gifts” respectively is 
given closer scrutiny. The paramount gauge for taxes covered under the treaty is that they are levied 
on “income and capital” or on “estates, inheritances and gifts”. However, the OECD Model 
Conventions lack systematic definitions of either of these terms. The range of “taxes covered” in tax 
treaties that adopt the Model texts is thus often unclear. The concept of “income” in tax treaties has 
been particularly contentious in various contexts of treaty application. The study deals with various 
items of “income” in domestic tax laws and their treatment under tax treaties.  
 
Lastly, analysis turns to problems at the intersection of taxes on income and capital as dealt with in 
the Income and Capital MC and taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts as dealt with in the Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts MC. Despite the fact that they signified the historical beginning of bilateral 
action against double taxation, treaties in the area of taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts are 
nowadays far less common. One reason for this development may be that there has been more of an 
international element with taxes on income and capital than taxes levied on estates, inheritances and 
gifts. Nevertheless, unrelieved double or multiple taxation with respect to taxes on estates, 
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inheritances and gifts is an existing problem. Moreover, certain taxes are of a character that makes it 
difficult to determine whether they should be covered under the OECD Model Convention on Income 
and Capital or rather the Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts Model. An example is the replacement in 
several states of taxes on estates and inheritances with taxes on certain gains that may qualify as 
“taxes on income”. Some states levy taxes on gifts as a component of income and levy no separate gift 
tax.   
 
Building on the results obtained in Part III of the study with respect to the notion of “taxes on income 
and capital” and “taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts”, the analysis turns on the relation between 
the Model Conventions and whether delineation is called for in cases of potential overlaps in 
substantive scope. The objective of this part is to identify cases where treaty practice can and should 
draw a dividing line between the two Models as to their respective substantive scope. 
 
In conclusion of the thesis, a summary is given of the results obtained in the analysis of the fabric and 
conceptual grounding of Art. 2.  
 
 
2. The approach to treaty interpretation 
 
“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary 
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”7 
 
In the application of tax treaties, especially as regards the determination whether a treaty is relevant to 
a certain tax at issue, the interpretation of words and phrases used in the treaty text is of paramount 
importance. The following methodological considerations set up the foundation of the ensuing 
investigation into the substantive scope of tax treaties. 
 
Tax treaties are international agreements between two or more8 countries concerning taxes; as such, 
they form part of international law,9 a separate legal system with aims and concepts independent of 
those prevailing under the internal law of a single state.10 Tax treaty law has established its own 
international rules and principles, but firmly rests upon the foundations of international law. The 
language used in tax treaties should therefore in principle be presumed to epitomize an international 
concept,11 the assumption being that it has a meaning independent of domestic legal systems. The 
view that tax treaty terms are used in an international sense is supported by the provisions on 
interpretation in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,12 which are 
                                                 
7 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 US 418, 425 (1918). 
8 In the field of international taxation, attempts at the drafting of a single comprehensive multilateral treaty have so far been largely 
unsuccessful. See the arguments made in favour of replacing the existing bilateral tax treaty network with a multilateral treaty by 
Thuronyi, “International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty”, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 2000-2001, pp. 1641 et seq. See also the 
comprehensive analysis in M. Lang et al. (eds.) Multilateral Tax Treaties (1998). 
9 Since about 1840, the term “international law” has replaced the older terminology “law of nations” or “droit des gens”. In the 
German, Slavic, Dutch and Scandinavian languages, the older terminology is still in use (“Völkerrecht”, “Volkenrecht”, etc.). 
International law has traditionally been defined as a system of equal and sovereign states whose actions are limited only by rules 
freely accepted as legally binding. See thereto the decision of the PCIJ in Lotus, Judgment No. 9 (1927) p. 18, No. 10. 
10 The theory of “moderate dualism”, now generally accepted in jurisprudence and academia across the nations, postulates that 
international and domestic law are two spheres which in principle exist as separate from each other. 
11 Debatin, Auslegungsmaximen zum internationalen Steuerrecht, AWD 1969, p. 479. Opp. Pijl, “The definition of ’beneficial 
Owner’ under Dutch law”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation June 2000, p. 256 (259). Vogel takes the approach that 
terms that were used in the 1963 OECD MC and were explained in the Commentary have become part of “international tax 
language” (see K. Vogel, “The Influence of the OECD Commentaries on Treaty Interpretation”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation December 2000, p. 612 (616).  
12 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331) is an international treaty 
adopted on 22 May 1969 at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties held in Vienna. Since the rules enshrined in this 
Convention have been accepted as declaratory of pre-existing international law, they are binding also on states that have not ratified 
the Convention. For a comprehensive insight, see Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1984). 
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applicable in the same manner to tax treaties as they are applicable to any other types of international 
treaties.13 
 
The vast majority of countries – Members as well as non-Members of the OECD14 – have accepted 
the OECD Model Tax Conventions15 as a guideline in their bilateral treaty negotiations, often 
following the Model to the letter. From the outset of the drafting of Model treaties for the prevention 
of double taxation, delegates from countries that did not have full membership attended the meetings 
and provided valuable input that considerably contributed to the shaping of the Model texts.16 Since 
1997, the OECD Models have included official statements of non-OECD Member countries on the 
articles of the Model and on the Model Commentaries.17 Due to their paramount role in the practice of 
conclusion of tax treaties, the OECD Model Conventions are the principal item of analysis throughout 
the study.  
 
The findings will in large part also be of value for treaties based on the other model treaties that have 
developed aside from the OECD Models. The most widely used model other than the OECD Model is 
the US Model Income Tax Convention.18 The 1996 Technical Explanation thereto states: 
 
[T]he United States has actively participated in the development of the OECD Model…. [T]he strong identity 
between the provisions of the OECD and the U.S. Models reflects the fact that the United States drew heavily on 
the work of the OECD in the development of the U.S. Model.19  
 
The United States was involved in the work of the OEEC from the beginning, a fact that was often 
emphasized by the OEEC Fiscal Committee.20 The 2006 US Model has further tracked the wording of 
the OECD Model text; this is especially true for the provision on substantive scope.21 
 
The development of an international tax treaty network that is largely based on the OECD Model 
Conventions calls for an analysis that strives to elicit common basic principles. The same 
methodological approach is necessary in the case of an individual bilateral treaty.  
 
It should be noted that domestic law is by no means irrelevant at the tax treaty level;22 a taxable event 
under domestic law is the logical prerequisite to applying a tax treaty. Tax treaties do not aim to create 
                                                 
13 Cf. Art. 2(1a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defines the term “treaty” and gives a non-exhaustive 
description of the kinds of treaties to which the Convention applies. See further F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law, IBFD Doctoral Series Vol. 7 (2004) 426 et seq.  
14 Cf. the 2005 OECD Income and Capital Model Commentary, under B.14: “[T]he impact of the Model Convention has extended 
far beyond the OECD area. It has been used as a basic document of reference in negotiations between Member and non-Member 
countries and even between non-Member countries....” 
15 No material value is attributed in this study as to the designation of tax treaties as “Convention”, “Treaty”, “Agreement” since the 
OECD itself uses all of the above terms. Moreover, the titles of bilateral tax treaties vary, with some treaties making explicit 
reference in the title also to the avoidance of tax evasion. The title of a treaty will generally not be intended to be more than an 
indicator of its content. 
16 See thereto also Graetz/O’Hear, “The ‘original’ intent of U.S. International Taxation”, 46 Duke Law Journal (1997) p. 1023. 
17 Many non-OECD states have, in an Annex to the Model text, officially stated their positions on each of the Model articles as well 
as on the interpretations put forward in the Commentaries. Point 5 of the Introduction to this Annex states: “Whilst [the non-
Member countries] generally agree with the text of the Articles of the Model Tax Convention and with the interpretations put 
forward in the Commentary, there are for each country some areas of disagreement.” For more details, see the OECD Annual 
Report for 2006, p. 60. 
18 The first Model Treaty was published by the US Treasury in 1977; the most recent Model was published on 15 November 2006. 
There is no US Model as regards taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts. 
19 US Department of Treasury, Technical Explanation to the US Model Income Tax Convention of September 20, 1996, Preamble.  
20 See e.g. the statement in the 1958 Report of the OEEC FC: “The Fiscal Committee wishes to stress the importance it attaches to 
the fact that Representatives of the United States … have attended its meetings from the beginning and have taken part in its 
discussions.” (OEEC, Report of the Fiscal Committee on its Work, FC(58)2, Part I, m.no. 18. Hahn has noted: “It may sound over-
simplified, but it is probably a correct summary of OEEC practice that the US and Canada had, de facto, the same role as the full 
members of the OEEC, apart from the right to vote. Yet the lack of the veto power … has furnished them with an excellent occasion 
to prevent or support votes of the Council by sheer persuasion.” (Hahn, “Continuity in the Law of International Organization – Part 
Two: Continuity from OEEC to OECD,” DLJ 1962, p. 524). 
21 For more on the new US Model, see Avi-Yonah/Tittle, “The New United States Model Income Tax Convention”, Bulletin for 
International Taxation,  p. 224. More of an insight into the role of the United States in the beginnings of the drafting process of the 
OECD Model Conventions as well as on the influence of the OECD Model has had on the US Model is provided in Lazerow, The 
OECD Draft Influence on United States Income Tax Treaties (1976). 
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tax liabilities; their goal is to reduce or eliminate existing bases for taxation under the respective 
contracting party’s internal law. In this respect, they necessarily tie in with the national provisions that 
allocate taxable income to taxpayers, so that the context requires the relevance of domestic law.23  
 
The distributive rules of tax treaties, on the other hand, form a self-contained system and are therefore 
by their very nature barred from the application of domestic definitions and concepts. Vogel noted 
that “[t]ypes of income designated by treaties … should by no means be confused with those of 
domestic law, even where they do exist in domestic law; any resemblance that may show up will be 
superficial and accidental.”24  To safeguard effective application of tax treaties to domestically taxable 
items, the terminology of tax treaties should in principle be seen as autonomous from national 
phraseology.  
 
OECD Model Conventions were drafted to facilitate “common solutions to identical cases of double 
taxation”.25 The Model texts as well as the official Commentaries are of considerable interpretive 
value in that they are created by tax experts appointed to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs by the 
governments of Member countries. In its 1959 Report to the Council, the OEEC Fiscal Committee 
remarks that the favourable reception of the Model texts and Commentaries is “largely due to the fact 
that the Committee is composed of civil servants responsible in each Member country for the 
negotiation and the day-to-day administration of double taxation Conventions. The Committee is in a 
way a forum where problems which arise can be discussed thoroughly and constantly on a multilateral 
basis.”26 Representatives also from non-Member countries have always been invited to the Sessions of 
the FC and to this day are actively involved in work of the OECD.27  
 
With reference to the fact that the Model texts and Commentaries are not materials that originated in 
the context of negotiations of an individual treaty, Gloria has argued that they cannot be seen to be 
interpretive materials acceptable under the VCLT.28 Mössner29 and Lang30 have convincingly 
countered that the fact that the Models and Commentaries will regularly be the very basis of treaty 
negotiations renders them important also in the interpretation of individual tax treaties.  
 
The Model texts and Commentaries are neither binding nor can they be seen to offer ultimate 
solutions to treaty interpretation; still, woven through the present study is the premise that to the 
extent that the treaty between two contracting parties follows the structure and wording of a Model 
Convention, it is presumed that the parties have accepted the principles and concepts underlying the 
Model – unless they have made reservations to the Model texts and Commentaries. Such is also the 
approach taken by the OECD; an example for an explicit statement in this vein is the Report of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 Cf. the considerations of Becker, “Die Selbständigkeit der Begriffsbildung im Steuerrecht und ihr Einfluß auf die Auslegung der 
internationalen Doppelbesteuerungsverträge vom Standpunkt der deutschen Entwicklung aus betrachtet”, StuW 1939, p. 746 (747). 
23 M. Lang, “Die Einwirkungen der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen auf das innerstaatliche Recht”, FJ 1988, pp. 72 et seq.; M. Lang, 
“Hybride Finanzierungen im Internationalen Steuerrecht” (1991) pp. 31 et seq.; Debatin, “Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und 
innerstaatliches Recht, Beihefter zu Heft” 23 DStR 1992, p. 1 (6).  
24 K. Vogel, Introduction, m.no. 50. See also Vogel/Prokisch, General Report, p. 62: “Since these types of income, profit or capital 
are often not recognized by the domestic tax laws of Contracting States, or defined differently, it is necessary to interpret the 
substantive requirements in the context without reference to domestic law. The term ‘enterprise’ in Article 7 MC, for example, 
presupposes a common understanding in the international community.” For examples of authority in case law in this vein, see Avery 
Jones, “The origins of concepts and expressions used in the OECD Model and their adoption by. States”, Bulletin for International 
Taxation 6/2006, p. 220 (221). 
25 See the Commentary on the 2003 OECD Income and Capital MC, at m.no. 2 of the Introduction: “[It is] most desirable to clarify, 
standardize and guarantee the fiscal situation of taxpayers in each Member country … through the application by all Member 
countries of common solutions to identical cases of double taxation.” 
26 OEEC, The Elimination of Double Taxation – 2nd Report by the Fiscal Committee, C(59)147, published by the OEEC in July 
1959, m.no. 10. 
27 For more information on the involvement of non-Member countries in the work of the OECD and their subscription to OECD 
agreements and treaties, see the homepage of the OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members (CCNM). 
28 Gloria, Das steuerliche Verständigungsverfahren und das Recht auf Diplomatischen Schutz (1988) pp. 90 et seq. 
29 Mössner, “Zur Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen“, in Böckstiegel et al. (eds.) Völkerrecht. Recht der 
Internationalen Organisationen. Weltwirtschaftsrecht, liber amicorum Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (1988) pp. 411 et seq.  
30 M. Lang, “Die Bedeutung des Kommentars und des Musterabkommens der OECD für die Auslegung von 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, in Gassner/Lang/Lechner (eds.) Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Internationalen Steuerrecht (1994) p. 
15. 
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Working Party to the OECD Council, noting: “It goes without saying that when the provisions of a 
convention merely reproduce the Articles of the O.E.C.D. Model Convention, they should in principle 
be interpreted in the light of the Commentaries on those Articles.”31 The fact that the parties have not 
included an explanation for certain term or formulation used does not mean that they did not want to 
provide for common solutions to possible problems in this area, but rather indicates that they were 
unable to reach an explicit agreement.32   
 
Ault sees the Commentaries as “a kind of ‘default’ setting for those treaties which are based on the 
OECD Model.”33 This seems to be the view taken by the OECD Fiscal Committee34 and also features 
in domestic jurisprudence in various countries.35  
 
While Ault36 has qualified the Model Conventions and Commentaries as comprising a “special 
meaning” in the sense of Art. 31(4) of the VCLT,37 against the backdrop of court decisions in various 
countries in this vein, Waters has convincingly argued that when looking for the “ordinary meaning” 
of words used in tax treaties it is warranted under Art. 31(1) to take account of the international 
context in which the words are used, including an interpretation expressed in the OECD Model 
Commentaries.38  
 
On these grounds, the view taken in the present study is that nothing is gained from attempting to 
classify treaty interpretation under one provision or another of the VCLT.39 The interpretation 
provisions contained in the VCLT should be seen as a means to an end, not as an end in themselves.40 
Interpretation cannot be effectively subjected to legal rules;41 even the Commentary on the 
interpretive provisions of the VCLT recognizes that interpretation is more an art than it is a science.42 
Whenever “rules of interpretation” are dealt with one should keep in mind that language as an 
expression of thought involves a process of free creation; so does any method of interpretation. In 
order to reveal the objective content of the term or phrase as may be inferred from the treaty text, it is 
crucial to use any materials available in connection with the treaty. A basic thread in the process of 
interpretation should be the consideration of textual, systematical, historical and teleological aspects 
                                                 
31 OECD, WP No. 22 of the Fiscal Committee (France-Switzerland) Second Report on Additional Studies concerning the Mutual 
Agreement Procedure, Paris, 7 April 1966, FC/WP 22(66)1, m.no. 10. 
32 Opp. Wassermeyer, “Die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen durch den Bundesfinanzhof”, StuW 1990, p. 405. 
33 See Ault, “The role of the OECD Commentaries in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties”, in Alpert/Van Raad (eds.) Essays in 
International Taxation (1993) p. 65. Ward, “Principles to be Applied in Interpreting Tax Treaties”, 25 Can. Tax J. (1977) p. 264 
m.no. 3., affirms that the Commentaries should be used unless Canada has recorded disagreement by making a reservation. See also 
the considerations in Chebounov, Die Qualifikationsproblematik im deutschen Recht der DBA, Europäische Hochschulschriften 
Reihe II, Vol. 3369, Peter Lang (2002) p. 73. 
34 OECD, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital: Report of the Fiscal Committee, Paris (1977), Para. 29: 
“With regard to the reservations of states, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs considers that they must be viewed against the 
background of the global results which have been obtained….” This formulation has since been contained in the Commentaries to 
both OECD Model Conventions. 
35 See, e.g. the UK Special Commissioner in UBS AG v. HM Revenue and Customs, [2005] STC (SCD) 589, Para. 10: “[T]he 
negotiators on both sides could be expected to have the commentary in front of them and can be expected to have intended that the 
meaning in the commentary should be applied in interpreting the treaty when it contains the identical wording and neither party 
made an observation disagreeing with the commentary.” See also the US Court of Federal Claims in National Westminster Bank Plc 
v. United States of America (58 Fed.Cl. 491), Judgment by Judge Firestone, point B. See also the Netherlands Supreme Court, Case 
No. 27.252, decision of 2 September 1992. 
36 Ault in Alpert/Van Raad (eds.) Essays in International Taxation, (1993) p. 62. 
37 Art. 31(4) stipulates: “A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 
38 Waters, “The relevance of the OECD Commentaries in the interpretation of Tax Treaties”, in Lang/Jirousek (eds.) Praxis des 
Internationalen Steuerrechts, liber amicorum Helmut Loukota (2005) p. 677. 
39 See also Jiménez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (2004) p. 17 (28), who argues that the distinctions made in the 
VCLT, rather than being mutually exclusive, are mutually reinforcing.  
40 See similar considerations in Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (1997) p. 131. 
41 Köck, Vertragsinterpretation und Vertragsrechtskonvention (1976) p. 101. See also M. Lang, “Die Bedeutung des 
Musterabkommens und des Kommentars des OECD-Steuerausschusses für die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, in 
Gassner/Lang/Lechner (eds.) Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Internationalen Steuerrecht (1994) p. 21. 
42 YBILC 1966, Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, Vol. II, p. 200, at paras. 5 and 6: “[T]he interpretation of 
documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science. Any attempt to codify the conditions of the application of those principles 
of interpretation whose appropriateness in any given case depends on the particular context and on a subjective appreciation of the 
varying circumstances would clearly be inadvisable. Accordingly, the Commission confined itself to trying to isolate and codify the 
comparatively few general principles which appear to constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaty provisions.”  
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of the wording.43 Sinclair has stated: “[I]t is clear that no would-be interpreter of a treaty, whatever his 
doctrinal point of departure, will deliberately ignore any material which can usefully serve as a guide 
towards establishing the meaning of the text with which he is confronted.”44  
 
This is reflects the view of the International Law Commission of the United Nations in drafting the 
provisions on interpretation in the Vienna Convention. In his capacity as a member of the ILC, Alfred 
Verdross noted that “where two States had concluded a treaty, they would not be bound by the rules in 
question because they could agree to use other means of interpretation.”45 The ILC did not attempt to 
codify the many maxims of interpretation found in national and international jurisprudence but rather 
to give assistance in the application of such maxims, which is never an automatic process and depends 
on the respective circumstances.46  Even prior to the codification of international treaty law, this 
approach was prevalent in doctrine and practice:  the Permanent Court of International Justice used to 
consider itself free to apply whatever means of interpretation it saw fit, “as the circumstances and 
evidence in a particular case may require.”47  
 
With regard to amendments to the OECD Commentaries that change the interpretation of the Model 
text or bring new aspects to it, there has been considerable academic dispute.48 Domestic 
jurisprudence and administrations sometimes take into account the revised text of Commentaries but 
do not comment on its interpretive weight.49  
 
It has been argued that changes to the Commentaries should be taken into consideration if they were 
made a long time ago and the new meaning is currently part of international tax language.50 However, 
this approach is legitimate only where it is established that both parties have agreed to a changed 
interpretation. Logically, only such materials that the parties had access to at the time of conclusion of 
the treaty can be of relevance. An interpretation that they could not have envisioned at the time of 
conclusion of the treaty cannot logically be seen to be binding upon the parties; to do so would mean 
to go against the status of the tax treaty as an international convention between two countries. 
Therefore, amendments to the Commentaries cannot have an effect on treaties concluded prior to the 
amendments, except in cases where newer Commentaries do not reflect any change in substance but 
merely clarify the pre-existing line of interpretation.51  
 
The OECD Fiscal Committee holds that “existing conventions should, as far as possible, be 
interpreted in the spirit of the revised Commentaries”.52 This statement seems to reflect practical 
considerations following the fact that an overwhelming majority of treaties was concluded decades 
ago. The Memorandum of Understanding to the tax treaty between the United States and Austria is an 
interesting example in support of the argument that changes in the Commentary that in effect clarify 
rather than change the meaning should be followed; the Memorandum states: “The Commentary – as 
may be revised from time to time – constitutes a means of interpretation in the sense of the Vienna 
                                                 
43 Cf. the approach in M. Lang, Einführung in das Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002) m.mos. 137 et seq. 
44 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester University Press (1984) p. 117. 
45 Minutes of the 765th Meeting of the ILC, YBILC 1964 Vol. I/1, p. 279. 
46 See the conclusions drawn by Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (2004) 522. 
47 29 AJIL (1935) p. 943, cited in Köck, Vertragsinterpretation und Vertragsrechtskonvention (1976) p. 101. 
48 See the conclusive summary of discussions in the OECD/IFA seminar at the 2001 IFA Congress provided in Avery Jones, “The 
Effect of Changes in the OECD Commentaries after a Treaty is Concluded”, 56 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 3 
(2002) p. 102. 
49 See, e.g. with respect to the India–US income tax treaty, the Indian Authority for Advanced Rulings (AAR) 238 ITR 296 (1999), 
which qualifies revised OECD Commentaries as a “useful reference … to accommodate the emerging developments”.  
50 See the summary of results of a joint seminar of the OECD, IFA, the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition 
and Tax Law and the German Ministry of Finance, in Deitmer/Dörr/Rust, “Invitational Seminar on tax Treaty Rules Applicable to 
Permanent Establishments, in Memoriam of Prof. Dr. Berndt Runge, Seminar Report”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2004, on p. 184. 
51 M. Lang, “Later Commentaries of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Not to Affect the Interpretation of Previously 
Concluded Tax Treaties”, Intertax 1997, pp. 7 et seq.; M. Lang in Gassner/Lang/Lechner, Aktuelle Entwicklungen, pp. 24 et seq. 
Wattel/Marres, “The Legal Status of the OECD Commentary and Static or Ambulatory Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, European 
Taxation 2003, p. 222. 
52 Introduction to the 1977 Model Commentary, m.nos. 33-36. 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.”53 Austrian jurisprudence has confirmed that existing, but not 
later, Commentaries are to be used in tax treaty interpretation as an indication of the intention of the 
parties.54 However, as they are devised by expert Members of the OECD Fiscal Committee and its 
Working Parties, even later Commentaries may be taken into consideration – on equal footing with 
opinions of tax experts that may be convincing.55  
 
The approach to treaty interpretation in courts worldwide is generally a broad one that refers to a wide 
array of items to be taken into account as part of the treaty context.56 Courts, administrators and tax 
advisers in the different countries have given substantial weight to the Model texts as well as the 
Commentaries. Whether this practice is in accordance with the rules of the VCLT has been subject to 
much academic dispute.57 The foregoing considerations were to show that such disputes are ultimately 
futile. To the extent that the treaty parties adopt the text of the OECD Model Commentaries and 
abstain from making any observations or reservations to the Commentaries, these materials can be 
seen to reflect the objective intent of the parties as expressed in the treaty text.58 This does not take 
away from the parties’ discretion to expressly agree otherwise in a Protocol or Technical Explanation 
to the treaty, which serve as official guides to the treaty since both parties have subscribed to its 
contents. 
 
 
2.1. The importance of history: Documents from the OECD archives 
 
The OECD Model Commentaries existing when the treaty was concluded have been described as its 
“legal context”.59 Although it cannot be accorded the same weight in treaty interpretation as the 
OECD Model texts and Commentaries, written official documentation of the process that led to the 
adoption of the Model texts forms a “historical context” that can provide conceptual footing and 
valuable insights into the “spirit of the Conventions”,60 and can thus guide present treaty interpretation 
and application. The Model Commentaries, which are indisputably the primary resource in 
interpretation, merely display interpretive conclusions – without any hint as to the grounds from 
which they were derived.61  
 
Documents surrounding the drafting history of Art. 2 in the 1963 and 1977 Model Conventions could 
in principle be seen to be of value also in the interpretation of tax treaties that have adopted Art. 2 as 
formulated in the current 2005 Model Conventions, based on the fact that this article and the Model 
Commentaries thereto have not changed in substance since the first drafts for a Model text of Art. 2 
were presented in 1957. It is submitted in the following that the rules of international law regarding 
the drafting history of international agreements62 apply also in the context of the OECD Model texts. 
                                                 
53 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Austria on Interpretation of the Convention of May 31, 1996, 
m.no. 78. See also the considerations thereto in Avery Jones, “Are Tax Treaties Necessary?”, 1 Tax L. Rev. 1999,  p. 61. 
54 Austrian Administrative Court, decision of July 31, 1996, 92/13/0172. See the discussions of this decision by M. Lang, “Later 
Commentaries”, Intertax 1997, p. 25; M. Lang, “Die Auslegung der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen in der Rechtsprechung der 
Höchstgerichte Österreichs”, in Lang/Mössner/Waldburger, Die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen in der 
Rechtsprechung der Höchstgerichte Deutschlands, der Schweiz und Österreichs (1997) pp. 122 et seq. 
55 K. Vogel, “Probleme bei der Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, SWI 2003, p. 110.  
56 See the references to Australian, New Zealand, US and UK cases in Baker, Double Taxation Conventions (2001) m.nos. E.04 – 
E.08. 
57 Ward, “Principles to be applied in interpreting tax treaties”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1980, pp. 545 et seq.; 
K. Vogel, “Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und ihre Auslegung (I)”, StuW 1982, p. 111 (124); Ault, “The Role of the OECD 
Commentary in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties”, Intertax 1994, pp. 144 et seq.; Jiménez, “The 2003 Revision of the OECD 
Commentaries on the Improper Use of Tax Treaties: A Case for the Declining Effect of the OECD Commentaries”, Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation No. 58 (2004) p. 17 (18). 
58 M. Lang in Gassner/Lang/Lechner (eds.) Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Internationalen Steuerrecht (1994) p. 11. 
59 See Supreme Court of Canada, The Queen v. Crown Forest Industries Ltd., 95 DTC 5389. 
60 Referral to the “spirit” of the treaty and its provisions is made throughout the Commentaries to the OECD Models. See, e.g. m.no. 
8 of the 2005 Commentary on Art. 4 para. 1; m.no. 10 of the Commentary on Art. 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure). The Mutual 
Agreement Procedure has from its inception been “designed to give effect to the spirit of the Convention” (explicitly stated in the 
Commentary to Art. 13 of the 1927 League of Nations Draft Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation). 
61 M. Lang, Einführung (2002) p. 56. 
62 See generally, Pratter, “À la Recherche des Travaux Préparatoires: An Approach to Researching the Drafting History of 
International Agreements”, Hauser Global Law Paper, December 2005. 
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Art. 32 of the VCLT provides that 
 
 [r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or 
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
 
It is not explained, however, what the “preparatory work”, or travaux préparatoires as they are 
commonly called in international law, may comprise. From the wording, it seems that a broad 
coverage of materials in the context of the conclusion is intended. This view is affirmed in the 
Commentary of the ILC on Art. 32 VCLT, which states: “The Commission did not think that anything 
would be gained by trying to define travaux préparatoires; indeed, to do so might only lead to the 
possible exclusion of relevant evidence.”63 
 
A broad take on the notion of travaux préparatoires is also prevalent in leading literature. McNair 
defines travaux préparatoires as “an omnibus expression which is used rather loosely to indicate all 
the documents, such as memoranda, minutes of conferences, and drafts of the treaty under 
negotiation, for the purpose of interpreting the treaty.”64  
 
The documents from the context of the drafting of the Model Conventions of the OECD as well as the 
preceding OEEC65 include, inter alia, the Reports of various Working Parties of the OECD’s 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs as well as of the Fiscal Committee of the preceding OEEC. The Fiscal 
Committee, replaced in 1971 by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, was a body of tax experts and 
government officials from various Member countries66 established to evaluate the existing worldwide 
treaty practice and prepare draft articles for the envisaged Model Conventions.  
 
The Reports of Working Parties dealing with specific issues regarding the articles of the Draft 
Conventions were distributed regularly for consideration to governments of Member countries as well 
as non-Member countries for consideration, after which discussion sessions of the FC/CFA were 
held.67 The Working Party Reports and Minutes of sessions held within the OEEC/OECD are 
extrinsic materials of the drafting of Model texts not of an individual treaty. Nevertheless, as Lang68 
has pointed out, the interpretive problems are largely analogous.   
 
An argument against attributing value to documents from the OECD archives could be that a 
considerable amount of documents now accessible at the archives were originally classified as 
“restricted” material.69 The ICJ has held that the fragmentary nature of preparatory materials means 
that they can only be used with caution;70 however, no decision could be found by the present author 
as to confidential materials. While the VCLT as well as major treatises in the area of international 
law71 do not deal with the interpretive value of materials that are not readily accessible, it has been 
                                                 
63 YBILC 1966, Vol. II/2, Commentary to Art. 32, m.no. 20. 
64 McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961) p. 410. 
65 For more on the transition from OEEC to OECD, see Hahn, “Continuity in the Law of International Organization – Part Two: 
Continuity from OEEC to OECD”, Duke Law Journal 1962, pp. 522 et seq. 
66 Often, the same persons represented on the FC/CFA later negotiated bilateral tax treaties for their countries. See Prang, Die 
Vertragspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beim Abschluß von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (1982) p. 46. 
67 To this day, the CFA can be seen to be “the global forum for countries to cooperate”. See the statement by Prang (1982) p. 46. 
68 Profound accounts on the role of materials from the Archives of the OECD can be found in M. Lang, “Wer hat das Sagen im 
Steuerrecht? Die Bedeutung des OECD-Steuerausschusses und seiner Working Parties”, ÖStZ 2006, p. 205; M. Lang, 
“Kommunalsteuer und DBA”, SWI 2005, pp. 16 et seq. 
69 Council Resolution of 10 July 1997 on Derestriction of Documents, C(97)64/FINAL; Council Resolution of 19 December 1991 
on Archives, C(91)132/FINAL. 
70 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 6, para. 41. 
71 Examples are Evans, International Law, 1st edn. (2003) and Brownlie, Public International Law, 6th edn. (2003). 
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held in academic literature that an implied prerequisite to the classification of materials as part of the 
travaux préparatoires is that it was actually accessible and known to all the original parties.72  
 
Avery Jones73 found that while courts sometimes refuse to take into account evidence of confidential 
negotiations,74 referral to such materials has been rightly accepted where such documentation is 
readily accessible to the parties involved.75 With respect to any binding effect on the taxpayer of an 
understanding between the countries engaging in such negotiations, domestic courts regularly hold 
that a mutual understanding will be binding on the taxpayer on sole condition that it was made 
public.76 That said, it should be noted that international law does not appear to sustain public 
availability in the sense of accessibility to all, rather than just the parties concerned, as a qualifying 
factor for travaux préparatoires.77  
 
The ILC has considered whether Art. 32 VCLT should enable the use of travaux préparatoires only 
as between countries that took part in the negotiations of the multilateral treaty or, alternatively, only 
if they have been published, and comes to the conclusion: 
 
A State acceding to a treaty in the drafting of which it did not participate is perfectly entitled to request to see the 
travaux préparatoires, if it wishes, before acceding. … These considerations apply to unpublished, but accessible, 
travaux préparatoires as well as to published ones; and in the case of bilateral treaties or ‘closed’ treaties between 
small groups of States, unpublished travaux préparatoires will usually be in the hands of all the parties. 
Accordingly, the Commission decided that it should not include any special provision in the article regarding the 
use of travaux préparatoires in the case of multilateral treaties.78 
 
In a 1928 case before the Permanent Court of International Justice the winning argument advanced by 
counsel for the French government regarding the competence of the International Labour 
Organization was “that Powers who took no part in the preparatory work were invited to accede to the 
Treaty as it stood, and did so accede, without (it may be added) having had the text of the preparatory 
work communicated to them.”79 This has since been repeatedly affirmed in practice, the ratio being 
that new member countries may peruse older documents pertaining to the international treaty they are 
acceding to.80  
  
Similar questions can be posed, with analogous results, regarding the acceptance of the OECD Model 
texts among a steadily growing number of Member countries. Presumably, new Members will 
scrutinize all accessible materials that give an insight into the views and process prevailing within the 
organization. In fact, acceding Members will more often than not look to documentation on the 
positions of Members as well as positions officially held within the organization so as to extensively 
canvass conceptual issues that may come up during Membership. This is evidenced by 1966 OECD 
Reports81 containing questions posed by, and answers provided to, the Delegate of Japan in its role as 
a newly joining Member.  
                                                 
72 See fundamentally Köck, Vertragsinterpretation und Vertragsrechtskonvention, p. 92. See also Pratter, “À la Recherche des 
Travaux Préparatoires”, Hauser Global Law Paper, December 2005. See fundamentally Köck, Vertragsinterpretation und 
Vertragsrechtskonvention, p. 92. 
73 Avery Jones et al., “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties”, BTR 1981, p. 99. 
74 The ECJ, for example, has refused to place any interpretive value on an unpublished declaration made by a representative of the 
European Commission in C-8/81 Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53. 
75 Avery Jones makes reference to unpublished notes taken during negotiations at a 1980 Conference of the Canadian Tax 
Foundation. 
76 See, e.g. the Danish Administrative Tax Court with respect to the Denmark–France Income and Capital Tax Treaty, Case No. 
1985-5-173, decision of 22 May 1985.  
77 See the points made in M. Lang, “Kommunalsteuer und DBA”, SWI 2005, p. 18. 
78 YBILC 1966, Vol. II/2, Commentary to Art. 32, m.no. 20. 
79 Publications of the Court, Series B, Nos 2 and 3, p. 41, as cited by Ehrlich in Hague Academy’s Recueil des Cours (1928) vol. iv, 
p. 128, no (1). 
80 Rest, “Interpretation von Rechtsbegriffen in internationalen Verträgen”, Dissertation, University of Cologne (1971) p. 152. 
81 OECD, WP No. 25 of the Fiscal Committee, Preliminary Report on questions by the Japanese Delegation concerning the Draft 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and capital, FC/WP 25(66)1; FC/M(66)1 under VI. 
(Questions raised by the Japanese Delegation); FC/M(66)2 under IV. (Questions raised by the Japanese Delegation). Cf. also 
FC/M(64)6 under V.: “The Delegate for Japan stated that the explanations requested were necessary as the provisions of the double 
taxation Conventions that Japan would be negotiating on the basis of the draft Convention established by the Fiscal Committee 
would become an integral part of Japanese taxation law.” (emphasis in the original) 
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Therefore, in interpreting treaties concluded by OECD Member countries, it is plausible to turn to 
materials from the archives as accessible to the Member concerned, irrespective of accession dates. 
With respect to treaties concluded with non-Member countries, however, the importance of such 
documents will certainly not be as straightforward, and caution is to be exercised in determining the 
objective intent of the parties.82  
 
In domestic jurisprudence regarding tax treaty provisions, courts regularly consider the history of a 
tax treaty provision so as to identify its object and purpose in the context of the treaty.83 Under the 
VCLT, however, the role of travaux préparatoires appears to be limited in that recourse to such 
materials is acceptable only “when an interpretation according to Art. 31 leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure” Nevertheless, this does not impose serious restrictions in court decisions, 
because “[o]ne can, almost by definition, assume that a dispute about the interpretation of a treaty 
provision … will have arisen because the text is ambiguous or obscure.”84 
 
The Canada Federal Court of Appeals has stated: “The Commentaries to tax conventions and other 
extrinsic evidence regarding the intention of the drafters of tax treaties form a part of the legal context 
surrounding international taxation…. Accordingly, it is clear that Commentaries to tax conventions 
and other evidence are to be used as an aid in the interpretation of tax treaty provisions.”  The US and 
France are not parties to the VCLT; especially US courts have taken a very liberal view towards the 
use of travaux préparatoires.85 
  
As has been argued in the preceding chapter, any materials that may be of use in determining the 
objective intent of the parties is relevant. Sinclair has rightly said: “It would be wrong to regard the 
principles of interpretation contained in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention as amounting to 
anything more than general guidelines.”86 In accordance with the principles of international law, a 
court, taxpayer or anyone who is interested in the meaning of the agreement, will want to consult all 
available materials for insight into the “common intentions and agreed definitions”87 of the 
negotiators. As background documentation on the formation of Model texts and Commentaries 
provides chapters for formulations that are the basis of current treaty negotiations, it provides 
conclusive supplementary materials and therefore has a place in the process of interpretation.   
 
International tax treaties are special in that to this day, the worldwide network of treaties concluded as 
based on the OECD Model tax treaties, the US Model Treaty, as well as the United Nations Model, is 
conceptually grounded in the Model texts developed by the League of Nations. The fundamental 
structure for international taxation laid out in the 1928 League of Nations Model Treaty forms the 
common basis for more than 1,200 bilateral tax treaties currently in force. Despite massive changes in 
the world economy, the international tax regime formulated in the 1920s has remained remarkably 
intact.88 It is therefore of considerable value to the interpretive process to include materials 
documenting the deliberations of the experts arriving at the basic common consensus that is the 
foundation of today’s international tax system. 
 
 
2.2. Dealing with undefined treaty terms 
 
The Model Conventions, by their very nature, are “paragons of simplicity”,89 as their goal is to 
provide a workable template facilitating agreement for countries with vastly disparate fiscal systems.90 
                                                 
82 See the statement made by M. Lang, SWI 2005, p. 18. 
83 See, e.g., the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court in S. v. Tax Authorities, Case Number 5823-1985, decision of 3 June 1986. 
84 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1984) p. 142. 
85 See US Supreme Court, Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. (1996) at 226: “[W]e have traditionally considered as aids 
to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux préparatoires).” 
86 Sinclair, “Interpretation of Tax Treaties”, 40 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2 (1986) p. 76. 
87 Jennings/Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (1992) p. 545. 
88 Graetz/O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation”, 46 Duke Law Journal (1997) 1021.  
89 Sasseville, “The Role of Tax Treaties in the 21st Century”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2002, pp. 246 et seq. 
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Formulations tend to be broad and only very few terms are explicitly defined. Avery Jones has 
referred to tax treaty terminology as “boilerplate” wording,91 which, however, has been conducive to 
the fact that the exact wording of the Models is followed in an overwhelming majority of bilateral tax 
treaties.   
 
In each of the Models, Art. 3 gives general definitions of words like “person”, “property” and 
“competent authority”. Furthermore, the OECD Commentaries on Art. 3 point out that “some 
important terms [are] explained elsewhere in the Convention.”92 Still, crucial terms such as “tax”, 
“income” or “capital gain” are not defined; moreover, existing definitions will often contain terms that 
remain unclear.   
 
Most tax treaties contain a provision that can be seen as lex specialis to the basic interpretation 
provisions of the VCLT.93  In the OECD Model Conventions, Art. 3(2) states that any term not 
defined in a treaty shall, “unless the context otherwise requires”, have the meaning that it has at that 
time under the domestic law94 of the state applying the treaty.  
 
The question arises whether taxpayers and tax counsellors, administrative authorities and courts may 
resort to notions and concepts prevailing in their respective internal legal systems to determine the 
meaning of terms not defined in the treaty. Art. 3(2) is unclear as to whether domestic law concepts or 
rather an interpretation from the context of the treaty should prevail. Opinions are divided among 
members of the academic community; some scholars argue that an interpretation from the context of 
the treaty is warranted95 while others deem instant recourse to domestic law preferable.96   
 
The position taken in this thesis is that a term used in tax treaties between countries with diverse legal 
systems should be given an international meaning, consistent with the international fiscal context it is 
used in, rather than a meaning dependent on the domestic law of one of the contracting parties. 
 
In a recent study on the origin of expressions used in the OECD Model, Avery Jones et al. have found 
that the formulation “unless the context otherwise requires” has a common law origin. They conclude 
that this expression is unnecessary as applied to civil law countries since it is implied by way of 
                                                                                                                                                        
90 In a letter to the Chairman of the League of Nations Fiscal Committee of April 12, 1927, the Chairman of the Committee of 
Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Pasquale d’Aroma, stated: “[H]aving regard to the diversity of the 
legislative systems represented in the Committee, and the necessity for finding formulae capable of acceptance by everyone, it will 
be recognized that the experts were bound to confine themselves to indicating general rules, leaving particular points of difficulty to 
be dealt with – in the spirit of the accepted general principles – by those on whom the task of negotiating the bilateral conventions 
will ultimately fall.” (emphasis added) 
91 Avery Jones, “The Multiple Amendment of Bilateral Double Taxation Conventions”, Bulletin for International Taxation, “Tax 
Treaty Monitor”, January 2006, p. 19. 
92 See the Income and Capital Model Commentary and the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model Commentary on Art. 3, each in 
Para. 1. In the Income and Capital Model, the terms “resident” and “permanent establishment” are defined in Arts. 4 and 5, 
respectively, while the distributive articles on special categories of income clarify the terms therein (“immovable property”, 
“dividends”, “royalties”, etc.). The Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model defines “domicile” in Art. 4; the meaning of certain terms 
used in other articles (“immovable property”, “permanent establishment”, “nationals”) is clarified by the provisions of those articles. 
93 The 1981 US Model Income Tax Treaty contains a provision corresponding to that in the OECD Model. For more on the 
interpretation article in US tax treaties, see Shannon, “United States Income Tax Treaties: Reference to domestic law for the 
meaning of undefined terms”, Intertax 1989/11, pp. 453 et seq. 
94 According to the Commentary on Art. 3 Para. 2, at m.no. 13.1, the reference is to “any relevant provision of the domestic law of a 
Contracting State, whether or not a tax law. However, where a term is defined differently for the purposes of different laws of a 
Contracting State, the meaning given to that term for purposes of the laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention applies shall 
prevail over all others….” 
95 M. Lang, “Die Einwirkungen der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen auf das innerstaatliche Recht”, FJ 1988, pp. 72 et seq.; M. Lang, 
“Irrwege der DBA-Auslegung am Beispiel der Besteuerung von Lehrbeauftragten – Off-track Interpretation of Double Taxation 
Treaties as Exemplified by the Taxation of Lecturers”, SWI 1998, pp. 508 et seq.; Debatin, “Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und 
innerstaatliches Recht”, Beihefter zu Heft 23 DStR 1992, 1 (6); Blumenstein, System des Steuerrechts (1995) p. 35; Rivier, Droit 
fiscal international, pp. 99 et seq. 
96 H. Loukota, “Tax Treatment of Short-term Teaching Activities of University Professors”, SWI 1998, pp. 456 et seq.; H. Loukota, 
“Vermeidung von Irrwegen bei der DBA-Auslegung”, SWI 1998, pp. 559 et seq. Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermayer, 
“Commentary on Art. 4”, m.nos. 88 et seq., suggests recourse to domestic law prior to efforts to derive an interpretation from the 
context of the treaty. 
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systematic interpretation.97 The usefulness of the phrase can indeed be called into question as it has 
led to confusion as to the extent to which domestic tax law provisions might supersede treaty 
definitions. 
 
Interestingly, the provision of Art. 3(2) has sparked controversy over its usefulness and application 
from early on; during a 1965 Session, the following remarks were made by the Delegates to the 
OECD Fiscal Committee: 
 
The Delegate for Denmark … considered that a common interpretation of the O.E.C.D. Draft Convention was 
essential and that only an international authority could give one.… The Delegate for Austria, while endorsing the 
views of the Delegate for Denmark on the need for a uniform interpretation, said that it was the domestic law 
which gave rise to the most serious difficulties.… The Delegate for Germany, pointing out that Article 3, 
paragraph 2, of the Draft Convention referred to the definitions in the domestic laws, thought that the elaboration 
in the Convention of rules and definitions that were as precise as possible would limit differences as to 
interpretation. The Delegate for Belgium supported the remark of the Delegate for Germany, and pointed out that, 
in adopting Article 3, paragraph 2, the Committee had created a source of difficulty that it must now remove.98  
 
The provision has not been removed from the Model Conventions; nor were the definitions in Art. 
3(1) elaborated on. However, Art. 3 is to be interpreted in accordance with the general principles of 
interpretation in international law. 
 
Under Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, a term is to be interpreted “in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.” The ICJ has held this to constitute customary international law.99 The materials to the 
Convention100 state that “ordinary meaning” is to be understood in the context of the special scope in 
which a term is applied, which actually indicates that the term will have a “special” meaning 
depending on its respective context as well as the underlying object and purpose.101  
 
The meaning of a term can only be ascertained by reference to the particular legal framework from 
which it has derived its substance. There is no obligation under the treaty for one state to adopt the 
interpretation given to a term in the other state, because such line of thought is not compatible with 
the object and purpose of tax treaties. Vogel argued that an interpretation in light of the object and 
purpose of a treaty requires that “states should seek the treaty interpretation which is most likely to be 
accepted in both contracting states (the goal of ‘common interpretation’).”102 The context of tax treaty 
terms calls for them to be regarded as expressing a common international understanding of the parties. 
 
The term “context” as used in Art. 3(2) seems to have a broader meaning than “context” mentioned in 
Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. The Income and Capital Model Commentary on Art. 3(2) states: 
“The context is determined in particular by the intention of the Contracting States when signing the 
Convention….”103 The Commentary does not explain on what basis it names the intention of the 
parties in this declaratory enumeration. To ascertain the intention of the parties has always been 
regarded an important factor in the interpretation of international treaties. While there used to be a 
dispute among international legal scholars whether the primary object of interpretation should be the 
“true” intentions of the parties104 rather than the objective treaty text,105 the commonly accepted 
approach is one that aims to derive the “objective intent” of the contracting parties.106  
                                                 
97 Avery Jones et al., “The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model and their Adoption by States”, Bulletin 
for International Taxation June 2006, p. 220 (221). 
98 OECD, Fiscal Committee, Minutes of the 21st Session held in Paris on Tuesday 28th, Wednesday 29th, Thursday 30th 
September, and Friday 1st October, 1965, FC/M(65)3, Paris, 22nd October 1965, p. 3 (“General Remarks”). 
99 See e.g. the judgment in Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 803. para. 23.  
100  Para. 17 of the Commentary to Art. 27 of the ILC Final Draft. 
101 Cf. the approach taken in statutory interpretation in common law jurisdictions, which distinguishes between the “ordinary 
English meaning” of words as opposed to their “technical meaning”. 
102 K. Vogel, Commentary, Introduction, m.no. 74. (emphases in the original) 
103 Model Commentary on Art. 2, m.no. 12.  
104 J.N. Gladden Estate v. The Queen (1985) 1 C.T.C. 163 (F.C.T.D.) 166-167: “[A] treaty or convention must be given a liberal 
interpretation with a view to implementing the true intentions of the parties.” See also the US Supreme Court in as early as 1895, 
United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, at 36-37: “Undoubtedly, the intention of the two governments, as gathered from the words of the 
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The Commentary of the ILC to the VCLT notes that “the starting point of interpretation is the 
elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the 
parties”.107 Proclaimed subjective intentions of the parties will thus only be of relevance if expressed 
in the wording of the treaty in light of the surrounding circumstances.  
 
The VCLT never mentions in its exhaustive list the intention of the parties; rather, Art. 31(2) 
stipulates a somewhat narrow notion of “context”, comprising the text of the treaty itself as well as 
any protocol and other instrument made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. Still, there are 
no grounds to view the VCLT as being in conflict with Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model Conventions. 
The methods of interpretation set forth in the VCLT do not differ fundamentally from the basic 
methods prevailing in any other area of law, nationally or internationally.108 In his groundbreaking 
thesis on the interpretation of tax treaties under international law, Engelen submits that Art. 3(2) 
concretizes the application to tax treaties of the general rule of interpretation embodied in Art. 31 
VCLT. 109   
 
Some authors have argued that the term “requires” in the wording “unless the context otherwise 
requires” of Art. 3(2) presupposes that an interpretation from the context of the treaty is appropriate 
only if there are compelling reasons to this effect.110 Such approach is by no means justified with a 
view to the object and purpose of tax treaties. Even though interpretation will in practice always be 
influenced to a certain extent by the approach taken in domestic law,111 it would undermine the 
purpose of tax treaties as international agreements not to see as the ultimate goal a uniform 
application of their rules.  
 
The terms used in Art. 3(2) are to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to 
them in their context, and with regard to the object and purpose of the treaty. Instant recourse under 
Art. 3(2) to the domestic law meaning of a term would clearly thwart the object and purpose of tax 
treaties as per Art. 31(1) of the VCLT: If a term is understood by either of the treaty partners 
according to definitions in their respective domestic legal systems, “qualification conflicts”112 are 
inevitable, which might entail double taxation or “double non-taxation.” Moreover, an opportunity to 
take domestic concepts to the international level would enable states to unilaterally influence their 
obligations under the treaty. Recourse to domestic concepts does not enhance clarity; on the contrary, 
a term might not even bear any meaning under a country’s domestic law.113 The term “context” as 
used in Art. 3(2) of the OECD Models should be seen to have the broadest possible meaning, with 
                                                                                                                                                        
treaty, must control; and the entire instrument must be examined in order that the real intention of the contracting parties be 
ascertained.”  
105 For more on this see Köck (1976) p. 27, citing a statement of the Permanent Court of International Justice from the PCIJ-
Publications of 1931: “The Court is not prepared to adopt the view that the text of the treaty … can be enlarged by reading into it 
stipulations which are said to result from the proclaimed intentions of the authors of the treaty, but for which no provision is made 
in the text itself.” 
106 Cf. K. Vogel, Introduction, m.no. 69-69a; Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung, Art. 3 m.no. 78. 
107 YBILC 1966, Vol. II/2, p. 220. 
108 Fundamentally Rill, “Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff”, ZfV 1985, pp. 461 et seq.; see also Gassner, Tax 
Avoidance/Tax Evasion, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 68a, p. 250. 
109 Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, IBFD Doctoral Series Vol. 7 (2004) 482. 
110 Van Raad, “The Term ‘Enterprise’ in the Model Double Taxation Conventions”, Intertax 1994, at p. 493: “However, the word 
‘requires’ in Article 3(2) indicates that not just any treaty contextual meaning has priority.” See also the view taken in Pijl, “The 
Definition of ‘Beneficial Owner’ under Dutch Law”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2000, p. 259.  
111 Generally speaking, it can be observed that Continental European legal scholars are traditionally more accustomed to working 
with different elements of interpretation, and civil law courts refer far more readily and frequently to the preparatory materials or 
legal history of a text than common law courts would. 
112 This expression is used in international tax literature to describe situations where the contracting states apply different articles of 
the treaty on the basis of differences in their respective domestic laws. 
113 Moreover, the authentic treaty text will in many cases be expressed in a language different to that in which each contracting 
state’s tax laws are expressed; see Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation, Chap. 7, at p. 2. See also M. Lang, 
“Qualifikationskonflikte im Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, in Kirchhof et al. (eds.) Staaten und Steuern, liber 
amicorum Klaus Vogel (2000) pp. 922 et seq.  
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recourse to domestic concepts to be had only in the scarcest of cases.114 Art. 3(2) merely emphasizes 
that an interpretation of treaty terms from their international context should always prevail over 
domestic definitions.115   
 
According to an often quoted statement of the US Tax Court on tax treaty interpretation, “The clear 
import of treaty language controls unless application of the words of the treaty according to their 
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectation of the signatories.”116 
 
In its Art. 2(2), the VCLT explicitly provides that “[t]he provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use 
of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings 
which may be given to them in the internal law of any state.” The “ordinary meaning” of tax treaty 
terms in the sense of the VCLT can only be revealed with regard to their international context. 
Guidance should equally be sought from the terminology of the treaty as a whole, its structure and 
systematic build-up, the function of the article in question, its historical context as well as other 
circumstances that may be relevant. The objective of treaty interpretation is to “give the specific 
words of a treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.”117 
 
A significant deficiency in this context is the lack of an international body to enforce consistent 
interpretation in all nations.118 Terms in tax treaties often appear to be left deliberately open, as states 
plan on addressing problems when they arise, retaining the best possible bargaining position in 
negotiations between their respective administrative authorities.119 Avery Jones has ascribed the lack 
of harmonization in domestic tax laws to the said practices in treaty negotiations: “The reason why 
treaties do not lead to useful harmonization of tax laws is what normally is referred to as sovereignty, 
but is really the need to preserve one’s negotiating position.”120 
 
In the absence of institutions competent to render authoritative interpretations that would be binding 
on the states, it cannot be denied that all international law is somewhat relative and conceptual 
problems are intrinsic.121 The vast majority of existing tax treaties contain a provision for mutual 
agreement in case of disputes that corresponds to Art. 25(3) of the OECD Income and Capital MC, 
stating that “[t]he competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavour to resolve by 
mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the 
Convention. They may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not 
provided for in the Convention.”122 This procedure, however, has significant shortcomings123 and 
usually does not reap clear-cut definitions binding upon both states. In the Model Commentaries to 
Art. 25, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs acknowledged that albeit unsatisfactory, this article 
has been the maximum the Member countries could agree on.124  
                                                 
114 This approach is frequently taken in jurisprudence; see, e.g., Canada Federal Court of Appeal, Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. 
Her Majesty the Queen, 98 TNI 206-19, m.no. 19: “Article 3(2) of the OECD Convention [establishes] that where a term is not 
defined in a bilateral tax treaty, definitions from domestic income tax law should be applied UNLESS THE CONTEXT 
INDICATES OTHERWISE.” [upper-case in the original] See also the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court, Case No. 2004:116, 
decision of 22 December 2004. Further references to court decisions in various nations are found in Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty 
Interpretation (1995) Chap. 7, p.12. 
115 M. Lang, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und innerstaatliches Recht (1992) p. 105. 
116 SumitomoShoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 US 176, 180 (1982), quoting Maximov v. US, 373 US 49 (1963) at 54. 
117 Maximov v. US, 373 US 49 (1963). 
118 Cf. the considerations in Rest, Interpretation von Rechtsbegriffen in internationalen Verträgen, p. 209. 
119 Debatin has stated that the contracting parties will often aim to leave themselves a backdoor for settling differences in 
interpretation in the form of the mutual agreement procedure (see Debatin, AWD 1969, p. 478).  
120 Avery Jones, “Are Tax Treaties Necessary?”, Tax L. Rev. 1999, Vol. 1, p. 54. 
121 See also the considerations by D. Shelton, “International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in Evans (ed.) International Law 
(2003) p. 145 (146). 
122 Cf. the corresponding provision in Art. 11(3) of the OECD Model Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts. See also 
the OECD Report on Mutual Agreement Procedure (1984), at Paras. 39 and 40. 
123 For an in-depth analysis, see Avery Jones et al., “The legal nature of the mutual agreement under the OECD Model Convention 
(I)”, BTR 1979, pp. 337 et seq.; see also IFA, Mutual Agreement – Procedure and Practice, Cahiers de droit international, Vol. 66a 
(1981); Skaar, “The legal nature of mutual agreements under tax treaties”, 5 Tax Notes International 26 (1992), pp. 1441 et seq.; M. 
Züger, “Mutual Agreement and Arbitration Procedure in a Multilateral Tax Treaty”, in M. Lang et al., Multilateral Tax Treaties – 
New Developments in International Tax Law (1998) pp. 153 et seq. 
124 Para. 45 of the OECD Model Commentary on Art. 25(3). 
 20 
 
 
The 1928 League of Nations Draft Conventions contained a provision125 that established, in case 
amicable settlement by the parties could not be reached, the appointment of 
 
such technical body as the Council of the League of Nations may appoint for this purpose. This body will give an 
advisory opinion…. The Contracting States may agree … to regard the advisory opinion given by the said body as 
final. In the absence of such an agreement …, they shall be free … to have recourse to any arbitral or judicial 
procedure which they may select, including reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
 
Now as well as then, such authorization to submit disputes to an international court does not bode 
well with governments.  
 
Suggestions for an international judicial or arbitral mechanism have arisen throughout the work of the 
OECD in the field of double taxation. A 1966 Report of WP No. 22 to the Council of the OECD 
states: “In reality, it would be necessary not only to make the mutual agreement procedure mandatory 
whenever a difficulty of interpretation arose, but also, and above all, … a procedure would be 
necessary for referring such cases to some higher authority, whose decisions would be binding on 
both states.”126 The Report proposed as alternative solutions an “independent arbitrator [who] would 
necessarily have to be an eminent person of unquestionable impartiality”, as well as a “committee of 
jurists, composed of a number of eminent specialists in taxation law from different countries and 
whose decisions would be conclusive.”127 Despite clear rejection on the part of most Member 
countries, the WP voiced optimism: 
 
[I]t may be expected that as international co-operation becomes a matter of course, the present resistance to any 
relinquishment of sovereignty – even in matters of taxation – will gradually become weaker and one day – which 
one may hope will not be too far distant – the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.C.D. will once again be able to consider 
the question….128 
 
The International Fiscal Association has supported pleas in academic literature for an “international 
tax court”.129 Moreover, there have been suggestions to involve the International Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Justice in tax treaty dispute resolutions.130 The tax treaty between Austria and 
Germany of 2000 is unique in that it refers interpretation conflicts that cannot be resolved under the 
mutual agreement procedure to the European Court of Justice as an arbitral body;131 however, thus far, 
not a single case has been submitted to the ECJ. Van Raad has proposed the creation of an 
international panel of tax treaty experts that might be called upon by courts and administrative 
authorities to give an opinion on the interpretation of a treaty provision in the respective case at 
issue.132 
 
The prevailing judgment among scholars is that an international tax court is currently not a realistic 
option,133 and chances for the realization of mentioned suggestions are bleak. Recent treaties of the 
                                                 
125 Art. Art. 13 of Draft Convention No.IC of the Draft Conventions for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of 
Direct Taxes; Art. 6 of the Draft Convention fort he Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of Succession Duties. 
126 Second Report of WP No. 22 (France–Switzerland), which dealt with the issue of “Protection of tax-payers under Article 25”; 
FC/WP 22(66)1, m.no. 68. The vast difference in opinions of the experts as to the nature and role of such a body is evidenced in 
m.nos. 74–79 of same Report. 
127 Id., m.nos. 69 and 71, resp. 
128 Id., m.no. 68. 
129 The question was discussed at length at the 5th Congress of IFA in Zurich in 1951. For more on the topic, see Azzi, “Tackling 
Tax Treaty Tensions: Time to Think about an International Tax Court”, 52 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 8-9 
(1998) pp. 348 et seq. 
130 See, for example, E. van der Bruggen, “Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in tax cases: Do we already 
have an ‘International Tax Court’?”, Intertax 8-9 (2001), pp. 250 et seq. 
131 See M. Züger, “The ECJ as Arbitration Court for the New Austria-Germany Tax Treaty”, 40 European Taxation 3 (2000) pp. 
101 et seq. 
132 Van Raad, “International Coordination of Tax Treaty Interpretation and Application”, Intertax 2001, pp. 212 et seq., who rejects 
the idea of a mandatory arbitration system; arguing in favour of internationally binding arbitration to supplement the mutual 
agreement procedure: A. Ribes Ribes, “Compulsory Arbitration as a Last Resort in Resolving Tax Treaty Interpretation Problems”, 
European Taxation September 2002, pp. 300 et seq. 
133 See, inter alia, M. Edwardes-Ker, The International Tax Treaties Service, loose-leaf edn (1994), Chap. 2, p. 2.01; M. Waters, 
“The relevance of the OECD Commentaries in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties”,. pp. 671 et seq. (674). 
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United States with Canada and Germany require that the competent authorities of the contracting 
parties submit a matter to arbitration if they are unable to reach complete agreement within a 2-year 
period; however this applies only to certain specified matters, i.e. matters involving residency, 
permanent establishment, business profits, transfer pricing and royalty issues.134 Disputes as to the 
substantive scope of the treaty are not directly addressed and it will be interesting to see how an 
arbitral tribunal established under the treaty might handle matters that implicate substantive scope.   
 
It is submitted, and substantiated throughout the study at hand, that treaty application should start 
from the recognition of the parties’ common consensus on concepts underlying the OECD Model 
texts where they have not stipulated otherwise. To interpret a tax treaty with reference only to 
domestic tax law and concepts would mean to gravely oversimplify treaty application. It may often be 
difficult to derive an international fiscal meaning of a treaty term from the context within which it is 
used,135 and even within the treaty, a term might have different meanings when used in different 
provisions.136 Still, these interpretive efforts have to be undertaken to do justice to the internationality 
of terms used in tax treaties and to avert looming “qualification conflicts”. Therefore, the best way to 
carry into effect the goals of the OECD Model Tax Conventions is to interpret terms in treaties that 
correspond with the wording of these templates against the backdrop of the common international 
consensus reflected in the Model Conventions.  
 
The interpretation of a tax treaty between two countries should factor in other tax treaties and 
international agreements concluded by each of the parties.   
 
Considerable influence can be ascribed to EC law. While the intricacies of interaction between tax 
treaties and EC law in the field of direct taxation are in large part contentious,137 EC law explicitly 
acknowledges the importance of bilateral treaties for the prevention of double taxation.138 EC Member 
States are largely free to enter into agreements in the area of taxes as they see fit. The ECJ noted in 
Gilly: 
 
The Member States are competent to determine the criteria for taxation on income and wealth with a view to 
eliminating double taxation-by means, inter alia, of international agreements – and have concluded many bilateral 
conventions based, in particular, on the model conventions on income and wealth tax drawn up by the OECD.139   
 
In Saint-Gobain, the Court emphasized that “in the absence of unifying or harmonising measures 
adopted in the Community … the Member States are at liberty, in the framework of bilateral 
agreements concluded in order to prevent double taxation, to determine the connecting factors for the 
purposes of allocating powers of taxation.”140 
 
As EC law is superior to national laws and even to Member States` constitutions,141 it is clear that tax 
treaties concluded between EC Member states must be consistent with the provisions of EC law and 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ, and Member states must not violate EC law in contracting with non-
                                                 
134 See Art. 21 of the 2007 Fifth Protocol to the United States–Canada Income Tax Treaty. 
135 The term “enterprise”, for example, has different meanings depending upon the respective provision it is used in: see van Raad, 
“The Term ‘Enterprise’ in the Model Double Taxation Conventions – Seventy Years of Confusion”, in Alpert/van Raad (eds.) 
Essays on International Taxation, liber amicorum Sidney I. Roberts (1994) pp. 317 et seq. 
136 Id.  
137 Williams, EC Tax Law (1998) p. 17. M. Lang, “Die Bindung der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen an die Grundfreiheiten des EU-
Rechts”, in Gassner/ Lang/Lechner (eds.) Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und EU-Recht (1996) p. 25. For a recent analysis into the 
subject, see Kofler, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (2007).  
138 Art. 293 EC Treaty. See also the references to bilateral treaties in the EU Mergers Directive 
(90/434/EEC) and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (90/435/EEC). 
139 C-336/96, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Gilly v. Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, Judgment of 12 May 1998, ECR 1998, p. I-
02793. 
140 C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, Judgment of 21 
September 1999, ECR 1999, p. I-6161. 
141 The doctrine now known as the supremacy of EC law emerged from the decision of the ECJ in Flamino Costa v. ENEL [1964] 
ECR 585, 593. 
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Member states.142 Especially in the areas of non-discrimination and the fundamental freedoms laid 
down in the EC Treaty, intersections with tax treaty law may occur.143   
 
Moreover, as the way in which taxes are levied will also influence international trade,144 provisions of 
the GATT and WTO Agreements are to be factored in, particularly in the area of non-discrimination; 
in some areas the distinction between tax law and trade law seems to be blurring.145 This holds true 
also for the relation between tax treaties and bilateral agreements concluded in the area of social 
security coordination, sometimes called “totalization agreements”.146 The issue of EU Member States 
moving gradually towards funding social security schemes from taxation leads to problems in the 
application of tax treaties with a view to EC legislation on the coordination of social security 
payments and benefits.147  
 
With the international context in mind, it is all the more important to advocate that terms used in 
treaties that correspond to the Model texts are to be seen as reflecting a common international 
consensus148 of the contracting states. This approach best serves the goal of determining the ordinary 
meaning of a treaty term in the international treaty context and serves the object and purpose of 
treaties concluded along the lines of the OECD Model Conventions. Moreover, it is the only way to 
bring about consistency in treaty application, which has been a key objective of the OECD. 
 
 
2.3. The role of domestic court decisions in interpretation 
 
A recent congress of the International Fiscal Association (IFA) dealt with the use of foreign court 
decisions by domestic courts in interpreting tax treaties in more detail than is possible in the present 
context.149 The OECD as well as its predecessor, the OEEC, have stressed the desirability of uniform 
interpretation of tax treaty provisions patterned on the OECD Model text. Therefore, unilateral 
administrative rulings, parliamentary materials or statements by a treaty partner’s taxation authorities 
per se cannot be decisive in treaty interpretation. Nevertheless, such materials are useful as evidencing 
the respective party’s expectations and understanding of the terms of the treaty at the time of 
conclusion, which can help to clarify the common international consensus expressed in common 
treaty language.   
 
Caution must be exercised nevertheless where such materials bear on substantive treaty provisions 
resulting from bilateral negotiations. These are extrinsic materials, which, according to Art. 32 of the 
                                                 
142 The ECJ has consistently held that although “direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Community, the 
powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law”. See, for example, C-
279/93 (Schumacker), m.no. 21; C-80/94 (Wielockx), m.no. 16. 
143 For an extensive analysis of the fundamental freedoms, see Barnard, The Substantive Law of the European Union: The Four 
Freedoms (2004). A concise account of the impact of non-discrimination rules of the EC Treaty on national tax systems is given in 
Lang/Schuch/Staringer, Die Diskriminierungsverbote im Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2006). An evaluation of 
problems at the intersection of international tax law and EC law can be found in Lang/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) Tax Treaty Law and 
EC Law (2007). 
144 Schön, “World Trade Organization Law and Tax Law”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation July 2004, p. 283. 
145 Li, “Relationship Between International Trade Law and National Tax Policy: Case Study of China”, Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation February 2005, p. 77. For more insight into this topic, see Lang/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) WTO and Direct 
Taxation (2005). 
146 A comparative analysis from the perspective of numerous countries can be found in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions 
and Social Security Conventions (2006). For general considerations on distinguishing the areas of international tax law and 
international social security law, see K. Vogel, “Internationales Sozialrecht und Internationales Steuerrecht im Vergleich”, in 
Ruland et al. (eds.) Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats, liber amicorum Hans F. Zacher, pp. 1173 et seq. 
147 See Pieters, Social Security, Taxation, and European Integration (1992) p. 235. 
148 Cf. Edwardes-Ker at p. 3. See also Prokisch, “Does it Make Sense if We Speak of an ‘International Tax Language’?”, in K. 
Vogel (ed.), Interpretation of Tax Law and Treaties and Transfer Pricing in Japan and Germany, Series on International Taxation 
(1998) p. 103 (104). Similar views are held in Rest, pp. 179 et seq., and in K. Vogel, “The Influence of the OECD Commentaries on 
Treaty Interpretation”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2000, p. 612 (616). 
149 See further Bulletin for International Taxation “Tax Treaty Monitor” of January 2009, p.4, as well as the extensive study of this 
topic provided by David A. Ward, “Use of Foreign Court Decisions in Interpreting Tax Treaties”, in G. Maisto (ed.) Courts and Tax 
Treaty Law, IBFD (2007). 
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VCLT, may only be used to interpret the treaty in cases of doubt. Justice Graham Hill, judge of the 
Federal Court of Australia, noted that 
 
[i]f the language of the treaty itself is clear, there should in any event be no reason to access extrinsic material.… 
[S]ince most double taxation treaties follow, although with some modification, one or other of the model 
conventions [US or OECD Model], most usually the OECD Model, and since the model conventions are issued 
with a commentary, recourse may be had to that commentary in interpreting a tax treaty clause which adopts the 
model or even in interpreting a clause which departs from the model. Where a state has filed reservations to the 
commentary or made particular comments concerning a particular commentary, clearly such reservations or 
comments would necessarily be relevant to the interpretation of a particular treaty which adopted the model in a 
relevant respect.150   
 
Since the vast majority of tax treaties concluded worldwide is based on the OECD Model texts, 
treaties regularly share identical or closely similar terminology, leaving the respective parties with 
shared interpretive challenges. A contracting party will usually monitor the other party’s domestic 
court decisions that are of import to treaty application.   
 
Baker has taken the position that courts should follow decisions of authorities of other states regarding 
treaty interpretation, “unless they are convinced that the other decisions are incorrect.”151 While there 
is no explicit legal basis for such practice in the VCLT, it is a common practice in international law 
when dealing with multinational treaties to refer to foreign court decisions so as to derive a common 
interpretation.   
 
Moreover, from a practical standpoint it is feasible to accord weight to the interpretation of similar 
treaty provisions in other countries. This goes beyond the need for common interpretation of a treaty 
as between its contracting parties: If a contracting party has concluded treaties with other nations that 
employ the same terminology, administrative rulings and court decisions concerning the interpretation 
of these treaties, albeit not binding on courts in the other contracting state, should be considered in 
interpretation. As tax treaties result from specific negotiations between two contracting parties, the 
argument for universal interpretation of treaty terms appears to be less strong than in the case of 
multilateral treaties. The idea of a multilateral convention to prevent international double taxation was 
first expressed within the League of Nations.152 In 1931, proposals for the text of a Draft Plurilateral 
Convention were presented by the experts of the League of Nations Fiscal Committee.153 All efforts in 
this vein went unheeded and were eventually disregarded by the OECD as unlikely in practice.154 
Nevertheless, the widespread adherence to the OECD Model texts in treaties around the globe is 
evidence of a common conceptual consensus that takes the process of treaty interpretation beyond a 
mere analysis of bilateral bargaining positions.   
 
Rosenbloom, contrary to Baker’s view, argued that those responsible for interpreting a treaty must 
ascertain and implement the treaty bargain rather than develop an approach that will reduce all treaties 
                                                 
150 Justice Graham Hill, “The Interpretation of Double Taxation Agreements – The Australian Experience”, Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 2003, 320 (324). 
151 Baker, Commentary, C-28, note 3. 
152 See League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Committee (1929), 
under Chapter V.: “The Committee unanimously agreed that bilateral conventions only constitute a partial solution of the problem 
of double taxation. Though recognizing that this solution appears at the present time in most cases to be the only possible one, the 
Committee felt that it should always be borne in mind that multilateral conventions would be better calculated to secure the desired 
unity of method and principle. It therefore thinks that an endeavour should be made to conclude such conventions as soon as 
agreement, even on a limited scale, seems to be possible.”  
153 League of Nations Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Work of the Third Session of the Committee, 
C.415.M.171.1931.II.A, Geneva, 6 June 1931, Appendix I: Draft Plurilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation 
of Certain Categories of Income; Appendix II: Draft Plurilateral Convention “A” for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of 
Certain Categories of Income; Appendix III: Draft Plurilateral Convention “B”.  
154 See point C, m.no. 37-40 of the 2003 OECD Model Commentary on the Income and Capital MC, in particular under 40: “[T]here 
are no reasons to believe that the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention involving all Member countries could now be 
considered practicable. The Committee therefore considers that bilateral conventions are still a more appropriate way to ensure the 
elimination of double taxation at the international level.” The multilateral approach has been successful as regards the Nordic 
countries; see the Nordic Convention on Income and Capital of 23 September 1996, effective 1 January 1998 (replacing 1989 
Convention), concluded between Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
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to common themes.155 While this reflects the general position of the US Treasury and in fact any 
nation’s treaty negotiating body, common themes do exist in the form of the OECD Model and 
Commentaries as well as the US Model and Technical Explanation. Courts have not limited 
themselves to references to treaty decisions of the treaty partner: The Federal Court of Appeals in 
Canada, for example, referred to US court decisions in interpreting the treaty between Canada and 
China,156 and invoked a UK decision to interpret a Canada–US treaty.157  
 
In another decision, the Canadian Court of Appeals noted with respect to interpreting the Canada–US 
treaty: 
 
While it is true that this Court has the right to interpret the Canada-United States Tax Convention and Protocol 
itself, and is in no way bound by the interpretation given to it by the United States Treasury, the result would be 
unfortunate if it were interpreted differently in the two countries where this would lead to double taxation.158   
 
International business appears to transcend even the fundamental legal distinction between “common 
law” and “civil law” countries. For instance, the New Zealand Tax Court cited a decision of the 
German Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof) in a case regarding the New Zealand–UK income tax 
treaty;159  the US Tax Court,160 interpreting the US–Japan tax treaty, referred to and adopted the 
reasoning of a German court decision regarding the Germany–Netherlands treaty. 
 
Where domestic court decisions contain a sound analysis that considers the international context of 
the treaty language, interpretive results can be of value for the interpretation of other treaties that were 
concluded adopting the Model Treaty language. While court decisions of one country are certainly not 
binding on another, they have played and continue to play a crucial role in the formation and further 
clarification of an international tax treaty system that operates using a common international tax 
language. 
 
 
2.4. The case for an international tax language 
 
Prokisch noted that “in case of interpreting tax treaties we must read Article 31(1) as follows: a term 
must be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to it by international tax 
language.”161 He defines “international tax language” as “the common international understanding of 
terms which are used within the formulation of tax treaties.”162 
 
The view that tax treaty language is an “international tax language” has been explicitly confirmed by 
courts in the United Kingdom,163 India,164 New Zealand,165 the Netherlands166 and South Africa.167 In 
Indofood International Finance Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase NA, London Branch,168 the Dutch court held 
that the term “beneficial ownership” used in the interest and dividend articles has an “international 
                                                 
155 Proceedings of the New York University Fortieth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation (1982). 
156 Quig Gong Kli v. The Queen, 94 DTC  6059.  
157 The Queen v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 81 DTC 5115. 
158 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. The Queen, 76 DTC 6120, at 6135. 
159 CIR v. United Dominican Trust, 197331 NZTC 61-028. 
160 Taisei Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 104 TC 535 (1995). 
161 Prokisch in K. Vogel (ed.), Interpretation of Tax Law and Treaties and Transfer Pricing in Japan and Germany, Series on 
International Taxation (1998) p. 103 (106). Opp. Pijl, p. 259, at note No. 21: “The interpretation method under which a term is 
explained as a general concept of ‘international tax language’ is, in the author’s opinion, not sustainable, considering the text of Art. 
3(2) of the OECD Model.” 
162 Prokisch, id., at p. 104. 
163 In Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society, Lord Radcliffe noted: “The language employed in this agreement is what may 
be called international tax language and … such categories as ‘enterprise’, ‘industrial or commercial profits’ and ‘permanent 
establishment’ have no exact counterpart in the taxing code of the UK.” 
164 See M. Butani, “India – Tax Treaty Interpretation”, Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2004, No. 1, pp. 56 et seq. (62). 
165 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v JFP Energy Incorporated (1990) 3 NZLR, at 536. 
166 E.g. Hoge Raad, Beslissingen in belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak (BNB), 1991/248. 
167 Regarding the South Africa–Switzerland Income Tax Treaty (1967), see the case Secretary for Inland Revenue v. L.J. Downing, 
Natal Income Tax Special Court, Case No. 6737, decision of 27 October 1972. 
168 Court of Appeal, decision of 2 March 2006, 8 ITLR 653 (2006) STC 1195. 
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fiscal meaning”. Courts around the world have in principle shown recognition of an international 
common understanding expressed in tax treaties.169 This common international consensus has its 
foundation in the Model Tax Treaties and Commentaries developed by international bodies such as 
the League of Nations, the OEEC as predecessor to the OECD, and the US Model Treaties.170  
 
In a 1957 note by its chairman on the aims of the Fiscal Committee – classified as confidential and 
intended to be discussed at an ensuing session of the FC – it is stated: 
 
From the very outset, the work of the Committee has been governed by the question whether it would not be 
possible to find, from the point of view of the demarcation of the individual countries` taxing powers, a policy 
acceptable to all O.E.E.C. countries.… This advantage becomes particularly obvious if common definitions are 
agreed upon.171 … The question might be considered of replacing certain clauses in existing conventions for the 
avoidance of double taxation – for instance definitions – by a uniform text prepared by the Committee, of course 
only in so far as the Committee’s conclusions were not already taken into account when the conventions were 
drafted.172 
 
This confirms that certain concepts and interpretive conclusions can be presumed as a starting point in 
interpretation where the contracting parties have adopted the OECD Model texts. 
 
The conjecture of a set of autonomous international concepts in tax treaties already existed when the 
foundations of today’s tax treaty network were laid. Mitchell B. Carroll, who was a member of the 
League of Nations Committee that prepared the 1928 Draft Conventions and who later became the 
first Honorary President of the IFA, appears to be one of the first to note that the terms used in tax 
treaties are expressed in “international tax language”,173 thus recognizing that terms used in tax 
treaties are to be seen autonomously in their international context.174  
 
“International tax language” employs open formulations and contains very few definitions. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion of tax treaties along the lines of the OECD Model Conventions warrants 
for them to be seen as encapsulating a compromise175 in the sense of a common international 
consensus among governments. Although it will in many cases be the “lowest common 
denominator”,176 such a common basis can be decisive in cases of uncertainty.  
 
In 1927, Pasquale d’Aroma, the Chairman of the Committee of Technical Experts that prepared the 
first Draft Conventions under the auspices of the League of Nations, noted: 
 
[H]aving regard to the diversity of the legislative system represented in the Committee, and the necessity for 
finding formulae capable of acceptance by everyone, it will be recognised that the experts were bound to confine 
themselves to indicating general rules, leaving particular points of difficulty to be dealt with – in the spirit of the 
accepted general principles – by those on whom the task of negotiating the bilateral conventions will ultimately 
fall.177   
 
                                                 
169 See further Prokisch, “Does it Make Sense if We Speak of an ‘International Tax Language’?”, in K. Vogel (ed.), Interpretation 
of Tax Law and Treaties and Transfer Pricing in Japan and Germany, Series on International Taxation (1998) p. 103 (103). 
170 Vogel/Prokisch, General Report p. 62, speaking of an international fiscal language, state: “Indeed, the Model Conventions by 
the League of Nations, the OECD and the United Nations must be considered steps in the development towards such an 
international language of specified terms.” 
171 OEEC, Fiscal Committee, Note by the Chairman on the aims of the Fiscal Committee, Paris, 23 January 1957, TFD/FC/10, p. 2. 
172 Id., p. 4. 
173 1935, 588; Carroll, Global Perspectives of an International Tax Lawyer (1978). 
174 Similar views are held in Rest pp. 179 et seq. See also Prokisch in K. Vogel (ed.) at p. 104: “International tax language is the 
common international understanding of terms which are used within the formulation of tax treaties.”  
175 Messere, European Taxation 1993, p. 246: “The compromise approach inherent in getting the consensus necessary to reach any 
agreed model has so far mostly prevailed, but this flexibility causes much uncertainty.” See also Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty 
Interpretation (1995) Chap. 7, p. 14: “[Tax treaty definitions] typically follow a model which neither signatory State may have 
analysed in-depth. They often represent a compromise between two States.” 
176 Cf. the Report submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations: “After long discussion, 
we finally arrived at agreement on certain fundamental points.” (League of Nations Double Taxation and Tax Evasion (1925) Part I, 
m.no. 3). 
177 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion, Covering Letter addressed by the Chairman of the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation 
and Tax Evasion to the Chairman of the Financial Committee of 12 April 1927. 
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Similar language can be found in the subsequent Report containing several drafts for possible Double 
Tax Conventions: 
 
The Meeting endeavoured to reach complete agreement on all essential points.  In view, however, of the diversity 
of fiscal systems, the differences in national economic interests and the divergent conceptions concerning both 
theory and practice, unanimous agreement could not be reached in regard to all the questions which had to be dealt 
with. Points on which complete understanding could not be achieved have been left for decision to any States 
desiring in the future to negotiate bilateral treaties. The Meeting, however, earnestly strove to reduce to a minimum 
the number and importance of questions thus left open. 
 
Avi-Yonah has called the current international tax regime “a miracle because taxes are the last topic 
on which one would expect sovereign nations to reach a consensus.”178 Moreover, he argues that to 
the extent that there is opinio juris on the part of states complying with international tax rules laid 
down in treaties, it can be argued that the rule amounts to customary international law which can be 
used to ascertain the underlying purposes of treaties.179 While this line of thought has not been 
explicitly adopted in jurisprudence, courts worldwide have increasingly recognized the existence of an 
“international tax language”, especially in cases where undefined treaty terms are unknown to the 
domestic tax system of the state applying the treaty. A poignant statement in this vein has been given 
by the High Court of Australia with regard to the term “enterprise”: “[A]n expression such as the 
word ‘enterprise’ may not have an exact counterpart in domestic tax laws, being part of an 
‘international tax language’.”180  
 
Van den Tempel181 has argued that the number of definitions in the OECD Model Conventions should 
be increased to establish international definitions valid across domestic legal systems.182 It is desirable 
to alter existing definitions in the Models so as to minimize referral to domestic tax law. In fact, this 
has been done as regards the term “interest” in Art. 11 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and Capital.183 However, in terms of including more definitions in the Model Conventions, 
there is a danger that this might run counter to their objective of facilitating compromise among 
contracting states. The Models do not aim at providing comprehensive definitions. By the same token, 
it would be virtually impossible to cover all possible questions of detail that might arise in different 
nations. This holds true also for tax treaties negotiated bilaterally among contracting states.   
 
Sasseville stated that more precision in tax treaties would hold great dangers, “as taxpayers and courts 
might logically assume that to the extent treaty negotiators have taken care to address one narrow 
issue, they were not as concerned by other narrow issues on which the MC is silent.”184 This is a valid 
point considering that a deluge of definitions in the Model Conventions would render them difficult to 
apply. 
 
                                                 
178 Avi-Yonah, Tex. L. Rev. 1996, p. 1303.  
179 For examples evidencing customary international law in taxation issues, see Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 
University of Michigan, available http://ssrn.com/abstract=516382. 
180 Thiel v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, decision of 22 August 1990, 21 ATR 531, at 537. 
181 Van den Tempel, Relief from Double Taxation (1967) p. 54. 
182 See also the suggestion in H. Vogel, “Aktuelle Fragen bei der Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, BB No. 21, p. 
1021 (1021). See also Vogel/Prokisch, General Report, p. 55 (84), who argue that “Model Conventions and specific Double 
Taxation Conventions should increasingly define terms used, and thus contribute to the development of an “international tax 
language”. 
183 Para. 3 of Art. 11 in the 1963 version of the Model read: “The term ‘interest’ as used in this Article means income from 
Government securities, bonds or debentures, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate 
in profits, and debt-claims of every kind as well as all other income assimilated to income from money lent by the taxation law of 
the State in which the income arises.” In the revised Model of 1977, this was altered to the effect that “interest” is defined 
autonomously for purposes of the Model: “The term ‘interest’ as used in this Article means income from debt-claims of every kind, 
whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's profits, and in particular, 
income from government securities and income from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such 
securities, bonds or debentures. Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the purpose of this Article.” 
See also M. Lang, ÖStZ 1989, No. 1/2, p. 11 (15). 
184 Sasseville, “The Role of Tax Treaties in the 21st Century”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2002, p. 247.  
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One suggestion might be to elaborate on the definitions currently contained in the OECD “Glossary of 
Tax Terms”,185 an international tax dictionary drawn upon by tax practitioners and courts alike. At 
present, a disclaimer made at the outset of the glossary points out: “Explanations on the terms are very 
condensed and may not be complete. They are not considered to necessarily reflect the official 
position of the OECD in interpreting international tax terms, for example, in the tax treaty context.” 
 
Definitions by the experts in the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs might improve the chances of 
further approximation of concepts in the various national tax systems.186 Nevertheless, an elaboration 
of definitions on the part of the OECD in the sense of an “encyclopaedia” providing official 
statements as to what the terms in treaties mean would not be a cure-all for conflicts among nations in 
the interpretation of terms. Although a worldwide approximation of international tax terms would do 
great service to the attainment of the object and purpose of the OECD Model Conventions, such 
approximation cannot be achieved through an increase in definitions, no matter how elaborate they 
may be, as they can never be universally applicable.  
 
Treaty application should strive for an internationally consistent interpretation of terms and use all 
available materials so as to arrive at an autonomous meaning “from within” the international treaty.187 
Terms in treaties that correspond to the wording of the OECD Model Conventions are to be 
interpreted against the backdrop of the common international consensus reflected therein, as 
manifested by international tax language.   
 
Avery Jones rightly noted: “Although the particular treaty being interpreted is a bilateral one, it 
should be borne in mind that the treaty was not drafted solely with the particular countries` tax 
systems in mind when it follows the wording of the Model.”188  
 
 
PART II. The structure and workings of Art. 2 of the OECD Model Conventions 
 
Art. 2 of the OECD Model Conventions provides a system whereby the taxes covered under the treaty 
are determined. The framework provided in this article is largely adhered to in treaty practice. In the 
application of tax treaties, the mode to ascertain whether certain payments are within treaty coverage 
is therefore generally analogous. However, as automated as the adoption and application of this 
provision seems to be, it does prompt unclear points that have resulted in differences of opinion 
among contracting parties.  
 
The preliminary remarks to the OECD Model Commentaries on Art. 2189 give the following broad 
explanation of the structure of this Article:  
 
The Article is intended:  
– to make the terminology and nomenclature relating to the taxes covered by the Convention more acceptable 
and precise;  
– to ensure identification of the Contracting States' taxes covered by the Convention;  
                                                 
185 The “Glossary of Tax Terms” has been made available by the OECD at http://www.oecd.org. 
186 There is an ongoing academic debate between proponents of global tax harmonization and proponents of unilateral solutions, 
boiling down to the question whether there might be such a thing as a “world tax regime”, a worldwide single set of international 
tax rules. For purposes of this treatise, it would lead too far to deal with these issues. See Brauner, “An International Tax Regime in 
Crystallization”, Tax L. Rev. 2003, Vol. 56, p. 259; Rosenbloom, “International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax System’”, 
Tax L. Rev. 1999, Vol. 53, p. 137. 
187 M. Lang, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und innerstaatliches Recht (1992) p. 105, arguing that an interpretation using all 
available materials in connection with the tax treaty to interpret the treaty from “within itself” is unlikely to produce cases where 
such international meaning cannot be derived.  
188 Avery Jones, “Problems of Categorizing Income for Tax Treaty Purposes”, in van Raad (ed.) International and Comparative 
Taxation – Essays in Honour of Klaus Vogel (2002) p. 9 (18). 
189 OECD, Commentaries on the Articles of the Income and Capital Model Convention of 15 July 2005, Commentary on Art. 2, 
m.no.1; Commentary on the Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts Model Convention of 3 June 1982, Commentary on Art. 2, point 
I., m.no. 1. 
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– to widen as much as possible the field of application of the Convention by including as far as possible, and in 
harmony with the domestic laws of the Contracting States, the taxes imposed by their political subdivisions or 
local authorities;   
– to avoid the necessity of concluding a new Convention whenever the Contracting States' domestic laws are 
modified; and   
– to provide for the periodic exchange of information about changes which have been made in their respective 
taxation laws. 
 
These formulations originate from the exact same wording contained in the Commentary on a Draft 
Art. 2 adopted by the OECD Fiscal Committee in 1957190 and have been used ever since in the official 
OECD Commentaries to describe the general object and purpose of Art. 2.  
 
Until 1963, when the Draft Conventions of the OECD Fiscal Committee were turned into “full-
fledged” Model Conventions, this basic outline of Art. 2 was followed by the statement: “The clauses 
are framed as simply and comprehensibly as possible and in a similar manner for taxes on income and 
capital and taxes on estates and inheritances.”191 This statement is still accurate with respect to the 
present Model versions of Art. 2.192 
 
In the following, closer consideration will be given to the four paragraphs of Art. 2, separately as well 
as with a view to their interconnectedness. Special attention will be given to the Reports of experts 
appointed to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs by the Governments of Member countries.  
 
At a session of the OEEC FC in 1956, the agenda was laid down to study, inter alia, “the listing and 
definition of taxes on income and capital”.193 This was followed by the institution of WP No. 3, 
consisting of Delegates from Italy and Switzerland, who submitted, as a result of their studies of the 
existing tax treaties, a Report containing Draft Conventions (see Annex I) and Commentaries 
thereto.194  Following this Report, a Draft Article was adopted by the FC, the formulations of which 
are virtually identical to those in the 1963 OECD Model Conventions. (Annex I).  
 
In 1967, the OECD Fiscal Committee established WP No. 30195 and appointed the experts from 
Austria and Switzerland, inter alia, to analyse existing treaties and deal with difficulties encountered 
in the application of Art. 2. The considerations in the 1969 Report of WP No. 30196 shed further light 
on the texts of the 1963 Model Conventions and Commentaries and served as a guideline in the 
drafting of the 1977 Income and Capital Model Conventions.  
 
The considerations contained in the above-cited OECD WP Reports have in principle lost none of 
their actuality with regard to current treaty practice, as Art. 2 has seen no fundamental changes in 
structure and wording since its 1963 version (cf. Annex I). 
 
                                                 
190 FC(57)1, Paris, 17 October 1957, on p. 4. 
191 FC(57)1, p. 4; OEEC, Report of the Fiscal Committee on its Work, FC(68)2 (1st Revision) Part II, Annex A, m.no.2. The texts, 
in substance, differ only in two aspects: Until 1963, Art. 2 contained a Para. 5 stating: “The competent authorities of the two States 
shall by mutual agreement clarify any doubts which may arise as to the taxes to which the Convention ought to apply.” This is in 
line with Para. 3 of Art. 25 (Mutual Agreement) and was thus deleted in the context of Art. 2. The second major difference is that 
gifts were not included in the Estates and Inheritances MC before they were incorporated in the 1982 MC. 
192 These older versions of Art. 2, in substance, differ only in two aspects: Until 1963, Art. 2 contained a Para. 5 stating: “The 
competent authorities of the two States shall by mutual agreement clarify any doubts which may arise as to the taxes to which the 
Convention ought to apply.” This is in line with Para. 3 of Art. 25 (Mutual Agreement) and was thus deleted in the context of Art. 2. 
The second major difference is that gifts were not included in the Estates and Inheritances MC before they were incorporated in the 
1982 MC. 
193 FC/M(56)1(Prov.)3. 
194 OEEC, WP No. 3 of the Fiscal Committee (Italy–Switzerland) on the Listing and Definition of Taxes on Income and Capital 
(including Taxes on Estates and Inheritances) which should be covered by Double Taxation Agreements, Paris, 10 January 1957, 
FC/WP 3(57)1. 
195 OECD, Fiscal Committee, Summary record of the 27th Session held at the Château de la Muette, Paris, 2 October, 1967, 
FC/M(67)2, m.no.1: “The Fiscal Committee set up Working Party No. 30 to examine Articles 2, 3, 6, 13 and 22 of the O.E.C.D. 
Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital 1963 in order to complement and improve these Articles and to study 
problems arising in connection.” 
196 OECD, WP No. 30 of the Fiscal Committee (Austria–Switzerland), Paris, 27 June 1969, FC/WP 30(69)1. 
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1. The general description in Art. 2(1) and (2) 
 
In both OECD Model Conventions, Art. 2(1) states in a general manner the scope of application of the 
treaty, namely “taxes on income and on capital” and “taxes on estates, inheritances, and on gifts”.197 
As can be deduced from the wording that the Convention “shall apply to” said taxes, the function of 
this statement is more than just an introductory headline; it aims to set a general boundary for the 
cases of double taxation it is designed to prevent. Art. 2(1) is to be read in conjunction with Art. 2(2) 
since it enlarges on the statement made in paragraph 1.  
 
The OECD Commentaries on Art. 2(2) in both Model Conventions state that this paragraph “gives a 
definition” of the taxes covered. However, the “definition”198 of the taxes covered in paragraph 2 
bears more resemblance to an observation than a definition: Taxes on income and on capital are 
described as “all taxes imposed on total income, on total capital, or on elements of income or of 
capital….” Indeed, a certain tautology199 can be detected, similar to the circular definition of an 
elephant stating, “An elephant is large and grey and lives in a herd of elephants.”200  
 
The description in Art. 2(2) of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC is slightly more expressive: 
Taxes on estates and inheritances are described to be “taxes imposed by reason of death in the form of 
taxes on the corpus of the estate, of taxes on inheritances, of transfer duties, or of taxes on donationes 
mortis causa”, whereas “[t]here shall be regarded as taxes on gifts taxes imposed on transfers inter 
vivos only because such transfers are made for no, or less than full, consideration.” Greater detail of 
this description in comparison to the description in the Income and Capital MC can be explained by 
the fact that the area of donationes mortis causa and donationes inter vivos is per se a special matter 
as opposed to the broad field of income and capital taxation primarily relied on in most countries.201 
 
With respect to Art. 2(1) and (2), the Report of WP No. 30 states: 
 
Both paragraphs together describe in a fundamental and general way, but without going into details, the taxes to 
which the Convention applies. These taxes are then – provided they are in force at the time of signature of the 
Convention – enumerated by note in the lists of paragraph 3; the special purpose of this paragraph in its present form 
is merely to illustrate what was said generally in paragraphs 1 and 2.”202   
 
The Report also observes that “the general descriptions given in paragraphs 1 and 2 are not too precise 
and might probably be called to be rather vague.”203  
 
Nevertheless, the important role of paragraphs 1 and 2 cannot be overestimated: The adoption of an 
international treaty entails that common solutions are to be found on the basis of the text that has been 
agreed upon. By adopting the broad terminology of paragraphs 1 and 2 in their treaty text, the parties 
have expressed objective intent as to their being bound accordingly, in line with the declared purpose 
of Art. 2 to “widen as much as possible the field of application of the Convention”. This explains why 
states will often choose to omit paragraphs 1 and 2 in the text of Art. 2 and limit their scope of 
agreement to such taxes as are explicitly listed.  
 
                                                 
197 The OECD Commentary to the Income and Capital MC on Art. 2(1) states: “This paragraph defines the scope of application of 
the Convention: taxes on income and on capital…”. The Commentary to the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model provides: “This 
paragraph establishes the scope of the Convention as to the taxes covered, namely: taxes on estates and inheritances and taxes on 
gifts.” 
198 The OECD Commentaries on Para. 2 state that this paragraph “gives a definition” of the taxes covered in the respective Model 
Convention. 
199 Cf. also K. Vogel, speaking of a tautology in his Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 30. 
200 See Williams/Morse, Davies: Principles of Tax Law (2004) p. 3; the authors employ this notion to illustrate the difficulty of 
defining the term “tax”. 
201 The substance of the concept of “taxes on income and capital” and “taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts” will be dealt 
with elaborately in Part III of this study. Further elaboration in this vein does not serve the present purpose of evaluating the 
functional framework provided in Art. 2.  
202 FC/WP 30(69)1, p. 5, m.no. 7. 
203 Id., m.no. 9. 
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2. The list of taxes in Art. 2(3) 
 
The idea of a blank list to be filled in by the contracting states as to their respective taxes covered 
under the treaty has taken centre stage in Model Tax Conventions ever since the very first Drafts of 
the League of Nations. The regular text of the OECD Income and Capital MC provides for an 
enumeration of taxes that is merely of illustrative character, as clearly indicated by the phrase “in 
particular”. The listing in the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, on the other hand, is exhaustive. 
This could be explained by the fact that the field of taxes on estates, inheritances or gifts is much 
more contained, whereas taxes in the area of income and capital existing in a given state will regularly 
be numerous; in particular, taxes on income have in many states functioned as an “engine of the 
revenue”204 and have taken numerous forms and variations. 
 
The wording “in particular”, indicating that the list is not exhaustive, can be found in treaties in the 
area of income and capital as early as 1925.205 Looking to the roots of tax treaty practice (cf. Annex 
II), the inconsistency with respect to exhaustive or non-exhaustive listings becomes obvious and it is 
equally prevalent in the current tax treaty network. Earlier treaties sometimes coupled a general 
description of the taxes covered with an express provision for agreement of the contracting states as to 
the taxes covered. US and UK treaties have had a close connection to the League of Nations Drafts206 
and thus regularly provide for an exhaustive listing of the taxes covered.  
 
The Commentary on Art. 2(3) states: “The list is not exhaustive. It serves to illustrate the preceding 
paragraphs of the Article. In principle, however, it will be a complete list of taxes imposed in each 
State at the time of signature and covered by the Convention.”207 As Lang has pointed out,208 the 
statement seems to a certain extent contradictory: On the one hand, the list is expressly said not to be 
complete but, on the other hand, it should “in principle” be seen to be exhaustive.  
 
The roots of this formulation in the Commentary can be traced back to the work of WP No. 3 of the 
OEEC Fiscal Committee. The Italian Delegate noted in his Commentary:  
 
The object of the list provided for in the third paragraph of the draft is clear. Such a list gives the Contracting 
States and each taxpayer an accurate idea of the field of application of the Convention. The Italian Delegate 
considers that the list provided should not be irrevocable but should merely serve to illustrate the preceding 
paragraphs of the draft. However, in view of the high qualifications and experience of the persons whose duty it is 
to conduct the preliminary discussions for a Convention, it is safe to say that in practice the lists are complete and 
authoritative for the interpretation and application of the Conventions.209   
 
The Swiss Delegate, with respect to the identical text in Para. 4 of his Draft (cf. Annex I), is less 
wordy: “Paragraph 4 lists the taxes imposed by each of the two States at the time of signature of the 
Convention.” The Commentary to the Draft eventually adopted by the Council (cf. Annex I) supports 
the explanations of the Italian Delegate in stating as follows:  
 
Paragraph 3 lists the taxes in force at the time of signature of the Convention. The list is not exhaustive. It serves to 
illustrate the preceding paragraphs of this Article. In principle, however, it will be a full list of the taxes imposed in 
each State at the time of signature and covered by the Convention.210 
 
                                                 
204 Plehn, “Review of The Income Tax. A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad by 
Edwin R.A. Seligman”, Am. Ec. Rev. 1915, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 115. 
205 See, e.g., Art. 1 of the 1925 Direct Taxes Convention and Final Protocol between Italy and the German Reich, (published 31 
October 1925; effective 1 January 1926).  
206 Flick, “Zur Auslegung von Normen des Internationalen Steuerrechts“, in Felix (ed.) Von der Auslegung und Anwendung der 
Steuergesetze (1958) p. 160. 
207 Para. 6 of the Income and Capital MC Commentary. 
208 M. Lang, “‘Taxes Covered’ – What is a ‘Tax’ according to Art. 2 OECD Model Convention?”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2005, p. 220.  
209 FC/WP 3(57)1, Commentary by the Italian Delegate, under Point C., at m.no. 6. 
210 OEEC, Fiscal Committee, Listing and Definition of Taxes on Income and Capital, Including Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, 
which should be covered by Double Taxation Agreements, Paris, 17 October 1957, FC(57)1, Commentary on the Draft Art., Point 
II., m.no. 9. 
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The non-exhaustive listing obviously accounts for an assumption on the part of the contracting parties 
that despite their respective “high qualifications and experience”, they may forget to enumerate 
certain taxes, due to the fact that there will regularly be a broad field of taxes in the area of income 
and capital in the various states. This is confirmed by WP No. 30, which sees problems in an 
exclusive listing in that “[a] wrong decision about the character of a tax or ‘forgetting’ a surcharge 
would mean that those levies were not within the scope of the Convention, even if later on both 
Contracting Parties admitted that the tax in question should have been enumerated in the list.”211 
 
Lang argued that such forgetfulness can plausibly be presumed only with regard to taxes that are not 
major revenue-raising taxes of the respective state, because treaty negotiators can be deemed to be 
extremely careful to include such major taxes.212 Büge makes this argument with respect to taxes that 
have had a firm and substantially stable place in the taxation system of the state.213 This assumption, 
although it will regularly be true in practice, is not generally supported by WP No. 30: 
 
The list of taxes will also give in principle a complete picture of all taxes imposed in each State at the time of 
signature and covered by the Convention. However, taxes not enumerated in paragraph 3 but qualifying for a test 
under paragraphs 1 and 2 are – under the present O.E.C.D. concept – nevertheless within the scope of the 
Convention.  
 
Thus, if the parties incorporate broad general descriptions in the sense of Art. 2(1) and (2), coupled 
with a merely illustrative list of taxes covered, the objective intent can be seen to be of the character 
to “broaden as much as possible the scope of the Convention.” Although it is highly unlikely in 
practice (“in principle … it will be a complete list”), it is not generally ruled out that even major taxes 
on income and capital that are not mentioned in the non-exhaustive list may still come within the 
substantive scope of the treaty. In case of a dispute, unless it is established that the tax at issue was 
omitted purposely, the presumption should be that a tax omitted in the illustrative listing of Art. 2(3) 
will nevertheless be covered if it comes under the general descriptions of Art. 2(1) and (2). This 
approach best serves the purpose of Art. 2 to clarify the scope of the Convention:  Exclusions of a tax 
from the intended broad scope should be explicitly made cognizable by the contracting parties. 
 
Apart from ensuring, in connection with Art. 2(1) and (2), a broad scope of the treaty, the non-
exhaustive nature of paragraph 3 could also be seen to serve another function: Lang214 makes the point 
that treaty negotiations usually span a considerable period of time, involving several rounds of 
negotiations; this makes it difficult, in the event of changes in the tax law of each of the contracting 
states, to go back to issues that have already been discussed. Art. 2(3) could thus take account of 
events such as the introduction of a new tax in one or both of the states before the finalization of 
negotiations and signing of the treaty. There is no hint in the materials backing that this was, in fact, a 
consideration in the drafting of the Model text. The words “conclusion” and “signature” are used 
interchangeably throughout the materials, as well as in the current Commentaries. Still, whether this 
was intended or not, the non-exhaustive list will undeniably have this effect, which serves 
practicability in treaty negotiations and will generally be in the interest of the contracting parties. This 
is in line with the finding that the demonstrative listing was instituted to diminish cases of mutual 
consultation of the parties in unclear cases as to the taxes covered. 
 
 
3. Art. 2(3) relating to Paras. 1 and 2  
 
The general description of the taxes covered, alongside a list of taxes covered given by each of the 
contracting states, raises questions as to how these paragraphs are interrelated. The inclusion of a 
general description does not always go hand in hand with the adoption of a merely illustrative listing; 
for instance, the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC includes a general description despite the fact that 
                                                 
211 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 11. 
212 M. Lang, “Taxes Covered”,  p. 220. 
213 Büge in Becker/Höppner et al. (eds.), “Commentary on Art. 2(3)”, m.no. 35. 
214 M. Lang, “Taxes Covered”,  p. 220. 
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the list therein is of exclusive nature. Similarly, the 2006 US Model contains an exhaustive listing 
coupled with a general description.215 
 
Baker has stated that paras. 1 and 2 have no stand-alone significance within the structure of Art. 2.216 
Wassermeyer has argued that the list in para. 3 restrains the general descriptions in paras. 1 and 2, as 
it will in general be a complete listing.217  
 
This, however, begs the question why the abstract definitions do feature in the current Model texts. In 
conformity with the customary legal principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat,218 as well as with a 
view to the object and purpose of Art. 2 to “widen as much as possible the field of application of the 
Convention”, it cannot be assumed that paras. 1 and 2 are without substance.219  
 
The non-exhaustive list in Art. 2(3) cannot thus restrict the scope laid out in the wording of paras. 1 
and 2. If the parties have incorporated a general description equivalent to paras. 1 and 2, it will not 
suffice to look to para. 3 to determine the taxes covered. The parties can be held to their express 
consent on such broad coverage as expressed in the general description. If they wish to limit their 
commitment, they are free to do so, as is specifically recognized in the Income and Capital MC 
Commentary: 
 
Some Member countries do not include paragraphs 1 and 2 in their bilateral conventions. These countries prefer 
simply to list exhaustively the taxes in each country to which the Convention will apply, and clarify that the 
Convention will also apply to subsequent taxes that are similar to those listed.  
 
Countries that wish to follow this approach might use the following wording: 
‘1. The taxes to which the Convention shall apply are: 
a) (in State A): ........................  
b) (in State B): ........................’220  
 
With respect to the importance of paras. 1 and 2, WP No. 30 states: 
 
The omission of paragraphs 1 and 2 would primarily affect the position of paragraph 3: under the present scheme, 
the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the determination of the subject of the Convention goes with paragraphs 1 and 2; 
… [L]eaving out paragraphs 1 and 2 would mean that the scope of the Convention is determined solely by the list 
of taxes in paragraph 3; and this would imply that the enumeration of taxes therein must be exhaustive.…221   
 
This supports the view that paras. 1 and 2 play an independent role in the determination of taxes 
covered. It also indicates that Art. 2(4) (analysed in more detail below) plays an equally important 
role irrespective of whether the list in Art. 2(3) is exhaustive or merely demonstrative. 
 
On its face, omitting paras. 1 and 2 and adopting an exhaustive listing seems to facilitate treaty 
application.  There are, however, serious pitfalls to this decision.   
 
WP No. 30 elaborates: 
 
If paragraphs 1 and 2 were omitted and the list of taxes was made exhaustive,… the scope of the Convention – at 
least as far as the ‘existing taxes’ are concerned – would then be described in a most precise form. But it should be 
borne in mind that the importance of an exhaustive list which determines for itself the subject of the Convention goes 
far beyond that of a list which serves only as illustration for a general formula. The elaboration of an exhaustive list 
would therefore cause much more problems and difficulties than the compilation of a list of the present paragraph 3. 
                                                 
215 See further infra in this chapter. 
216 Baker, Commentary, 2B.04: “Of themselves, these two paragraphs are of limited practical significance, but they are relevant 
when determining what constitute ‘identical or substantially similar’ taxes under paragraph (4).” 
217 Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung (2004) Commentary on Art. 2, m.no. 11. 
218 This principle, also called “principle of effectiveness”, was recognized by the ICJ in the 1966 YBILC, Vol. II, p. 219: “When a 
treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good 
faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted.” 
219 See also the argument to this effect in Sutter, “Der sachliche Anwendungsbereich des ErbSt-MA“, in Aigner et al. (eds.) 
Erbschaftssteuern und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002) p. 62. 
220 Point 6.1. of the Income and Capital MC Commentary to Para. 3 of Art. 2. 
221 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.nos. 7 and 9 (emphasis in the original text). 
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It would not be sufficient for the Contracting Parties to agree only on the principle that all taxes on income (capital) 
within the meaning of the general definition of paragraphs 1 and 2 should be covered by the Convention, but each 
Contracting Party would be obliged to scrutinize most carefully every single tax, accessory duty, charge, contribution 
and any other levy of any form of both Contracting States to find out whether such tax should be mentioned in the 
list.222  
 
In accordance with the objective intent expressed by the incorporation of general descriptions in the 
sense of paras. 1 and 2, these paragraphs should be seen to have importance in their own right, 
independently of the list in para. 3. Whether the tax at issue qualifies as a “tax on income and capital” 
under the treaty is to be determined also, but not exclusively, with a view to the illustrative listing the 
parties have provided. To prevent the broad coverage provided in paras. 1 and 2, the parties are free to 
lessen the substantive scope of their treaty – either by forgoing certain elements of the broad 
description of paras. 1 and 2,223 or by restricting the substantive scope to specifically enumerated 
taxes. In this respect, paras. 1 and 2 can be seen to preserve the broad scope of the Convention. 
 
One could make the argument that paras. 1 and 2 can also have a “restricting” function with respect to 
the enumerated taxes in para. 3. With respect to the exhaustive list in the Estates and Inheritances 
Model, Sutter argued that paras. 1 and 2 should be seen to “control” the exhaustive list in para. 3 in 
the sense that a tax listed in para. 3 that does not come under the general definitions should be seen to 
fall outside the scope of the treaty. He considers this necessary to prevent “excessive” amplification of 
the scope of the treaty.224   
 
To generally take such a view, however, would disregard the expressed consensus of the contracting 
parties. If the parties have agreed to list a certain tax, anyone applying the treaty has good reason to 
believe that this tax is covered, even if the general descriptions were not altered to this effect.225 This 
is expressly confirmed in the considerations of WP No. 30: 
 
The Working Party is aware of the fact that there might exist fiscal charges, fees or other levies with respect to which it 
could be doubtful whether they are ‘taxes on income (capital)’ within the meaning of the general definition given in 
paragraphs 1 and 2.… If those levies shall be brought under the Convention then it is – in the opinion of the Working 
Party – sufficient to enumerate such taxes by name in the list of taxes in paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 has quite obviously 
the power (although being principally an illustration to paragraphs 1 and 2) to amplify the scope of the Convention so 
that taxes and charges might be included in the Convention even if they were not considered to be ‘taxes on income 
(capital)’ within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2.226  
 
This result corresponds to the object and purpose of Art. 2 to provide for broad coverage. “Excessive” 
broadening in the sense that a treaty partner includes, in its domestic provisions regulating an 
enumerated tax, elements that are out of character with what the other partner could assume to be 
comprised in this tax, can be avoided only in accurately determining the objective intent of the parties. 
In the case of a non-exhaustive enumeration, there is a general presumption that the parties intended 
to retain broad coverage.  
 
Conversely, the mere exclusion of a tax from the list in Art. 2(3), be it exhaustive or demonstrative, 
cannot override the general description in paras. 1 and 2. WP 30 states: 
 
If … the Contracting States want to exclude in their bilateral negotiations certain taxes or charges which are or 
might probably be ‘taxes on income (capital)’ within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2, then it is – in the opinion 
of the Working Party – not sufficient to exclude such taxes or charges solely from the list of taxes in paragraph 3, 
but it is necessary to make express reference in the Article that those taxes and charges are excluded from the 
scope of the Convention. Only if the list of taxes in paragraph 3 was exhaustive, an exclusion of those taxes or 
charges from such list would for itself be sufficient.227 
 
                                                 
222 Id., m.no. 11. 
223 States frequently limit the scope of application to “taxes on income” by deleting the reference to “taxes on capital” in Paras. 1 
and 2.  
224 Sutter, Der sachliche Anwendungsbereich (2004) p. 64. 
225 M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (2005) p. 221. 
226 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no.40. 
227 Id., m.no. 41.  
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This appears to reaffirm the statement made at the outset of the Report to the effect that “taxes not 
enumerated in paragraph 3 but qualifying for a test under paragraphs 1 and 2 are – under the present 
O.E.C.D. concept – nevertheless within the scope of the Convention.”228 The statement clarifies that 
in the overall spirit of Art. 2, broad coverage under paras. 1 and 2 applies unless the parties have 
explicitly provided otherwise. If, for example, neither of the contracting states has mentioned a tax on 
capital in the list of para. 3, but the general description nevertheless mentions taxes on capital, such 
taxes will be seen to be covered under the treaty. 
 
If, however, the parties have explicitly stated in either para. 3 or paras. 1 and 2 that a certain tax is 
outside the scope of the treaty, this expression of consensus must prevail – as in the case where an 
“atypical” tax is explicitly listed in para. 3 or where the general description notes the exclusion of a 
certain type of levy. An illustrative example of the extent to which the parties will sometimes specify 
the substantive scope can be found in the 1994 Sweden–US Treaty.229 Art. 2 of this treaty provides: 
 
The existing taxes to which this Convention shall apply are: (a) in the United States: the Federal income taxes 
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (but excluding the accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company 
tax and social security taxes) and the excise taxes imposed on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers and with 
respect to private foundations. The Convention shall ,however, apply to the excise taxes imposed on insurance 
premiums paid to foreign insurers only to the extent that the risks covered by such premiums are not reinsured with a 
person not entitled to the benefits of this or any other convention which exempts these taxes….   
 
The development of the US Model Income Tax Convention is interesting in this context. While the 
1981 US Model text did not include a general description of taxes covered, the new US Model 
Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006 tracks the formulations of paras. 1 and 2 of the OECD 
Model.230 The Technical Explanation to the new Model states: 
 
Paragraph 1 identifies the category of taxes to which the Convention applies. Paragraph 1 is based on the OECD 
Model and defines the scope of application of the Convention.… Paragraph 2 also is based on the OECD Model 
and provides a definition of taxes on income and on capital gains.231   
 
The list of taxes in the US Model, however, is exhaustive. A question arising in this context is 
whether the general descriptions incorporated alongside an exhaustive listing are intended by the 
contracting parties to provide a baseline standard with respect to the substantive scope that can in 
unclear cases have controlling influence over the taxes exhaustively named in para. 3. The Report of 
WP No. 30 names the example of France: 
 
The O.E.C.D. Analysis of recent Conventions shows further that in 3 Conventions concluded by France … the list 
of taxes is exhaustive although those Conventions have adopted a general description of the taxes covered by the 
Convention. This implies obviously that the general description of taxes covered is of importance only with respect 
to ‘subsequent’ taxes … but of no importance with respect to the ‘existing’ taxes.232  
 
This suggests that the role of pars. 1 and 2 within the structural system of Art. 2 is such that, where 
the list in para. 3 is of a non-exhaustive character, the range of existing taxes covered under the 
Convention is as broad as described in paras. 1 and 2. The verbalization of general descriptions is 
inherently intended to complement the illustrative listing and serve the overall purpose of Art. 2 to 
                                                 
228 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 9. 
229 Art. 2 of this treaty provides: “The existing taxes to which this Convention shall apply are: (a) in the United States: the Federal 
income taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (but excluding the accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company tax 
and social security taxes) and the excise taxes imposed on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers and with respect to private 
foundations. The Convention shall, however, apply to the excise taxes imposed on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers only 
to the extent that the risks covered by such premiums are not reinsured with a person not entitled to the benefits of this or any other 
convention which exempts these taxes….” 
230 Paras. 1 and 2 provide as follows: “1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on income imposed on behalf of a Contracting State 
irrespective of the manner in which they are levied. 2. There shall be regarded as taxes on income all taxes imposed on total income, 
or on elements of income, including taxes on gains from the alienation of property.” For more on the provisions in the new US 
Model, see Avi-Yonah/Tittle, “The New United States Model Income Tax Convention”, Bulletin for International Taxation 2007, p. 
224. 
231 US Model Technical Explanation accompanying the US Model Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, resp. first 
sentences of the Commentary on Paras. 1 and 2 of Art. 2. 
232 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 38 (emphasis in the original). 
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broaden as much as possible the scope of the Convention. In cases where the parties have chosen to 
make the list of taxes exhaustive, objective intent is expressed to not rely on the vague descriptions in 
paras. 1 and 2. However, this does not diminish the general guidance provided by the conceptual 
elements contained in the description. 
 
Irrespective of whether the list is exhaustive or non-exhaustive, the broad formulations in paras. 1 and 
2 are not intended to “control” or restrict the scope of the treaty in the sense of preventing “excessive 
extension” of the substantive scope; in fact, due to their imprecision, they are inherently unsuited to 
fulfil such a task. Sutter’s argument233 to the latter effect cannot be upheld in this respect. In the case 
of an exhaustive list, omitting a certain tax will mean that it is not covered under the treaty; in the case 
of an illustrative listing, on the other hand, clarification as to the exclusion of a certain existing tax 
must logically involve paras. 1 and 2, as they are to be relied on, in their broadness, in determining the 
scope of the treaty. Any tax that can be classified as a “tax on income and capital” will be covered in 
the case of an illustrative listing. An exhaustive listing specifies the broad language in paras. 1 and 2 
to the effect that not any such tax existing at the time of signature will be covered. This specification 
carries over into the determination of substantial similarity of subsequently imposed taxes under Art. 
2(4).   
 
 
4. The relation between Para. 3 and Para. 4 
 
Both para. 3 and para. 4 incorporate a temporal factor. Para. 3 relates to the taxes existing at the time 
of signature of the treaty, which will be enumerated either exhaustively or by way of illustration, 
while para. 4 extends the scope of the treaty beyond the time of its signature. 
 
Explicit mention of the “date of signature” has sometimes appeared in the texts of earlier Draft Model 
Conventions (see Annex I). Until 1977, however, the OECD Model Convention spoke of “any 
identical or substantially similar taxes which are subsequently imposed in addition to, or in place of, 
the existing taxes”. No referral was made in the treaty text or the Commentary to the date of signature 
as the relevant temporal dividing line between paras. 3 and 4.   
 
This prompted calls among OECD Member countries for specification of the term “subsequently”.  
The 1969 Report of WP No. 30 dealt with this issue in the following clarifying manner: 
 
Reading through the whole of Article 2 shows that the term ‘subsequently’, as used in paragraph 4, has a sort of 
counterpart in paragraph 3, i.e. ‘existing’. Both terms require a reference to a certain time. The O.E.C.D. 
Commentary on paragraph 3 of Article 2 states that this paragraph ‘lists the taxes in force at the time of signature 
of the Convention’. Thereby the Commentary makes clear that the term ‘existing’ is related to the time of signature 
of the Convention. This being so, the context between paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 leaves no doubt that the term 
‘subsequently’ must necessarily refer to all taxes entering into force after that date, i.e. after the time of signature 
of the Convention.234 
 
The amendments made in the 1977 Commentary basically follow a proposal by the Delegate of the 
United Kingdom: “The United Kingdom feels that the reference in paragraph 4 to ‘taxes which are 
subsequently imposed’ is not very precise and therefore proposes to use a wording like ‘taxes which 
are imposed by either Contracting State after the date of signature of this Convention’.”235 
 
As was argued in the foregoing, para. 4 ties in with para. 3 in that both paragraphs speak of the 
“existing” taxes, i.e. the taxes that are covered at the date of signature of the treaty. Notably, para. 4 is 
indiscriminate as to whether the list in para. 3 is exhaustive or non-exhaustive. The “existing taxes” to 
which the criteria of substantial similarity should be applied are those contained in either an 
exhaustive or demonstrative listing in para. 3. Interestingly, the OECD Income and Capital Model 
Commentary states with respect to Art. 2(4) that this paragraph confirms the non-exhaustive character 
                                                 
233 See Sutter in Aigner et al. (eds.) Erbschaftssteuern und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, p. 64. 
234 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.nos. 43-45 (emphasis in the original). 
235 Id., m.no. 42. 
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of para. 3:236 “This paragraph provides, since the list of taxes in paragraph 3 is purely declaratory, 
that the Convention is also to apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes.”237   
 
This is misleading in that it seems to imply that the provision of Art. 2(4) is not necessary where the 
list of taxes covered is exhaustive. This is clearly not the case, as para. 4 is intended to prevent 
renegotiation of the treaty whenever there are changes in internal law.  The Commentary to the 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, which contains an exhaustive list of taxes covered, states with 
respect to Art. 2(4): 
 
This paragraph provides that the Convention is also to apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes which are 
imposed after the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. This 
provision is necessary to prevent the Convention from becoming inoperative in the event of one of the States 
modifying its taxation laws.238  
 
In fact, in the case of an exhaustive listing, the importance of providing for flexibility via paragraph 4 
is especially crucial. The independent significance of the general descriptions in paras. 1 and 2 
becomes apparent: A tax will be covered under the treaty so long as it qualifies as a “tax on income 
and capital” in the sense of the general descriptions. 
 
 
5. Automatic extension to “substantially similar” taxes in Art. 2(4) 
 
Art. 2(4) provides that “any identical or substantially similar taxes that are imposed after the date of 
signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes” will automatically be 
included. This is a characteristic provision which has featured in tax treaties since the very beginnings 
of bilateral tax treaty conclusion (cf. Annexes I and II). 
 
Vogel described the role of paragraph 4 most concisely, stating that the provision “takes into account 
the fact that the treaty text can expressly name only such taxes as exist at the time when the treaty is 
being concluded.”239 Art. 2(4) preserves treaty benefits in case of changes perceived to be immaterial 
to the bilateral consensus when the treaty was signed. From the point of view of international law, this 
provision is extraordinary, as it expresses a general commitment of the parties also with regard to 
future events. The Report of WP No. 3 expressly calls attention to the fact that with “Conventions 
without any mention of future taxes”, there is “the disadvantage that, in the event of the introduction 
of new arrangements or of changes in the tax structure in the two States, the Convention will become 
obsolete and the two contracting parties will be obliged to negotiate new agreements.”240   
 
The general statement in the Model Commentaries that Art. 2(4) “is necessary to prevent the 
Convention from becoming inoperative in the event of one of the States modifying its taxation 
laws”241 addresses the fact that the field of taxation in the various countries is typically highly 
dynamic and frequent changes in tax law provisions are to be expected. This is especially true for 
taxes on income and capital in the various states.242 The inclusion of a clause like paragraph 4 avoids 
the treaty having to be amended in the case of minor changes in the respective domestic tax systems 
of the parties.  
 
                                                 
236 See also Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 66: “[The extension in Para. 4] confirms 
that the list of taxes does not contain an exhaustive enumeration.” Translation from German by author of this thesis.  
237 Income and Capital MC Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 7 (emphasis added). 
238 Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 9. 
239 K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para.4 , m.no. 52. See the similar statement of Sutter regarding Art. 2(4) of the Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts MC: Sutter in Aigner et al. (eds.) Erbschaftssteuern und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002) p. 60. 
240 FC/WP 3(57)2 of 2 May 1957, II.A., m.no. 4. 
241 1977 Income and Capital MC Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 7; 1982 Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC Commentary on 
Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 9. 
242 Cf. the Draft Conventions of Mexico and London (Annex I) of 1943 and 1946, resp., which did not include a provision bearing 
analogy to Para. 4.  
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Neither the Model Conventions nor the Commentaries specify by what parameters taxes may be 
classified to be “identical or substantially similar”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
defines “similar” as “having characteristics in common” and being “alike in substance or essentials”. 
The Draft Conventions of Mexico and London (see Annex I) speak of taxes “upon substantially the 
same bases as the taxes enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this Article.” Apart from this 
automatic extension, the London Draft specifies in Art. XIX that “in the event of substantial changes 
in the tax laws of either of the Contracting states, the competent authorities of the two Contracting 
states shall confer together and take the measures required in accordance with the spirit of the present 
Convention.”  
 
Subsequently, and until the adoption of the 1963 Model texts, the last paragraph of Art. 2 contained 
an explicit reference to the procedure for mutual consultation of the parties (see Annex I). The 
Commentary to para. 5 of the 1958 Draft Art. 2 states that this paragraph 
 
is drafted fairly widely to enable the states to consult together whenever they think fit. Normally such procedure 
may be initiated whenever doubt arises as to the field of application of the Convention in regard to taxes. Doubts 
may also arise as to the interpretation of one or other243 of the preceding paragraphs of the Article, in particular 
paragraph 2, or any other question concerning taxes imposed additionally or substituted.244  
 
From the original reference to mutual consultation, it is clear that the contracting states are to confer 
on the grounds of basic common parameters with respect to both law and fact. The term “substantially 
similar” should be broadly construed in favour of coverage. Taxes that are factually similar or based 
on the same or similar objectives are generally intended to come within treaty scope under Art. 2(4). 
 
Similarly to the Mexico and London Drafts speaking of taxes that have “substantially the same 
bases”, the Italian expert in WP No. 3 (see para. 1 of the 1957 Draft Art. in Annex I) held that “taxes 
as defined above comprise not only those in force on the conclusion of the Convention, but also all 
other taxes of the same character and with the same objects which are imposed subsequently.”245  
 
In a later Report, WP No. 3 presents its analysis of the then existing treaty network and notes that the 
mere reference in many treaties to “future taxes” or to “new taxes, or taxes replacing those to which 
the Convention applies” leads to uncertainty in practice, which is why it is proposed that express 
mention should be made of the “substantially similar character” of future taxes.246 The Draft that was 
subsequently adopted247 (see Annex I) shows a close resemblance to the text of the 1963 Model 
Conventions. 
 
It is clear from the origins of Art. 2(4) and insinuated in the very wording “substantially similar” that 
the substance of the tax is of the essence. The denomination and formal arrangement of the tax cannot 
be more than a starting point in the determination of its substantial similarity; otherwise, a state could 
circumvent the test of substantial similarity simply by inserting a newly created tax into the corpus of 
a tax that is expressly listed in paragraph 3.248   
 
Not one characteristic, but several essential incidents of a tax will have to be evaluated to see if it 
meets the characteristics of a tax enumerated in Art. 2(3).249   
 
Vogel noted: 
 
                                                 
243 Sic. 
244 OEEC, Council, Report of the Fiscal Committee on its Activities, Part II, Annex A: Commentary on the Draft Article on Taxes 
which should be covered by Double Taxation Conventions, C(58)118, m.no. 12. 
245 FC/WP 3(57)1 of 1 January 1957, m.no. 4(e). 
246 FC/WP 3(57)1 of 2 May 1957, point II.A, m.nos. 1 and 2. 
247 FC/WP 3(57)1 of 17 December 1957. 
248 See the argument made by M. Lang in liber amicorum Helmut Loukota (2005) p. 282. 
249 See also the Commentaries on Art. 2(4) in Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, m.no. 70;  K. Vogel, m.no. 53b; Büge in 
Becker et al. (eds.) m.no. 41. 
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What is necessary is a comprehensive comparison of the tax laws’ constituent elements. In such a comparison, the 
new tax under review, rather than being compared merely with a solitary older one (to which it will always be 
similar in some respects and different in others), should be considered with reference to all types of taxes 
historically developed within the State in question – and of States with related legal systems – in order to 
determine which of such traditional taxes comes closest to the new tax law…. Whether a tax is ‘substantially 
similar’ to another can, consequently, not be decided otherwise than against the background of the entire tax 
system.250   
 
The substance of the taxable object is the ultimate yardstick to measure substantial similarity. 
 
It is expedient to focus on the legal aspects of the tax as the primary standard by which identity or 
similarity are measured, because economic and political constellations frequently change within a 
country, which causes factors like tax rates and the effects of a tax to be subject to variation. The key 
constitutive elements of a tax will regularly lie with the taxable object in the broad sense of the nature 
of the thing, transaction or sum of money that is subject to tax, and in a narrower sense, what items 
are included or excluded in the assessment of the tax.251  
 
Art. 2(4) clearly ties in with paragraph 3 in that the character of the taxes listed in para. 3 is the 
benchmark against which the “similarity” in characteristics is gauged. In determining coverage of a 
tax imposed after the conclusion of the treaty by one of the contracting states, the question arises 
whether this state can be held also to the characteristics of taxes listed by the other contracting party. 
No conclusive answer is given in either the Model Commentaries or the materials leading to the 
formulation of the Commentaries.  
 
The Report of WP No. 30 notes that this question may arise between the parties if no general 
description corresponding to paras. 1 and 2 is adopted: the WP gives the example of States A and B 
concluding a treaty that lacks a general description of the taxes covered and enumerates, on the part of 
State A, taxes on income as well as on capital, whilst on the part of State B, only taxes on income are 
listed. Assuming that State B subsequently introduces a tax on capital, the Report goes on to state:   
 
The Working Party is aware of the fact that State A has an argument for including the new capital tax in the scope 
of the Convention which is at least as strong as the argument of State B for excluding the tax: State A might 
counter that one must not look exclusively to the list of only one State but [that] it is necessary to take into 
consideration both lists together as one single unit; since State A has embodied his252 capital taxes in the list also 
State B’s subsequently imposed capital tax falls under the Convention. Whichever might be the solution of this 
dispute, it is felt that the adoption of provisions like the present paragraphs 1 and 2 would have made such dispute 
obsolete.253  
 
Further into the Report, WP No. 30 implicitly favours an evaluation of both lists seen together in 
determining the scope of the treaty. Dealing with the question whether the unilateral inclusion of taxes 
on capital has an influence on developments in the other state, which lists only taxes on income, it is 
stated:   
 
[T]he Working Party is inclined to refer primarily to paragraph 1 of the O.E.C.D. Commentary on Article 2, stating 
that the Article intends to widen as much as possible the field of application of the Convention. Based on this 
fundamental idea of the O.E.C.D. Model Convention, a unilateral inclusion of taxes on capital seems quite 
preferable.254   
 
Subsequently, the WP explains its inconclusiveness in the matter: 
 
Although there could certainly be found more arguments in favour of a unilateral inclusion of taxes on capital, the 
fact remains undeniable, that the one State who includes unilaterally his capital taxes gives up unilaterally taxation 
rights too; a situation which might probably be compensated by income tax renounciations of the other Contracting 
                                                 
250 K. Vogel, Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd edn. (1998). 
251 Cf. the definition of “taxable base” in Larkins (ed.) International Tax Glossary (1001), as well as the descriptions of “tax object” 
and “tax base” in Obenaus/Weidacher, Handbook of Business English – Keywords in Context (1990). 
252 Sic. 
253 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 13.  
254 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 34. 
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State (such ‘compensation’ could incidentally be caused solely by a higher income tax level in the State with no 
capital taxes or by his255 position as ‘debitor state’, etc.). Because of this multiplicity of facts to be taken into 
account, the Working Party feels that it should be left open for bilateral negotiations between the Contracting 
States concerned to find a satisfactory solution to this question.256 
 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the object and purpose of Art. 2 as well as from its wording and 
structure, the stronger argument in case of dispute will be that of State A in the original example:  
Para. 4 speaks of the “existing taxes”, which spans all of para. 3, i.e. the lists of both states taken 
together.257 The agreement entered into between the two parties is made against the background of 
both tax systems. It lies in the nature of mutual bargaining, which is a vital element in treaty 
negotiations, to look to the taxes envisaged for coverage by the other contracting party. It can be 
presumed that not only an identical, but also a similar tax levied in the other contracting state will 
regularly induce the treaty negotiators to include the tax within the scope of the treaty.258 Unless the 
parties have provided otherwise in the treaty or in a Protocol thereto, this “bilateral spirit” should be 
seen to govern the evaluation of para. 3 in the context of determining identity or substantial similarity 
under Art. 2(4).   
  
These principles are showcased in a 2007 court decision rendered in Ireland regarding the tax treaty 
between Ireland and Italy, where the court held with respect to the Irish capital gains tax imposed 
after conclusion of the treaty that “the new tax has to be identical or substantially similar to an 
existing tax whether that existing tax is Irish or Italian. Such an approach is consistent with the 
reciprocal nature of the Convention. It is also supported by the obligation of annual notification of tax 
changes by the contracting States.”259 The High Court further stressed the significance of Art. 2.2 of 
the treaty, which specified the taxes which are to be regarded as taxes on income as “all taxes imposed 
on total income or on elements of income, including taxes on gains from the alienation of movable or 
immovable property”: 
 
Had the Convention been intended to apply only to taxes which were in existence at the time that it was negotiated 
there would have been no need to include Article 2.2. It would have been sufficient to have Article 2.3. Indeed the 
fact that Article 2.3 speaks of existing taxes to which the Convention applies when read in conjunction with the 
remainder of Article 2 makes it clear that the Convention was designed to have prospective effect. 
 
Regarding the existing taxes explicitly named in para. 3, and thus covered under the treaty, each state 
will be informed on the character of these taxes in the other state. An example for a decision to this 
effect by domestic administrative authority is a ruling issued by the Spanish Directorate General of 
Taxes,260 which held that by inclusion of a list of taxes covered, both countries implicitly recognized 
that the taxes included by the other party were equivalent to the taxes included by itself.261 Any other 
approach by the two sovereign states to their bilateral commitment may constitute an infringement of 
the principle of good faith, as the scope of the Convention would be obliterated where its scope keeps 
drifting apart as between the treaty partners. 
 
The wording “in addition to, or in place of” is derived from the formulation “new taxes, or taxes 
replacing those to which the Convention applies” used in the Report of WP No. 3. The formulation 
“in addition to, or in place of” first featured in the Draft Conventions formulated by WP No. 3 (see 
Annex I). One could see this wording to suggest that only newly created taxes, as opposed to changes 
made to the existing taxes, are to be drawn within treaty coverage via para. 4. WP No. 30 uses the 
                                                 
255 Sic. 
256 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 35. 
257 This view is taken also in K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 53; Sutter in Aigner et al. (eds.) Erbschaftssteuern und 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, p. 61; M. Lang in liber amicorum Helmut Loukota, p. 280. 
258 M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation  2005, p. 221. Debatin, Grundzüge der Abkommen zur Vermeidung der 
internationalen Doppelbesteuerung, Sonderdruck der Steuer- und Wirtschafts-Kurzpost (1963) p. 17. 
259 Lorraine Kinsella v. The Revenue Commissioners, High Court of Ireland, decision of July 31, 2007, IEHC 250, m.no. 53. 
260 Ruling of 27 July 1999 regarding the 1995 Spain–France tax treaty, on the comparability of the French corporate income tax to 
the Spanish corporate income tax for purposes of the participation exemption under the Spanish tax regime; discussed by Gonzáles-
Cotera, “Spain: Tax Authorities Issue Rulings on ‘Comparable Income Taxes’ for Participation Exemption Purposes”, European 
Taxation 2000, pp. 153 et seq. 
261 Gonzáles-Cotera, id., p. 155. 
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open formulation that Art. 2(4) “makes clear that not only taxes being in force at the time of signature 
but also taxes subsequently introduced in a Contracting State will come under the scope of the 
Convention.”262 
 
Taking into consideration the purpose of Art. 2(4) to prevent the treaty from becoming inoperative, 
and with a view to its drafting history as laid out above, the wording cannot be understood to mean 
solely those taxes that are newly created. The clause on automatic adaptation is intended to apply also 
to any subsequent changes made to the existing taxes.263 Not to apply para. 4 to modifications of 
existing taxes would again leave the door wide open for states to circumvent treaty protection by 
avoiding to visibly create “new” taxes and rather changing an existing tax in substance.264  
 
Moreover, in accordance with the objective in para. 4 to be mindful of the substance of what is taxed, 
it is well worth noting that an existing tax that was not previously included via para. 3 should not be 
precluded from coverage in the event that it is fundamentally altered to the effect that it is “identical 
or substantially similar” to a tax listed at the time of signature.265 
 
Art. 2(4) expresses a commitment of the parties to the substance of their agreement also with respect 
to future developments in the domestic tax systems that leave the essence of bilateral commitment 
untouched. The commitment undertaken in a tax treaty containing a provision corresponding to para. 
4 spans newly created taxes as well as modifications of the taxes covered. Such flexibility is not to be 
taken for granted in the international arena; it is of paramount importance in the fast-paced world of 
taxes.  
 
Outside the boundaries of “substantially similar” cases lurks the inconvenience of renegotiations to 
amend the Convention. The report of WP No. 30 ostensively comments: 
 
[M]aking an amendment means that the Convention must run again through the machinery of parliamentary procedure; 
and these are not the only difficulties: the problem, for example, must also be dealt with, if the tax in question should be 
brought under the Convention retrospectively, a measure which would no doubt be desirable from the point of equal 
treatment of all income (capital) taxes of the Contracting States but would not be so desirable under the constitutional 
law of several Member States.266  
 
Given the powerful impact the extension in para. 4 has on the application of a given tax treaty, it is 
not surprising that domestic court decisions on the substantive scope have centred on this provision. 
Throughout domestic court decisions, the litmus test by which substantial similarity is measured is an 
evaluation of the substantial characteristics of the tax, with particular weight on the nature of the 
taxable event. In a case regarding the Denmark–France tax treaty of 1957, the Danish Administrative 
Court held that it is not sufficient for a duty to be subsequently imposed in lieu of a tax mentioned in 
the list of taxes covered and held that a flat-rate tax on the gross amount of payments on the purchase 
of a pension could in no way be classified as substantially similar to an ordinary progressive tax on 
net income.267 
 
Review authorities in the United Kingdom held that national insurance contributions paid during 1978 
and 1979 did not fall within the reference to “income tax” in the UK–New Zealand treaty of 1966. 
Insurance contributions were not seen to be “of the same nature as income tax” for the purposes of 
New Zealand unilateral relief. The case was argued without reference to Art. 1(2) of that treaty, which 
corresponds to Art. 2(4) of the OECD Model and draws in “substantially similar” taxes, possibly 
                                                 
262 Id., m.no. 7. 
263 See also the Commentary to the corresponding provision in the Mexico and London Draft Conventions of 1943 and 1946 
(Commentary on resp. Art. I( 2) that this provision is “intended to assure the automatic adaptation of the Convention to changes in 
the taxes of the contracting States. It does so by providing for the extension of the provisions.” 
264 See also this conclusion arrived at by M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (2005), p. 222. 
265 See also Baker, Commentary, 2B.06: “Presumably, however, an existing tax which was not included but which is fundamentally 
altered after signature could be drawn in.” 
266 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 11 (emphasis in the original). 
267 Danish Administrative Tax Court (Landsskatteretten) Case No. 1985-5-173, decision of 22 May 1985; discussed in Weizman, 
“Scope of the Denmark-France Tax Treaty”, European Taxation 1994, pp. 27 et seq. 
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because national insurance contributions were in existence in the United Kingdom well before the 
1966 Agreement was signed. However, national insurance contributions in the United Kingdom have 
been the subject to major reforms in 1975 and subsequently.268 It is arguable that certain categories of 
contributions as currently existing in the United Kingdom where the payment of contributions is not 
relevant in determining entitlement to individual benefits (“class 4 contributions”) come within the 
scope of existing conventions. 
 
In a case before the Lower Civil Court of Paris, the issue was whether the 1985 Income and Capital 
treaty between Austria and France applied to the French net wealth tax, which was not expressly 
mentioned in Art 1(2) of the treaty as one of the French taxes covered. The Lower Court held that in 
the wording and the spirit of the treaty, an Austrian national who is subject to a tax in Austria similar 
to the French net wealth tax is not subject to the net wealth tax in France with respect to his 
shareholding in a French company. The Court’s reasoning was that the French tax authorities had not 
questioned the fact that the French net wealth tax was a tax which, if not identical to the Austrian 
capital tax, was at least similar to it.269 The logic of the treaty containing a provision corresponding to 
Art. 2(4) suggests that where taxes on capital are mentioned in the general description of taxes 
covered, the French net wealth tax is automatically covered as a substantially similar tax introduced in 
France after the treaty was concluded.270 
 
Another interesting issue in this regard came before the Austrian Administrative Court in 1999.271 The 
Austria–UK tax treaty contained an exhaustive list of taxes which named the Austrian trade tax levied 
on enterprises with a permanent establishment in Austria. This tax consisted of three taxable elements: 
adjusted profits, adjusted capital, and the total amount of wages.272 After this tax was abolished, the 
question arose whether the treaty was applicable also to a subsequently imposed tax that was a 
functional successor to the part of the tax base of the trade tax regarding the total amount of wages. 
The Court examined the substantial character of this tax (the so-called “Kom munalsteuer”, i.e. 
Municipal Tax), comparing its taxable object, the bearer of the tax burden, as well as the function and 
purpose of the tax in the domestic tax system to determine whether it qualified as “substantially 
similar” to the trade tax.  
 
The Court concluded that the Municipal Tax was of a character substantially similar to an element of 
the former trade tax and thus held it to come within the scope of the treaty. In a similar ruling 
concerning the Municipal Tax under the Austria–Germany tax treaty, the Court affirmed its prior 
position that substantial similarity to one element of a former tax is sufficient to draw a subsequently 
imposed tax within treaty scope.273 The rulings concerned treaties containing an exhaustive listing of 
taxes covered, but no general descriptions in the sense of Art. 2(1) and (2).   
 
The situation might be different where treaties do not list the trade tax in Art. 2(3) but contain a 
general description in the sense of paras. 1 and 2 that mentions “taxes on the total amount of 
wages.”274 Given the broad description in paras. 1 and 2, the newly introduced Municipal Tax seems 
to be covered by the general description “taxes on the total amount of wages or salaries paid by 
enterprises”. However, when commenting on proposed treaties, the Austrian tax authorities have 
consistently taken the position that even though the Municipal Tax might be covered under a general 
                                                 
268 See further the UK National Insurance Contributions Act 2008.  
269 Art. 3 of the treaty provided that capital was taxable only in the country of residence of the person holding the capital. 
270 Cf. Henry Lazarski, “Applicability of Tax Treaties”, European Taxation July 1985, pp. 200 et seq.). 
271 Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) Case No. 98/13/0021, decision of 15 December 1999. 
272 For a comprehensive analysis see Burgstaller, “Kommunalsteuer und DBA/Municipal Tax and Tax Treaties”, SWI 2004, pp. 17 
et seq.; M. Lang, “Kommunalsteuer und DBA/Tax Treaties and Municipal Tax”, SWI 2005, pp. 16 et seq. See also the criticism of 
the Court’s decision regarding the nature of the municipal tax in Wurz, “Kommunalsteuer und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, 
SWI 1998, pp. 231 et seq. See also the basic considerations in Firlinger, “Kommunalsteuer vom sachlichen Anwendungsbereich der 
DBA umfasst?/Municipal Tax covered under Tax Treaties?”, SWI 1994, pp. 65 et seq. 
273 Austrian Supreme Administrative Court, Case No. 99/15/0265, decision of 3 August 2000. 
274 See the considerations of M. Lang, “Kommunalsteuer und DBA”, SWI 2005, pp. 16 et seq. 
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description referencing taxes on the total amount of wages (“Lohnsummensteuern”), it is advisable to 
expressly mention the Municipal Tax in the list of taxes covered.275 
 
 
6. The role of Paras. 1 and 2 in the light of Art. 2(4) 
 
Paras. 1 and 2 have a similar objective to that pursued in Art. 2(4): the necessity for amendments is 
avoided to the extent that a tax, present or future, can be classified as coming under the general 
description of “taxes on income and capital”. Paras. 1 and 2, on the one hand, and para. 4, on the other 
hand, complement each other to obtain the overall objective of Art. 2 to “widen as much as possible 
the scope of the Convention.”  
 
This explains why 
 
the omission of paragraphs 1 and 2 could also cause problems with respect to subsequently introduced taxes: under the 
present O.E.C.D. concept, taxes being introduced after the signature of the Convention are automatically subject to the 
Convention, provided they are taxes on income (capital) within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2. This is the result of 
an interpretation of the present paragraph 4 in the light of paragraphs 1 and 2.276  
 
The general boundaries of applicability of the treaty can be inferred from Art. 2(4) in its relation to the 
other paragraphs: the treaty will not apply to taxes that existed at the time of signature, but are not 
covered either under paras. 1 and 2 or para. 3.277 The wording of para. 4 clearly ties in with para. 3 
when it comes to determining whether the characteristics of a given tax are “identical or substantially 
similar” to those of the taxes listed in para. 3. While paras. 3 and 4 form a systematic unit, the role of 
the general descriptions in paras. 1 and 2 with regard to para. 4 is unclear. Is it correct to assume that 
paras. 1 and 2 also play an important role in determining the criteria for substantial similarity of a tax 
under Art. 2(4)? WP No. 30 stipulates: 
 
At present, a subsequently introduced tax is considered to be ‘identical or substantially similar’ if it is a tax on 
income (capital) in the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2. If, however, paragraphs 1 and 2 were omitted, the criterion 
‘identical or substantially similar’ could be interpreted only in respect of the taxes enumerated in the list of 
taxes.278  
 
Wassermeyer has expressed the view that from para. 4, it follows that para. 2 as well as para. 3 refer 
solely to taxes existing at the time of signature, because otherwise, para. 4 would have merely 
declaratory character.279 Arguably, a tax that is “identical or substantially similar” to an existing tax 
listed in para. 3 will always be a “tax on income and capital” as per the treaty. However, the wording 
of Art. 2 clearly indicates that paras. 1 and 2 stand by themselves. The general description of taxes 
covered plays a role in determining similarity in substance and function as an “ultimate 
responsibility”280 for the determination of the subject of the treaty, independently of any temporal 
frames. The broad commitment to a general designation in paras. 1 and 2 makes a test as to substantial 
similarity unnecessary; taxes that come under the description of “taxes on income and capital” will be 
covered even in the event that they are not identical or substantially similar to the taxes listed in Art. 
2(3).281 According to the purpose of paras. 1 and 2 to broaden as much as possible the scope of the 
Convention, their value in determining the taxes covered is independent of either Art. 2(3) or (4).  
 
Naturally, the description of characteristic elements of the taxes covered in paras. 1 and 2 (“taxes on 
income and on capital imposed on behalf of a Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local 
                                                 
275 E.g. Austrian Ministry of Finance, Comments on the proposed double taxation convention between Austria and Qatar, GZ. BMF-
010221/0782-IV/4/2010 (23 April 2010). 
276 Report of WP No. 30 (FC/WP 30(69)1) m.no. 12.  
277 See also Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 69. 
278 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 12. 
279 Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 69. 
280 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 8; see the full quote supra Part II Chap. 3. 
281 This approach is taken by K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 54; M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation (2005), p. 221. Opp. Baker, Commentary on Art. 2 Paras. 1 and 2, m.no. 2B.04, stating that Paras. 1 and 2 are of 
practical significance only in determining what constitute “identical or substantially similar” taxes. 
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authorities, irrespective of the manner in which they are levied”) will play a role also in the 
determination of identity or substantial similarity under Art. 2(4).   
 
WP No. 30 illustrates this by way of an example: 
 
State A and State B have enumerated income taxes which are levied (in both States) only on the total income. 
Assuming that State B introduces subsequently a special tax on interest, it might – in the absence of paragraphs 1 
and 2 – be ambiguous if the new but special tax was ‘identical or substantially similar’ to the already listed taxes. 
State B might stress the fact that the new tax lacks of one decisive criterion which the already listed taxes have: it 
is not levied on total income; and therefore State B could refuse to treat the tax according to the Convention. 
Further similar examples could be furnished referring to every single criterion set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2. If a 
subsequently introduced tax bears such a criterion, but this criterion is not imminent to the already listed taxes, 
then it will – in the absence of paragraphs 1 and 2 – always be doubtful whether a justification can be found to call 
the new tax ‘identical or substantially similar’: thus it seems not to be quite clear whether a subsequently 
introduced provincial income tax comes under the Convention if the Contracting States refer in their lists only to 
federal taxes; similar uncertainty could be created by the introduction of a special tax deducted at source, if the list 
of taxes comprises only taxes levied by assessment, and so on.282 
 
Para. 4 is of particular importance when a treaty has omitted general descriptions corresponding to 
paras. 1 and 2.283 Conversely, due to the vagueness and generality of paras. 1 and 2, the extension 
under para. 4 in connection with para. 3 will be of importance in cases where a subsequently imposed 
tax cannot clearly be subsumed under the definition of para. 2. The standard of comparison in 
determining identity or substantial similarity of a tax under para. 4 is ultimately up to the contracting 
parties. A newly imposed tax that is not a “tax on income and capital” in the sense of paras. 1 and 2 
will be covered if it is identical or similar in its substantial characteristics to a tax explicitly listed by 
either of the parties in para. 3. If the parties choose to incorporate a general description corresponding 
to paras. 1 and 2, a tax imposed after the date of signature and not listed in Art. 2(3) that qualifies as a 
“tax on income and capital” under paras. 1 and 2 will nevertheless be covered, unless it can be 
established that the tax was intentionally omitted from the list so as to exclude it from coverage. If, 
however, the tax does not clearly qualify as a “tax on income and capital”, it will only be covered if it 
can be seen to be identical or substantially similar to a tax listed in Art. 2(3).   
 
Therefore, to the extent that a tax clearly comes within the descriptions of paras. 1 and 2, regardless of 
when it is created, this tax will indisputably be covered under the treaty. It is especially common in 
practice for contracting states to maintain reference in paras. 1 and 2 to taxes on capital, even if 
neither of the parties, at the time of conclusion of the treaty, levies a tax on capital. In case one of the 
parties subsequently introduces such a tax, it is automatically covered by way of paras. 1 and 2. By 
the same token, if one of the parties decides to abolish a tax that is covered under the general 
descriptions, notification to the treaty partner is required under Art. 2(4), last sentence. Such 
notification, however, has no effect on treaty scope of the treaty.284 Coverage of a tax coming within 
the general description of paras. 1 and 2 is independent of whether the changes in domestic tax law 
are communicated to the treaty partner. Similarly, the extension to “identical or substantially similar” 
taxes under para. 4 is automatic and independent of notification of the treaty partner. Modifications to 
the scope of the treaty in these respects can only be achieved through bilateral negotiations and 
amendments; in the alternative, each party may exercise its right to unilateral suspension or 
termination under the provisions of the treaty or in accordance with the general rules of international 
law.285  
 
Thus, both the general descriptions in paras. 1 and 2 and the extension clause in para. 4 have an 
important impact on tax treaty application: in a conflict of the contracting parties as to the 
classification of taxes under the treaty, making a successful argument that a tax comes under either of 
                                                 
282 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.nos. 14 and 15 (emphases in the original). 
283 See also K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 52. 
284 See also the examples in M. Lang, BIFD 2005, p. 222; M. Lang in liber amicorum Helmut Loukota, pp. 283 et seq. 
285 Under the general rules of the law of treaties, grounds for terminating or suspending a treaty are material breach (Art. 60 VCLT), 
supervening impossibility of performance (Art. 61 VCLT), or fundamental change of circumstances (Art. 62 VCLT). For more on 
these grounds for termination, see Fitzmaurice, “The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties”, in Evans (ed.) International Law 
(2003) pp. 173 (196 et seq.). 
 44 
 
these provisions will defeat the treaty partner’s possible allegations of wrongful treaty application or 
of interference with the balance of the treaty.286 
 
 
7. Notification of changes under Art. 2(4) 
 
The second sentence of para. 4 stipulates that the competent authorities287 of the contracting states 
“shall notify each other of any significant changes that have been made in their taxation laws.”  
 
No mechanism is provided for in the treaty to compel the contracting states to meet the requirement of 
notification.288 Vogel referred to this provision as “a nobile officium of the contracting States, which 
derives from the very conclusion of the treaty and which would exist even if it were not expressly 
inserted in the DTC.”289 Indeed, the “obligation”290 of the state to notify the treaty partner of changes 
in its tax system can be derived from effective application of the principle pacta sunt servanda – that 
legally binding treaties should be carried out in good faith.291 Although failure to notify the treaty 
partner does not give rise to legal consequences, it will entail political and economic consequences.292 
 
Consistent with the principle of good faith, notification of changes in domestic (tax) laws serves a 
valuable purpose with regard to all aspects of application of the Convention. The question arises why 
it explicitly features in the context of the substantive scope in Art. 2. Provisions for the regular 
exchange of lists of the taxes in force in each contracting state can be found in treaty articles and 
protocols of some of the oldest treaties concluded.293 Some treaties provided for an exchange of lists 
(on a regular basis or on the basis of occurrence of change in taxation laws) in addition to a non-
exhaustive or exhaustive listing, while others did not provide for a list of taxes, but instead 
incorporated the requirement for periodical exchange of lists of the existing taxes in each of the 
contracting states.  
 
In the Minutes of a 1956 Session of the OEEC Fiscal Committee it is set forth that upon examination 
of an initial Report of WP No. 3 “a discussion took place … on the question whether Conventions 
should contain a list of the taxes to which they applied or whether a periodical exchange of lists was 
sufficient….”294 WP No. 3 did not follow up on this discussion; however, the hitherto common 
“exchange of lists” was transformed into a “notification requirement” in the 1957 Draft versions of 
Art. 2 (see Annex I). The Commentary to the 1957 Draft of Art. 2 states: “Each State undertakes to 
notify to the other any amendments made to its taxation legislation, by communicating to it at the end 
of each year, when necessary, a list of new or substituted taxes imposed during that year.”295 
 
                                                 
286 See also the considerations with regard to the Danish exit tax under tax treaties in Weizman, “Departure Taxation – Treaty 
Override? – Extraterritorial Tax Law?”, European Taxation 2004, at p. 83. 
287 A definition of the term “competent authority”, meaning the authority that is to represent the state for the purpose of notification, 
is to be given by each of the contracting states in the treaty’s definitional article, usually Art. 3. 
288 See also the statement in this vein with regard to the corresponding provision in the US Model in Doernberg/van Raad, “The 
1996 United States Model Income Tax Convention: Analysis, Commentary and Comparison” (1997) Art.2, para. 1-2 on p. 17. 
289 K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 55c). See also Wassermeyer in Debatin/Wassermeyer, Commentary on Art. 2 
para. 4, m.no. 73.  
290 The 2005 Income and Capital MC on Art. 2 para. 4, m.no. 8, as well as the Technical Explanation to Art. 2(4) of the 1996 US 
Model, explicitly speak of an obligation of the states.  
291 This principle is enshrined in Art. 26 of the VCLT, which provides that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith.” 
292 Some scholars, according to the distinction between legal consequences, on the one hand, and political pressure and the pressure 
of market mechanisms, on the other,  would qualify such an obligation as “soft law”, of which there is no accepted definition. For 
extensive analysis of the concept of “soft law”, see Lang/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) Soft Law in der Praxis (2005). A quick and 
concise insight is given by D. Shelton in Evans (ed.) International Law (2003) p. 145 (166). 
293 An example is the 1925 Germany–Italy Direct Taxes Convention, which states in m.no. 1 of the Protocol: “The central fiscal 
authorities of the two States shall at the end of each year exchange a list, corrected to date, of the impersonal taxes in force in each 
country.” Moreover, Art. 1 of this convention gave a non-exhaustive list for each of the states (“In particular, the following shall be 
regarded as impersonal taxation: …”). 
294 OEEC, Fiscal Committee, Minutes of the 2nd Session held at the Château de la Muette, FC/M(56)2 (Prov.) at p. 6, under VI. 
(Listing and Definition of Taxes on Income and Capital which should be covered by Double Taxation Agreements).  
295 FC(57)1 of 17 October 1957, Commentary on the Draft Article, m.no. 11. 
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Some treaties explicitly state that notification shall be made “if necessary for the application of this 
Convention”.296 The US Model refers to “significant” changes in taxation laws; the Technical 
Explanation to the 1996 Model clarifies that “[t]he use of the term ‘significant’ means that changes 
must be reported that are of significance to the operation of the Convention.” Notification under the 
US Model shall be made by the contracting parties also as regards “other laws that affect their 
obligations under the Convention.”297 The 1996 US Technical Explanation further stipulates that 
“[t]he competent authorities are also obligated to notify each other of official published materials 
concerning the application of the Convention. This requirement encompasses materials such as 
technical explanations, regulations, rulings and judicial decisions relating to the Convention.” The 
OECD Commentary is less rigid in this respect: “Contracting States are also free to extend the 
notification requirement to cover any significant changes in other laws that have an impact on their 
obligations under the convention.”  
 
With regard to the purpose of the provision on notification of changes, the 1957 Commentary on the 
Draft Article of the Italian Delegate of WP No. 3 elaborates: “Each State binds itself merely to notify 
to the other contracting States all changes made to the existing taxes or any new taxes imposed, such a 
preliminary formality being necessary if the mutual consultation procedure provided in the last 
paragraph of the draft is to function.”298  
 
Until the 1963 OECD Model Conventions, a provision regarding mutual agreement of the parties in 
unclear cases was commonly contained in the last paragraph of Art. 2. Upon analysis of the provisions 
to this effect in existing treaties, the 1969 Report of WP No. 30 endorsed the deletion of this provision 
from the text of Art. 2: 
 
All these provisions deal with the question how the Convention could be adapted to alterations in fiscal law. The 
Working Party wonders if this question relates actually to Article 2, the principal function of which is solely to 
determine the subject of the Convention. Since those special provisions concern the Convention in its entirety it might 
be preferable to insert such provisions, if any, in an appropriate pace in Chapter VI (special provisions) or Chapter VII 
(Final provisions) of the O.E.C.D. Model Convention.299  
 
Whereas the provision on mutual agreement has a separate place in the OECD Model Conventions, 
the provision concerning notification of changes has consistently featured in the second sentence of 
Art. 2. The reason appears to be twofold: one aspect is that alteration in substantive respects to the 
taxation laws of a contracting state will regularly entail the question whether the changes produce 
“identical or substantially similar taxes” in the sense of the first sentence of para. 4. The other aspect 
as to why notification is dealt with in the context of substantive scope seems to lie in the fact that 
while the treaty in no way obliges the contracting states to continue to levy a tax mentioned in the 
treaty,300 fundamental changes to the tax system of a contracting state may amount to a change of 
circumstances that provides ground for the renegotiation or termination of the treaty. 
 
The provision on notification of changes is intrinsically linked with deliberations on whether a 
subsequently imposed tax can be seen to be “identical or substantially similar”. This is evidenced by 
the fact that the provision, originally intended to function as a “preliminary formality being necessary 
if the mutual consultation procedure provided in the last paragraph of the draft is to function”, was 
retained in the text of Art. 2. Although changes affect all aspects of the treaty, notification is 
especially crucial in that with respect to the substantive scope, the treaty explicitly ties in with future 
changes in defining the taxes covered. 
 
                                                 
296 An example is the Austria–Germany Income and Capital Tax Treaty of 24 August 2000, effective 1 January 2003. 
297 Second sentence in Art. 2(4) of the 2006 US Model. The Technical Explanation states that “[n]on-tax laws that may affect a 
Contracting State's obligations under the Convention may include, for example, laws affecting bank secrecy.”  
298 FC(57)1 of 10 January 1957, Commentary by the Italian Delegate, m.no. 7. 
299 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 50 (c). 
300 See the examples of possible interference of the parties in the balance of the treaty by M. Lang in liber amicorum Helmut 
Loukota, p. 283 et seq. 
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Much consideration was given in the Report of WP No. 30 to the limitation of notification to 
“significant” changes. The deliberations were triggered by the proposition of the Delegate of the 
United Kingdom to eliminate the wording “at the end of each year” with regard to requirement for 
notification.301   
 
WP No 3 states the following: 
 
No distinction is made between important and less important changes. A strict interpretation of this provision 
means that any change, whether of any importance or not, even, e.g., in the position of a comma in a Finance Act 
of a State, should be notified to the other State. But even if the interpretation of the last sentence of paragraph 4 did 
not go so far, it would be obvious that this provision could not be carried out correctly but with great effort of 
administrative measures. The present rule that the modifications should be made at the end of each year is 
obviously a ‘concession’ to the tax administrations of the States concerned. If the proposition of the United 
Kingdom is regarded from this angle the question would immediately arise whether it would not bring about a 
multiplied work for tax administrations.302   
 
The WP saw the question regarding frequency of notification to be interdependent with the character 
of changes to be communicated to the treaty partner via the notification provision: 
 
But this proposition could also be seen from another side: the importance of amendments to the taxation laws 
varies considerably. It seems to be a matter of fact that most States are interested to know amendments of great 
importance but are not so interested to be informed about amendments of minor importance which are of no 
influence on the international tax relations. If the notification’s303 provision in paragraph 4 could be interpreted (or 
amended) that way, i.e. that only major or essential changes are worth of notification, then it would seem to be 
quite a good solution that the notification is effectuated as when such essential change is made in the taxation law. 
The Working Party does not disregard that such a restrictive interpretation (or amendment) would probably require 
a discussion which sorts of changes in the taxation laws should be considered to be ‘essential’ and who should 
determine whether the change is essential or not.304 
 
While no such requirement was inserted in the Model texts, treaties often expressly specify 
notification to only entail “essential” changes, or such changes that are “necessary to the application 
of the Convention”. Changes of “significant” character could be seen to be those changes that go 
beyond the mark of “identical or substantially similar taxes”.   
 
If, on the other hand, notification entails any changes in tax laws, the contracting state whose 
competent authority notifies a new or altered tax without further comment appears to have 
acknowledged that this tax is “identical or substantially similar” in the meaning of the first sentence of 
Art. 2(4). A reaction from the other party may be deemed to be necessary to clarify that the new or 
amended tax is not automatically seen to come within the scope of the treaty.  
 
From the perspective of transparency of contractual obligations, however, comprehensive notification 
seems preferable: each of the parties has a vital interest in being in a position to react to changes that 
may constitute a departure from the substantive scope agreed upon. The bilateral agreement is based 
upon the mutual perception of the treaty partner’s tax system and its concepts and principles. Any 
unilateral changes could potentially disrupt the common consensus of the parties, possibly amounting 
to a fundamental change of circumstances that might even prompt termination of the treaty. 
 
The concluding considerations in the Report show how sensitive the issue is:  
 
A restrictive interpretation of the last sentence of paragraph 4 might also meet a point raised by Canada. Canada 
does not use the concluding sentence of paragraph 4 because such a formal undertaking is considered to be 
unnecessary; it seems to be dangerous in that an oversight in providing information about a change would be a 
breach of the Convention.… [T]he Working Party is prepared to accept an argumentation saying that a restriction 
                                                 
301 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 47: “The United Kingdom would prefer if the Contracting States notified each other of changes in their 
taxation laws not at the end of each year but when those changes are made and therefore suggests the omission of the words "at the 
end of each year" in the second sentence of paragraph 4” (emphasis in the original). 
302 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 48 (emphasis in the original). 
303 Sic. 
304 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 49. 
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of the scope of paragraph 4 to ‘essential’ changes in the taxation laws would reduce such danger of ‘breaching the 
Convention’ to a justifiable minimum, provided, however, that the meaning of the term ‘essential’ could be 
determined sufficiently.305 
 
The second sentence of Art. 2(4) is more than just a dispensable restatement of the treaty principle of 
good faith; it plays a vital role in the application of para. 4, as it indicates to the treaty partner that it 
might be necessary to examine whether an amended or newly imposed tax can be seen to be 
automatically covered by the treaty. The sensitive balance between the taxation systems of the 
contracting parties attained at the conclusion of the treaty should remain as stable as possible; a 
continuous dialogue enables either party to react to changes in the other party’s tax law and allows for 
consensual adjustments to the treaty or to policies employed in its application. 
 
 
8.  Summary of results 
 
By way of conclusion from the historical development of the structure of the current Art. 2, several 
findings can be pointed out. While the Draft Conventions and Commentaries of the League of Nations 
certainly form the starting ground for considerations in drafting Art. 2, the fact that the League of 
Nations Model text for Art. 2 remained largely without influence on bilateral treaties is reflected in 
the approach of the Working Parties of the OEEC and OECD. The Model texts of Mexico and 
London reflect pioneer work that distilled a framework for Art. 2 from the existing bilateral treaties. 
The foundational version of today’s Art. 2 was devised by WP No. 3 of the OEEC Fiscal Committee. 
The wording of the 1957 Draft Art. 2 as well as the considerations contained in the Reports of WP 
No. 3 not only determined the fabric of the 1963 Model Conventions, but they have had an impact 
that is to a great extent reflected in the current text of Art. 2. The Reports of WP No. 30 of the OECD 
Fiscal Committee identified points where clarification may be necessary, which were largely 
implemented in the 1977 Model texts.  
 
The structure and wording of the US Model treaty has its foundations in the League of Nations Draft 
Conventions. However, due to active involvement in the process of devising and improving on the 
OEEC/OECD Model texts, there have been no major conceptual differences in the approach to Art. 2. 
Effective January 2007, the US Model adopted the structure of Art. 2 as contained in the OECD 
Income and Capital MC and adopted the OECD Model text almost verbatim.  
 
The fact that the drafting efforts of the OEEC were based on the analysis of existing treaties and 
regular discussions among Delegates from Members as well as non-Member countries has led to a 
remarkable track record of adherence to the draft texts in bilateral tax treaties. This, along with its 
broad wording and equally broad reference to subsequently introduced taxes, accounts for the fact that 
Art. 2 has remained virtually unchanged throughout its drafting and negotiating history. 
 
 
PART III Looking behind the formal structure of Art. 2: The substantive scope of tax 
treaties 
 
A. General concept of taxes covered   
 
1. The concept of “tax” in Art. 2 
 
The notion of “tax” is a constituent foundation of the provision on “taxes covered”, but neither the 
OECD Model Conventions and Commentaries nor individual tax treaties provide a distinctive 
                                                 
305 Id., m.no. 50. 
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definition of the term.306 The following analysis aims to extract the essence of the term as used in the 
provision on taxes covered.  
 
 
1.1. Common conceptual principles 
 
From the perspective of the provision for the elimination of double taxation,307 the extent of payments 
that are seen as being covered under the treaty is particularly important under the “credit method”. If a 
payment qualifies as a tax under this article, credit will in most cases be given by the residence state 
for the payment at source even in cases where this payment is of a totally different nature than the tax 
against which it is credited.308 
 
The term “tax” has a key function not only in the treaty article on substantive scope, but also in the 
provisions on non-discrimination, exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes.309 
An entirely different understanding of the term “tax” may be called for in these respective contexts.  
 
On its face, the meaning of the term “tax” appears to be clear and universally understood. Historically, 
the legal notion of tax evolved along similar patterns in all countries, and developments seem to have 
been transported among nations. Adam Smith observed in Wealth of Nations (1776): “There is no art 
which one government sooner learns of another than that of draining money from the pocket of the 
people.” 
  
A comprehensive definition of the nature of “tax” is unattainable, as the notion is subject to complex 
social, economic and legal dynamics that work out differently across the nations and even within legal 
systems. There are vast discrepancies in detail depending on the context the term is used in.310 
Accepting that the standards to be met are far from static, basic elements of the concept of “tax” that 
are common to tax laws in the different countries serve as a touchstone in determining the taxes 
covered under tax treaties. The approach to be taken to determine whether a certain payment qualifies 
as a tax covered under tax treaties is one of approximation and of weighing up elements of more or 
less intensity against each other. The purpose of tax treaties warrants for a typological, flexible term 
of tax whose elements can be concretized by the contracting parties. To be aware of these elements 
can be of substantial support in the negotiation and application of tax treaties.  
 
Domestic tax laws usually do not provide a definition of what is a tax as covered by their tax treaties; 
recourse to domestic law under Art. 3(2) will thus not produce any results.311 It is usually economic 
and legal doctrine that deals with the notion of tax. From a comparative point of view, the concept of 
tax does not differ significantly from one country to another. As discussed at the 9th Meeting of the 
EATLP in 2005 on “The Concept of Tax”,312 an integrated approach is to be taken for purposes of tax 
treaties based on the OECD Models. Common general definitions, legal theory and decisions of courts 
in the different nations mirror key elements of the concept of tax that are independent of stand-alone 
domestic concepts and valid also in the context of tax treaties.   
 
                                                 
306 Treaties sometimes mention the term in the provision on general definitions; however, definitions remain rather uninformative. 
An example is the Germany–Ireland Income Tax Treaty of 1962, which stipulates in Art. II(1)(a) (General Definitions): “In this 
Convention, unless the context otherwise requires: The term “tax” means Federal Republic tax or Irish tax, as the context requires.”  
307 Art. 23 of the OECD Income and Capital Model Tax Convention; Art. 9 of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model Tax 
Convention. 
308 See also Jiménez, “Defining the Objective Scope of Income Tax Treaties: The Impact of Other Treaties and EC Law on the 
Concept of Tax in the OECD Model”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 432. 
309 Arts. 24, 26 and 27 of the OECD Income and Capital Model Tax Convention respectively deal with non-discrimination, 
exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes. There are analogous provisions regarding non-discrimination and 
the exchange of information in Arts. 10 and 12, resp., of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model Tax Convention. 
310 Cf. similar considerations in Heij, “The Definition of Tax”, Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2001, pp. 74 et seq. 
311 See also Van Raad, “The Concept of Tax in the OECD Model”, Paper for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting on "The Concept of 
Tax" held in Caserta, Italy (2005). 
312 9th Annual EATLP Meeting, “Il Concetto di Tributo/The Concept of Tax”, held in Caserta, Naples (Italy) from 26-28 March 
2005. 
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Based on common conceptual principles across the nations, the considerations that follow intend to 
provide a framework that can function as a coherent basis in the effort to ascertain whether a levy at 
issue qualifies as a tax covered under treaties patterned on the OECD Models. Identifying common 
characteristics indicating a “tax” for purposes of tax treaty application can help foresee common 
interpretive problems and trigger discussions of country-specific issues during treaty negotiations. 
 
The focus in the process of qualifying a payment as a tax coming within the scope of a treaty must 
logically be on the essential characteristics of the payment rather than its denomination.313 Chapter to 
this line of thinking was given, for example, in the Commentary to the Model Tax Conventions of 
Mexico and London: “The Convention is intended to apply to all ordinary and special taxes on 
individual and corporate income, whatever may be their denomination and method of assessment.”314   
 
Such an approach of “substance over form” is vital to the application of international agreements. 
Regarding the substantive scope of the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the ECJ held that a tax that 
had the same effect as a tax on income was to come within the scope of the Directive, irrespective of 
the fact that it was called an inheritance and gift tax under domestic law.315 
 
Whether a legal provision labels a payment as a “tax” can never be more than an indication of its 
nature316 because denominations will in many cases be the result of political and budgetary 
considerations rather than an assessment of the character of the levy. In fact, it is a widespread 
phenomenon among governments in the different states to avoid a clear distinction between “taxes” 
and other government levies, because the implementation of a “tax” (or its notional equivalent in the 
language of the respective state) will generally be more unpopular with taxpayers than a levy termed 
otherwise.317 The characteristics of a payment as opposed to its labelling by government are often 
invoked in constitutional law in the different countries.318 Whichever way a payment is termed in the 
respective state, it may come within the scope of tax treaties if its characteristic features are such that 
it can be seen to be a “tax in all but name”. Therefore, the key question to be answered is: What is the 
substance of a “tax” that qualifies as pertaining to “taxes covered” under a tax treaty adopting the 
OECD Model texts? 
 
In the context of tax treaties, one element of the term “taxes” that suggests itself is their pecuniary 
nature; the application of tax treaties presupposes a payment of money. Along with the fact that 
taxation is public in nature, its pecuniary character is rooted in its basic purpose of contributing to 
public treasury. However, as reflected in most generic definitions,319 pecuniarity is not to be taken for 
granted in all contexts. For purposes of the OECD Revenue Statistics, the OECD “Glossary of 
                                                 
313 See also Büge in Becker/Höppner et al., Commentary on Art. 2 para. 1, m.no. 12. 
314 League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions – Commentary and Text (Geneva, 
November 1946) C.88.M.88.1946.II.A, Commentary on the Model Bilateral Convention on the Prevention of the Double Taxation 
of Income and Property, Ad Article I – Object and Scope of the Model Convention, p.11 (emphasis added). 
315 C-375/98, Ministério Público and Fazenda Pública v. Epson Europe BV, Judgment of 8 June 2000, ECR I-4243. 
316 This approach appears to be universal in jurisprudence throughout the nations. Examples are the Australian case The King v. 
Caledonian Colleries Limited (1928) A.C. 358 (“The nature of the tax is the question of substance and does not turn on the language 
used by the legislature.”) and the US case United States v. LaFranca, US Supreme Court (1931) 282 U.S. 568 (“No mere exercise 
of the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be 
converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.”). 
317 See also Dahmén, “Tax or Charge – What is the difference, if any?”, in Lindencrona et al. (eds.) International Studies in 
Taxation: Law and Economics, liber amicorum Leif Muten (1999) p. 105 (108). 
318 For more on such provisions governing fiscal federalism in Austria, see Raschauer, “Abgabenbegriff und 
Rechtsformenmissbrauch”, in liber amicorum Stoll (1990) p. 214 (215); M. Lang, “Die Geldleistung an eine Gebietskörperschaft als 
Kriterium des finanzverfassungsrechtlichen Abgabenbegriffs”, in Akyürek/Metin et al. (eds.) Staat und Recht in europäischer 
Perspektive, liber amicorum Heinz Schäffer (2006) pp. 411 et seq. 
319 Black’s Law Dictionary states: “Although a tax is often thought of as being pecuniary in nature, it is not necessarily payable in 
money.” Most law dictionaries, however, see taxes to be pecuniary payments: Oran’s Dictionary of the Law defines tax as “a 
required payment of money to support the government.” Random House Webster’s Pocket Legal Dictionary: “[A] sum of money 
required to be paid to the federal, state, or local government for the support of government activities and services to the public at 
large.” Barron’s Law Dictionary: “[A] rate or sum of money assessed on a person or property for the support of the government.” 
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Statistical Terms” describes taxes as payments in cash or in kind.320 However, taxation addressed in 
tax treaties must be explicit in the sense that there is budgetary evidence of the taxation event.321 
 
As a starting point in the interpretation of tax treaty terms, dictionary definitions have often been cited 
by courts and administrations.322 Recurring in legal definitions across the nations is the description of 
“taxes” as compulsory contributions to revenue that are imposed by government authorities.323 
Voluntary payments do not have the character of “taxes” in the proper meaning of the word.  
  
An interesting issue in this context is whether a refund not granted to the taxpayer may be seen as a 
tax under the treaty. The Federal Tax Court of Germany decided a case concerning a refund that the 
taxpayer had been entitled to in the source state but which he did not claim in due time.324 The 
question arose whether, in the amount exceeding lawful withholding in the source state, the taxpayer 
could claim a credit for this “tax” in the state of residence under the provision conforming to Art. 23 
of the OECD Model text.   
 
The Court decided against a credit under the treaty, as the amount exceeding maximum credit cannot 
be considered to have been taxed in the source state “in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention”, given the fact that the source state did not have any domestic taxing jurisdiction 
regarding this amount in the first place. This corresponds to a principle commonly followed by 
countries that grant foreign tax credits: refundable amounts do not count against the foreign tax credit, 
as a refund is in essence a grant. Lang noted that the Court’s decision in fact leads to the only result 
feasible and practicable: any other approach would open the floodgates to collusion between the 
taxpayer and the tax authorities of the source state to effectively shift the burden of granting relief 
from double taxation to the residence state.325 Many credit states have specific rules explicitly denying 
a credit for “voluntary” taxes and usually employ the words “subject to the provisions of domestic 
law” in their version of Art. 23. This is not a novel issue: the 1924 draft for a treaty between Danzig 
and Poland clarified in Art. IX para. 2 that “[t]axes already collected shall be refunded in accordance 
with the regulations of the Party which is responsible for making the refund.”326  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the fact that a payment may be refundable or creditable does not 
preclude its character of a tax covered under tax treaties, so long as there was an actual taxation event 
that the treaty ties in with.327 
 
One aspect of the element of “compulsion” expressed in the various definitions (“compulsory”, 
“enforced”, “imposed”, “involuntary”) is that the taxpayer has no choice of whether or not to make 
the payment. The very notion of tax, in itself and of necessity, suggests imposition independent of 
individual consent. Stiglitz noted in his standard work on public finance that “taxes are inevitably 
painful.”328 Where pecuniary burdens directly result from decisions of a voluntary nature on the part 
of the payer, e.g. the decision to acquire a permit, the payment will in principle not be a tax for tax 
treaty purposes. However, the mere observation that payments result from an act or decision of the 
payor will not in all cases per se take away from their compulsory character, as a certain extent of 
                                                 
320 OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965–2005, 2006 edn, published 17 October 2006. The Glossary draws from international statistical 
guidelines prepared by international organizations such as the UN, ILO or IMF. 
321 The distinction between “explicit” and “implicit” taxation was coined by A. R. Prest; for more information on this definition see 
Heij, European Taxation 2001, p. 78. 
322 Edwardes-Ker (1996) Chap. 7, p. 3. 
323 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines “tax” as “a contribution to state revenue compulsorily levied on 
individuals, property, or businesses”. Oran’s Dictionary of the Law states that “tax” is “a required payment of money to support the 
government”. 
324 German Federal Tax Court (BFH) Case No. I R 37/83, decision of 21 May 1986. 
325 Cf. M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (2005), p. 219. 
326 Agreement between the Free City of Danzig and the Republic of Poland with a view to the adjustment of Taxation by the two 
States and in particular the Prevention of Double Taxation in the matter of Direct Taxes; unperfected, published 17 March 1924. 
327 See also Debatin/Wassermeyer, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 26. 
328 Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (2000) p. 456. 
 51 
 
unfettered choice is intrinsic to society.329 The delimitation from services rendered at the taxpayer’s 
request will sometimes be blurred.330  
 
An essential feature of taxes is that they are imposed “authoritatively” by way of an act of state 
sovereignty. Some authors have argued that the fact that a payment is enforceable by the government 
automatically renders it a tax.331 While it is a valid finding that any tax is “taken rather than paid”, the 
broad distinction between voluntary and involuntary payments is not sufficient to resolve unclear 
cases. A marker of distinction sometimes used in domestic court decisions332 is that taxes do not 
involve any contractual or do ut des relationship between government and the payer. Such payments, 
for example payments with regard to tax liens or bonds obtained through a contract with government 
authorities, are outside the scope of tax treaties.  
 
The involuntary character of taxes is closely linked to the existential justification of government in the 
large: taxes are used to fund the social costs of society as a whole and thus to provide “common 
welfare”. There is no incentive whatsoever for the individual to keep adding to the common fund 
where citizens can freely resort to the social benefits provided by society. To quote Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”333 This thought reflects the 
universally accepted and very general requisite that taxes are to be used for public purposes, i.e. to 
defray public goods and services such as public safety, the printing of currency, a functioning court 
system, transportation and education, etc.334  
 
Some definitions expressly stress the fact that taxes are to be used for public purposes in that taxes 
should be used to finance “public goods”.335 From the perspective used in this thesis, this common 
understanding is not to be mistaken with what has been called the “benefit principle of taxation” in 
mainstream economic theory.336 The “benefit principle” is the idea that taxes are justified in that they 
are levied in proportion to services provided by government that help to produce private profit. 
Another, nowadays more commonly invoked, principle for justifying the imposition of a tax is the 
principle of “ability to pay”, which postulates that persons should sacrifice to government according 
to their respective abilities to pay in terms of material wealth.337 Both of the said principles are 
accommodated in the allocation of taxing rights under the OECD Model Conventions.   
 
To determine whether there is a sufficient connection for assigning tax jurisdiction under a treaty, the 
drafters of the OECD Model texts considered the territory principle and the direct benefit principle.338 
                                                 
329 Regarding the decision to operate a business, cf. the considerations under II.A.1. in Blegen, 104 Comm.L.J. 97 (1999). 
330 See the considerations by Lorenzo del Federico, “The concept of tax and the commutative taxation”, p. 44 (45) of the Conference 
Paper on “The Concept of Tax in EU Member States - General Introduction and Comparative Analysis” by Peeters/Barassi/Barker 
et al., prepared for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting on “The Concept of Tax” in Caserta, Italy (2005). 
331 Brennan/Buchanan, The Power to Tax – Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (1980) Chap. 9.1.25: “For the ordinary 
citizen, the power to tax is the most familiar manifestation of the government's power to coerce.” 
332 See, for example, Farmers Frozen Food Company, 221 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Cal. 1963) regarding the distinction between taxes 
and other assessments, where “voluntary” is understood in the sense of “contractual”. 
333 In the US Supreme Court case Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, decision of 21 Nov 
1927, 275 US 87; 48 S Ct 100; 72 L Ed 177. 
334 This has been seen to be rooted in utilitarianism, which sees taxes as a contribution to a common societal goal, as opposed to 
libertarianism, which basically sees taxation as a form of expropriation. For more on what have been called “the libertarian vs the 
utilitarian views of taxation”, see Barker/Vording, “The relevance of a concept of tax – Normative considerations”, paper for the 
Meeting of the EATLP on “The Concept of Tax”, held in Caserta, Italy on 26-28 March 2005. 
335 Cf. a definition that has been quoted and endorsed by US courts: “Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons 
and property, levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs.” [Cited in Brian 
E. Garner (ed.) Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn. (2004) from the original: Thomas M. Cooley in Clark A. Nichols (ed.) The Law of 
Taxation, 4th edn. (1924) p. 61.] 
336 A comprehensive account of the “benefit principle” in public finance can be found in Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance – 
A Study in Public Economy (1959) pp. 61 et seq. 
337 This principle is foundational in the income tax systems of many countries. For a critical analysis, see Gassner/Lang, “Die 
mangelnde Leistungsfähigkeit des Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzips”, ÖStZ 2000, pp. 643 et seq. See also Geier, “Time to bring back the 
‘benefit’ norm?”, TAWD 2004, pp. 41 et seq. 
338 Cf. K. Vogel, “Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income: A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part III)”, Intertax 1988, 
393 et seq.; .Rixen, “Why Bilateralism? – Cooperation in International Double Taxation Avoidance”, Conference Paper, available 
online at www.gsa.iu-bremen.de/data/Rixen.pdf. 
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Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Stamp, in their 1923 Report on Double Taxation, discussed 
the direct benefit principle as part of the principle of ability to pay: “So far as the benefits connected 
with the acquisition of wealth increase individual faculty, they constitute an element not to be 
neglected.  The same is true of the benefits connected with the consumption side of faculty.”339 
 
These principles, however, are merely a vehicle to allocate tax jurisdiction in the treaty context; 
principles on tax fairness and equality of taxation of domestic tax systems are of no import for 
purposes of tax treaty application, as tax treaties follow existing tax burdens. Moreover, fairness 
considerations cannot logically be of use at this point of the study, as they presuppose as their very 
conceptual corollary a notion of tax and aim to provide a test and measure of how the burden of tax is 
to be apportioned; therefore, they cannot yield results with respect to what constitutes a “tax”.340  
 
A clear indicator of special benefits preventing classification as a tax is the conclusion that if it were 
used to fund general revenue, the imposition would constitute a “confiscation”.341 However, there are 
cases where it is open to argument whether a special benefit rather than a benefit to the general public 
is granted. Payments for services and utilities such as garbage disposal, lighting, sewer systems, storm 
drains or other infrastructure needs can be seen to directly benefit specific areas, and thus to benefit 
not the public at large but certain individuals. Where the individual incurs an expense that is met with 
a corresponding benefit, the nature of the payment is not that of a tax for tax treaty purposes.  
 
In domestic court cases, the “public purpose” requirement of taxes is usually seen to be fulfilled even 
if the funds collected are segregated from the general revenue pool in that they are earmarked by 
government to finance specific kinds of public expenditure.342 Earmarking a tax towards financing 
specific public goods and services that all taxpayers pay for may occur with respect to different areas 
in the various countries, e.g. higher education, research, health care, railroads, etc. The broad notion 
of “public goods” hinges upon common perception in the respective country,343 and the line between 
taxes and payments for certain benefits will often be tenuous.   
 
This is exemplified in the case of levies regarding television and radio where these services are 
provided by public authorities. Domestic jurisprudence in this area varies across the nations and may 
at times be ambiguous even within domestic jurisprudence.344 While the criteria to measure whether a 
payment is a “requited” payment rather than a tax remain uncertain, the basic distinction of taxes as 
opposed to payments that trigger individual services in return is consistently sustained throughout the 
nations. Where the payment is not directed toward the individual as such but rather aimed at the 
individual as part of society, any identifiable benefit to the individual being more or less incidental, 
the payment may qualify as a tax that comes under tax treaties. This distinction has also been used by 
the ECJ.345  
                                                 
339 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Report on Double Taxation, Submitted to the Financial Committee by 
Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Stamp, Geneva, 5 April 1923 (F.19) at 18. 
340 See also the remark that constitutional principles in the various nations such as legality and ability to pay do not influence the 
notion of tax in Barassi, “The notion of tax and the different types of taxes – Comparative Law Approach”, p. 32 (35) of the 
Conference Paper on “The Concept of Tax in EU Member States – General Introduction and Comparative Analysis” by 
Peeters/Barassi/Barker et al., prepared for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting on "The Concept of Tax" in Caserta, Italy (2005). 
341 See also the arguments made with regard to “special assessments” on property in Blegen, “Would a Tax by any other Name 
Smell as Sweet? The Treatment of Special Assessments in Bankruptcy”, 104 Commercial Law Journal 97 (1999). 
342 Cf. the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court, Case No. B 514/04, decision of 14 December 2004; US Court of the Northern 
District of California, Farmers Frozen Food Company (1963) For more on the treatment of earmarked taxes for purposes of the 
substantive scope, see Part III, Chap. 1.2.6. 
343 See also Heij, “The Definition of Tax”, Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 2001, p. 76. 
344 See, e.g., the Belgian Constitutional Court on levies in the audio-visual sector, which were not regarded as a tax: Cour 
d’Arbitrage, Case No. 117/2002, decision of 3 July 2002; however, the Belgian Judicial Court (Cour de cassation) has sometimes 
held the same levy to be a regular earmarked tax. See also Bourgeois, “Constitutional framework of the different types of Income”, 
p. 49 (74) of the Conference Paper on “The Concept of Tax in EU Member States – General Introduction and Comparative 
Analysis” by Peeters/Barassi/Barker et al., prepared for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting on “The Concept of Tax” in Caserta, Italy 
(2005). 
345 See ECJ, case C-130/93, ECR 1994, I-03215, on the issue whether a compulsory contribution is in accordance with Arts. 9 and 
12 of the EC Treaty: “[A] charge which is imposed on goods … may escape classification as a charge having equivalent effect as 
prohibited by the Treaty … if it represents payment for a specific service actually and individually rendered to the trader of a sum in 
proportion to that service.” 
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The OECD Model Conventions are in line with this conceptual approach. While the Model 
Commentaries do not explicitly give chapter for this distinction, the 1969 Report of WP No. 30 
contains a statement in this vein: “In theory, payments made upon a legal obligation are normally 
qualified as ‘taxes’ if they are made without any specific return.”346 
 
The IBFD International Tax Glossary, which is frequently referenced by practitioners and researchers 
alike, states: “There is no single definition of a tax and definitions tend to vary according to the 
context. In general a tax may be defined as a government levy which is not in return for a specific 
benefit….”  Moreover, mention is made in this glossary of the OECD Glossary of Tax Terms, which 
asserts: “The OECD working definition of a tax is a compulsory unrequited payment to the 
government.” While the OECD Glossary does not further elaborate, the IBFD’s definition goes on to 
state: “It is unrequited in the sense that benefits provided by government to taxpayers are not normally 
in proportion to their tax payments….” 
 
Seligman, one of the authors of the 1923 report submitted to the League of Nations Fiscal Committee 
that served as the basis for the first Draft Double Taxation Conventions,347 noted: “Where the 
government actually performs a definite service for the particular individual, the benefits of which are 
separably and measurably calculable, these payments do not come under the head of taxes, properly 
so-called, but they are fees.”348  
 
Whenever the payment secures concrete government action or the concession of certain commodities 
to the individual payer, it is not a tax in character and will generally be outside the scope of tax 
treaties. However, the notion of “benefit” is ultimately defined by government and often does not 
coincide with an actual subjective benefit of the payer, who may view the involvement of government 
as an intervention. An example is the case of stamp duties levied upon drawing up a contract between 
private individuals. Such duties levied on paper and electronic transactions are generally seen to be 
outside treaty scope. Some income tax treaties expressly list stamp duties in Art. 2.349 Unless 
expressly mentioned, these duties are not within the notion of tax in international tax language. 
However, where the basis of a stamp duty is the value of assets transferred, the duty can be qualified 
as an inheritance or gift tax; thus, stamp duties are sometimes included in inheritance and gift tax 
treaties.350   
 
Other payments regularly seen to be requited and thus not covered under tax treaties are user charges, 
court fees, passport fees and royalties paid to the state for the extraction of natural resources such as 
minerals or oil. Nevertheless, the fact that there is room for contention in practice as regards the 
distinction between taxes and payments for certain benefits is showcased in the area of royalty 
payments:  oil-rich states have sometimes been known to levy “profits taxes” instead of royalties in 
order to obtain relief under tax treaties.351 
 
Thus far, it can be observed that the concepts of tax on the one hand, and payments for certain 
benefits on the other hand, albeit commonly used as distinct notions, cannot be clearly differentiated 
in a global approach but rather on a case-by-case basis, weighing up the elements laid out in the 
above. The concept of tax in tax treaties is not a clear-cut analytical concept. There are in substance 
                                                 
346 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 27 (emphasis in the original). 
347 Cf. 1925 League of Nations Double Taxation and Tax Evasion – Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to 
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, under Part II.1.: “[W]e have profited by the results of the investigations 
undertaken and completed by the Special Committee of Economists … a most important work of economic analysis which … 
served as the basis for our work. This masterly report has been of inestimable value to us.” 
348 Seligman, “The Progress of Taxation during the Past Twenty-Five Years, and Present Tendencies”, AEAQ, 3rd Series, Vol. 11, 
No 1 (1910) p. 331 (342). 
349 See, e.g. Art. 2(3)(b)(iii) of the China–Macao Income Tax Treaty of 27 December 2003, effective 1 January 2004. 
350 See, e.g., the Nordic Convention on Estates, Inheritances, and Gift Taxes of 12 September 1989, effective 18 October 1992. 
“Stamp taxes” are oftentimes expressly incorporated in treaties with African states; see, e.g. the Benin–France Income, Inheritance, 
Registration and stamp Tax Treaty of 27 February 1975, effective 1 January 1977. 
351 See Baker, Commentary, 2B.12, with references to case law. 
 54 
 
certain core characteristics of taxes that recur in economic and legal definitions as well as in court 
decisions of the various nations, and that are suitable also in the tax treaty context: taxes are 
involuntary pecuniary burdens imposed by way of state sovereignty on all taxpayers, regardless of 
whether they utilize goods and services provided to the public at large. Moreover, it should be 
stressed that an exclusive financing function of taxes is not a prerequisite to the concept, as taxation 
has increasingly become an instrument allowing government to realize its social and economic 
policies, most importantly redistribution.   
 
The fact that the concept of tax in Art. 2 is fraught with definitional problems which make conclusive 
answers virtually impossible does not render further considerations pointless; quite the opposite is 
true: as shown in the following, it is a worthwhile effort to refine perception through further analysis 
of elements that play a role in the wording of Art. 2 as well as in the tax treaty context. 
 
A straightforward indication as to the concept of “taxes” under Art. 2 of both Model Conventions is 
the statement in para. 2 that the taxes described are covered “irrespective of the manner in which they 
are levied”. Whether taxes are levied directly or by way of withholding at the source, whether they are 
levied on a certain percentage that may be linked to specific factors, or even to the percentage of 
another tax, etc., the method of its assessment under domestic law has no bearing on the tax treaty 
coverage of the levy. Moreover, from this it can be concluded that the manner in which taxes are 
collected is irrelevant to treaty application. Government may outsource tax collection. Lawmakers in 
the United States, for example, have allowed private debt collectors to collect taxes due; as an 
incentive, the private collectors may keep 25% of the amount collected. Opponents of this practice, 
which was signed into law with the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, have argued 
that such collection of taxes undermines the inherently governmental character of taxation.352   
 
Arguably, net accretion to the government’s budget is not a necessary feature of taxes. Lozev makes 
this argument in the context of an envisaged compensatory tax in Bulgaria on interest income from 
countries that withhold payments in compliance with the EC Interest and Savings Directive.353  While 
different taxes have different immediate goals and vary with respect to revenue effects, the body of 
taxes as a whole nevertheless aims at increasing government funds. It should be noted, however, that 
where a levy is aimed at reimbursing government authorities for services rendered previously or 
subsequently, it is a fee in nature rather than a tax, and no tax treaty coverage is warranted.   
 
As the OECD Model Commentary to Art. 2 stresses that the article is designed to “broaden as much 
as possible the scope of the Convention,” the substantive scope crucially hinges upon the 
determination as to a broader or narrower conception of “taxes”. 
 
 
1.2. Indirect taxes 
 
The IBFD International Tax Glossary expresses a common legal distinction: “Taxes may be direct or 
indirect, depending upon whom the incidence of the tax burden falls.”  
 
Most commonly within the category of “indirect taxes” are taxes on the consumption of goods and 
services collected at the final (retail) level or at various stages of production and distribution, usually 
referred to as value added taxes (VAT). Value added taxes and similar turnover taxes can be found in 
the vast majority of tax systems across the globe. While they are implemented differently around the 
world and across OECD Member countries, there are common core features. VAT is usually levied on 
a broad base (as opposed to excise taxes, which cover specific products). The tax is collected in a 
staged process based on the production/distribution chain, with successive taxpayers entitled to deduct 
                                                 
352 See further Yvonne R. Cort and Karen J. Tenenbaum, “More Ways to Collect from Taxpayers – IRS can use private debt 
collectors”, article on file with the author. 
353 K. Lozev, “Implementation of the Savings Directive in Bulgaria – Selected Issues”, 48 European Taxation 10 (2008) p. 534 
(538) makes this argument in the context of an envisaged compensatory tax on interest income from countries that withhold 
payments in compliance with the EC Interest and Savings Directive.   
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input tax on purchases and account for output tax on sales. In general, OECD countries with value 
added taxes impose the tax at all stages and allow immediate deduction of the tax upon purchase by 
all but the final consumer. This right of deduction of input tax through the supply chain with the 
exception of the final consumer ensures the neutrality of the tax towards factors like the nature of the 
product or the structure of the distribution chain.354 
 
In the international context, double taxation with respect to VAT is usually avoided because of the 
destination principle: exports are exempt from tax, while imports are taxed on the same basis and at 
the same rate as domestic production. However, this principle is not uniformly implemented in 
different countries, which can sometimes lead to double taxation or unintended non-taxation.   
 
The 1925 Report of experts to the League of Nations Fiscal Committee gave the following reason for 
dealing with “direct taxes” only: 
 
We recognize … the possibility of double taxation and evasion in the case of other kinds of taxes; but we have 
reached the conclusion, after consideration, that this matter should not be subject of any prolonged examination on 
our part. In the first place, the financial results of double taxation and evasion in this class of taxes are, in our 
opinion, very limited; in the second place, the differences and complexities of the various legislatures are far more 
accentuated in this sphere than in the sphere of direct taxes.355 
 
However, at various stages throughout the history of international taxation, the inclusion of “indirect 
taxes” in tax treaties was taken into consideration. According to a 1931 Report of the League of 
Nations Fiscal Committee, 
 
[a]t the General Meeting of Government experts held at Geneva in 1928, the point was raised whether measures 
designed to prevent double taxation should not also be extended to the turnover tax.… A first exchange of views 
on this problem took place in the Fiscal Committee, which considered that it presented a different aspect according 
to whether the turnover tax was levied directly on the income of the taxpayers or on the movement of goods or 
capital.356 
 
The 1929 Report of the League of Nations Fiscal Committee to the Council contains the suggestion 
for a “study of the possibility of extending the measures designed to avoid double taxation to turnover 
tax, stamp duties and various charges in respect of international commerce.”357  
 
The OEEC sustained efforts in this vein. In 1954, a Swiss Delegation submitted to the OEEC Council 
a note concerning double taxation in relation to indirect taxes and duties, asking the Council to study 
this issue in further detail, which was circulated among Members and non-Members for discussion.358 
The Delegate for Sweden noted that indirect taxes 
 
did not generally give rise in the matter of double taxation to problems as grave as those raised by direct taxes.… [The 
Delegate for Sweden] nevertheless considers that a study which would help to clarify the situation might be useful, as 
it would show where there was double taxation with regard to indirect taxes and in what cases certain incomes were 
subject to double taxation in that they were subject to direct taxation in one country and in another country … to an 
indirect tax.359  
 
In a 1955 Proposal, Delegates from Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany referred the matter to 
the Council: 
 
                                                 
354 See further OECD, International VAT/GST Guidelines (2006). 
355 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report and Resolutions, Submitted by the Technical Experts to the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations, Geneva,  7 February 1925 (F.212) Note to Part III of the Report. 
356 League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Work of the Third Session of the Committee, held in Geneva 
from 29 May to 6 June 1931, C.415.M.171.1931.II.A, Chap. VII. (Double Taxation in regard to the Turnover Tax). 
357 League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, Report to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Committee Geneva, 26 
October 1929, C.516.M.175.1929.II, Chap. IV. 
358 The core statements of this document, circulated as C(54)331, are summarized in OEEC Council, Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion, C/M(55)2 (Prov.). 
359 C/M(55)2 (Prov.) p. 21-22. 
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It would also be of immediate practical interest to study these cases of double taxation which have not been settled 
by such agreements, particularly cases concerning indirect taxes, which have never been the subject of preparatory 
studies, either in the League of Nations, the United Nations or in other International Organisations.360   
 
This was followed up by the 1955 Report of a group of fiscal experts, which also suggested the 
creation of a Fiscal Committee.361   
 
With respect to indirect taxation, the experts noted: 
 
The Group was also of the opinion that a study should be made of the problems of double taxation arising in the 
field of indirect taxes and, in particular, turnover taxes. The object of this study would be: (a) to examine cases 
where the same transaction is subject to turnover tax in several Member countries of the O.E.E.C., by reason of the 
differences between their fiscal systems, and the means by which this double taxation can be eliminated; (b) to 
determine whether and in which way it would be possible, with regard to services, to establish rules concerning 
turnover taxes which would lead to the elimination of double taxation.362  
 
This Proposal was adopted, and the newly created Fiscal Committee was instructed, inter alia, to 
study: 
 
In the field of direct taxation: … Which taxes on income, capital, estates and inheritances should be included in 
Double Taxation Agreements; … In the field of indirect taxation: (a) By which means can double taxation be 
avoided where the same transaction is subject to turnover tax in several Member countries; and (b) Whether and in 
which way can double imposition of turnover tax be avoided with regard to services.363  
 
At the 17th Session of the OECD Fiscal Committee in 1964, WP No. 24 was set up “to study the 
question of international double taxation with respect to indirect taxes.” The WP stated that 
 
[d]ouble taxation of two different kinds may arise in connection with indirect taxes on services: (a) Double 
taxation arising out of the concurrent levying of an indirect tax and an income tax on the same service. (b) Double 
taxation arising out of the levying of an indirect tax in more than one country on the same service.364 
 
However, the WP noted from the outset that these problems are “limited in extent by the fact that in a 
number of Member countries taxes are either not levied on services at all or else are levied on only a 
few services.”365 Work in the area of indirect taxation was eventually discontinued, also with a view 
to the fact that EEC Directives in this area were expected to be adopted by 1967.366  
 
Moreover, VAT as well as customs duties and special excise taxes (e.g. taxes on petroleum, tobacco 
or alcohol) are dealt with in the framework of the GATT and WTO Agreements. Farrell noted that 
figuratively speaking, “adopting the assumption that customs duties fall under the concept of tax one 
may view the GATT as a multilateral indirect tax treaty.”367 As VAT and similar taxes like sales taxes 
in the cross-border context are increasingly taxed in the country of destination, problems of double 
taxation are rare, which is why non-coverage in tax treaties can be seen to be warranted. Customs 
duties and VAT also come within the EU customs union; Art. 93 of the EC Treaty provides for the 
harmonization of “turnover taxes”, which has been effected by a number of EC Directives regarding 
                                                 
360 OEEC, Proposal by the Netherlands, Swiss and German Delegations concerning Double Taxation Questions to be discussed by a 
Group of Taxation Experts which should be set up within the O.E.E.C., 9 Paris December 1955, C(55)307, p. 2. 
361 OEEC Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Fiscal Questions, 24 Paris February, 1955, C(56)49, m.no. 11: “The 
ad hoc Group of Experts therefore unanimously recommends to the Council that a specialist body on fiscal questions should be 
established within O.E.E:C. on a permanent basis.” 
362 Id., m.no. 6. 
363 OEEC, Council, Resolution of the Council Creating a Fiscal Committee, Paris, 19 March 1956, C(56)49(Final). 
364 OECD, WP No. 24 (Double Taxation with respect to Indirect Taxes) 1st Report on Double Indirect Taxation, FC/WP 24(66)1, 
m.no. 4. 
365 Id., m.no. 5. 
366 OECD, Fiscal Committee, Minutes of the 23rd Session held at the Château de la Muette, Paris, 10-13 May 1966; Paris, 10 June 
1966, FC/M(66)1, Point VII. (Double Indirect Taxation) containing a statement of the Representative of the European Economic 
Commission. 
367 Farrell, “The Concept of Tax in the World Trade Organisation Agreements − A Brief Overview”, Paper for the 9th Annual 
EATLP Meeting on “The Concept of Tax” on 27-29 May 2005. 
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VAT. All of these taxes, commonly classified as “indirect taxes”, can be seen to be outside of the 
scope of the OECD Model Conventions.  
 
Nevertheless, hybrid forms of taxation may well have aspects which are direct and such that are 
indirect, which makes classification difficult. An interesting case in this context arose when Italy 
introduced a tax on regional productive activities in 1998; the “IRAP”368 is a regional tax imposed on 
productive activities of manufacturing enterprises, professionals, non-residents and other entities, 
which replaced the Italian local income tax that is listed in Italian tax treaties. One of the features of 
the IRAP is that it is not based on a traditionally calculated taxable profit, but is closer to a turnover 
tax in that it is levied on each stage of production. The IRAP was accepted as a creditable tax under 
most tax treaties.369 The new Italy–US tax treaty of 1999 (which is not yet in force) explicitly lists the 
IRAP as a covered tax.370 The ECJ dealt with the question whether the IRAP was a prohibited 
turnover tax under the VAT Directives, a question that was answered in the affirmative in two 
Advocate-General Opinions.371   
 
A decision to the effect that the IRAP is seen to be incompatible with the Community prohibition of 
national turnover taxes other than VAT would have led to claims by taxpayers in Italy’s treaty 
partners to reclaim IRAP (or similar taxes) previously credited as income taxes. Surprisingly, the ECJ 
decided contrary to the earlier A-G Opinions, holding that the IRAP does not contravene EC law.372 
 
The express reference to “direct taxes” contained in the League of Nations Draft Model Conventions 
(see Annex I) was not endorsed in the 1957 Draft Conventions. The Italian Delegate comments that 
the first paragraph of the draft article “adopts … the terms ‘taxes on income’ and ‘taxes on capital’, 
thus dispensing with the less precise term ‘direct taxes’.”373 The current Model Commentaries contain 
a similar statement: “This paragraph defines the scope of application of the Convention: taxes on 
income and on capital; the term ‘direct taxes’ which is far too imprecise has therefore been 
avoided.”374 
 
The distinction between “direct” and “indirect” taxes is quite old; John Stuart Mill wrote in 1948: 
 
Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded from the very person who it is intended or 
desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intuition 
that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another; such are the excise or customs.375 
 
Such distinction, however, has been subject to criticism and different interpretive approaches in 
various contexts.376 It features prominently in EC law and in world trade law, the latter giving 
definitions of “direct” and “indirect” taxes as used in the ASCM.377 These definitions are applied in all 
                                                 
368 The regional tax on productive activities (Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive) was introduced by Legislative Decree 
(Decreto legislative) No. 446 of 15 December 1997. See Frei, “Die neue regionale Steuer IRAP” (in Italian),  IWB No. 12/1998, pp. 
433 et seq.; Gantz/Gramaccia, “Die Einführung der IRAP” (in Italien), SWI 2000, pp. 270 et seq. 
369 Cf. Pandolfini, “IRAP: The Regional Tax on Productive Activities – International Issues”, European Taxation 1999, pp. 249 et 
seq. 
370 Art. 2(b)iii of the Italy–US Convention for the Avoidance of Double taxation with respect to taxes on income and the Prevention 
of Fraud or Fiscal Evasion, concluded 25 August 1999, not yet effective. The Technical Explanation of the US Department of 
Treasury of 27 October 1999 states: “Subparagraph 2(b) specifies that the existing Italian covered taxes are the individual income 
tax; the corporation income tax; and that portion of the regional tax on productive activities (commonly known as IRAP) that is 
considered to be an income tax pursuant to paragraph 2(c) of Article 23 (Relief from Double Taxation) of the Convention.”  
371 Opinion of Attorney-General Jacobs, delivered on 17 March 2005; A-G Stix-Hackl issued her Opinion on 14 March 2006. 
372 C-475/03, Banca popolare di Cremona Soc. coop. Arl v. Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona, Judgment of the Court of 3 October 
2006.  Moreover, the European Commission has found that the IRAP does not constitute prohibited state aid:  Brussels, C(2006) 
State aid No 102/2006 Italy (Friuli -Venezia Giulia) – IRAP tax rate reduction – Regional Law 2/2006, art. 2.2. 
373 FC/WP 3(57)1, m.no. 4(a). 
374 Model Commentary on Art. 2(1) of the Income and Capital MC, m.no. 2. 
375 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book V, Chap. 3 (“Of Direct Taxes”), first published 1848. 
376 For more on this typological distinction and its early criticism see Weyermann, “Direkte und Indirekte Steuern – Zur 
Begründung ihrer begrifflichen Unterscheidung”, in Fricke (ed.) Finanzwirtschaft und Geschichte, FA 1936/1937. 
377 Annex I of the ASCM, note 58, provides the following definitions: “The term ‘direct taxes’ shall mean taxes on wages, profits, 
interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property.… The term ‘indirect taxes’ 
shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes 
other than direct taxes and import charges.” 
 58 
 
areas of world trade law.378 Especially for purposes of EC law, the distinction as between these two 
categories of taxes has been difficult to draw.379 Similar problems have arisen in domestic court cases 
outside of the European Community.380 However, the “shifting of burdens” seen to be the defining 
factor of indirect taxation may, in principle, also occur in the context of direct taxation.381 With a view 
to continuing difficulties attached to the delimitation between “direct” and “indirect” taxes, the 
elimination of reference to the notion of “direct taxes” in the Model Conventions was warranted.382 
 
 
1.3. Interest and penalties 
 
An important question to be answered in determining the substantive scope is whether the treaty 
applies not only to the principal amount of taxes due but also to incidental items that enable levying 
the principal tax. Until its 2000 version, the Income and Capital Model Commentary, on par with the 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, contained the following statement: 
 
Clearly, a State possessing taxing powers – and it alone – may levy the taxes imposed by its legislation together 
with any duties or charges accessory to them: increases, costs, interest, etc. It has not been considered necessary to 
specify this in the Article, as it is obvious that, in the levying of the tax, the accessory duties or charges depend on 
the same rule as the principal tax.383  
 
Coverage under the treaty is thus in general provided for taxes that are incidental to the principal tax 
and levied according to the same rules. However, practice among contracting states has varied in this 
regard. An example is the Technical Explanation to the US–Australia tax treaty, which states: “The 
covered taxes do not include penalty or interest charges. For example, the ceiling rate of tax at source 
of 15 percent on dividends under Article 10 (Dividends) does not include any penalty or interest 
charge for late payment of tax.”384 
 
New Zealand made the following observation to the 1977 OECD Commentary: “In contexts such as 
limitations on the rate of tax or the granting of credits for foreign tax, New Zealand would wish to 
make it clear that the term ‘tax’ does not include penalties.”385 This was to ensure that New Zealand 
grants credit only in the amount of the principal tax due in the other contracting state. New Zealand 
imposes penalties in the context of withholding taxes for late payment or non-compliance of fiscal 
requirements, which are regularly reciprocally exempted by the treaty partner.386 In 1995, New 
Zealand added to its observation the exclusion from treaty coverage of interest on overpayment or 
                                                 
378 Schön, “World Trade Organization Law and Tax Law”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation July 2004, p. 287. 
379 See ECJ, C-191/94, ECR 1995 at I-01859, para. 30, where the ECJ held with respect to the concept of tax in Art. 93 of the EC 
Treaty that “the charges in question could equally be regarded as direct or as indirect taxes.” 
380 See, e.g., the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan (1978) 2 S.C.R. 
545: “The dividing line between a direct and an indirect tax is referable to and ascertainable by the general tendencies of the tax and 
the common understanding of men as to those tendencies.… Certain well understood categories of taxation have been generally 
established as falling within one or other of these classes. The custom levies are recognized as being indirect taxes, whereas income 
and property taxes have been recognized as being direct taxes. A sales tax, imposed upon vendors of goods, has been generally 
regarded as an indirect tax. On the other hand, where the tax, although collected through the vendor is actually paid by the ultimate 
consumer, the tax has been held to be direct.” 
381 See the examples regarding taxes withheld at source as well as property taxes of a hired estate in Wassermeyer in 
Debatin/Wassermeyer, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 1, m.no. 13. 
382 See also M. Lang, BIFD 2005, p. 217, speaking of this decision to have been “a wise one”. 
383 1977 Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 4. See also the identical wording in m.no. 4 of the 1963 version, as well as the 1982 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 6., and m.no. 4 of the 1966 Estates and Inheritances MC 
Commentary. 
384 US Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the Convention between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of Australia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income, effective 1 December 1983, Commentary to Art. 3, at Para. 6. 
385 1977 Commentary on Art. 2 of the Income and Capital MC, m.no. 9. 
386 See, for example, Art. 3(2) of the 1982 New Zealand–US tax treaty: “In the Convention, the terms ‘New Zealand tax’ and 
‘United States tax’ do not include any amount which represents a penalty or interest imposed under the law of either Contracting 
State relating to the taxes to which the Convention applies.” 
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underpayment of tax.387 The observation was eventually deleted, as the 2000 Income and Capital MC 
Commentary took a stand on the issue: 
 
Clearly a State possessing taxing powers – and it alone – may levy the taxes imposed by its legislation together 
with any duties or charges accessory to them: increases, costs, interest, etc. It has not been considered necessary to 
specify this in the Article, as it is obvious that in the levying of the tax the accessory duties or charges depend on 
the same rule as the principal duty. Practice among Member countries varies with respect to the treatment of 
interest and penalties. Some countries never treat such items as taxes covered by the Article. Others take the 
opposite approach, especially in cases where the additional charge is computed with reference to the amount of the 
underlying tax. Countries are free to clarify this point in their bilateral negotiations.388 
 
Most income tax treaties concluded by the United States expressly provide that the accumulated 
earnings tax and the personal holding company tax are not covered.389 The accumulated earnings tax 
is classified as a penalty tax under US law since it is incurred if a corporation accrues earnings 
without distributing their dividends to stockholders. This penalty tax is owed in addition to any 
income taxes due. The holding company tax is a penalty tax of 39.6% imposed in addition to the 
corporate tax on personal holding companies. This tax is applied to the corporate taxable income, less 
distributions to shareholders, income taxes and certain other adjustments. Taxes that have a penalty 
character or similar strong domestic policy functions will regularly not be covered under tax treaties; 
however, some treaties provide for limited or conditional coverage of penalty taxes.390  
 
Arguably, for reasons of administrability and in the light of the broad coverage envisaged in Art. 2, 
interest and other charges incidental to the principal tax will regularly be covered. Monetary fines and 
penalties, albeit levied in respect of a principal tax, will often not be seen as merely incidental by the 
respective country due to their penalty character or for reasons of domestic tax policy. Conceptually, 
the non-coverage of penalty taxes does not necessarily mean that the foreign taxpayer who pays 
penalty taxes obtains no treaty relief: with respect to the US accumulated earnings tax and the 
personal holdings company tax, Larkins has noted that these penalty taxes arguably are indirectly 
reduced, since the starting point for calculating their respective tax bases is the person’s taxable 
income, as reduced by tax treaties. 
 
The concept of “tax” in tax treaties is thus broader than in the majority of domestic tax laws, where 
the notion of “tax” is limited to the principal amount due according to government tax legislation and 
does not extend to incidental charges. With regard to administrative fines and penalties accessory to 
the principal tax, the Commentary leaves the case for coverage open. Accessory duties, costs and 
interest for late filing of returns or late payment of tax can be seen to be within the substantive scope 
of the treaty unless the parties explicitly provide otherwise in the treaty or in a pertaining protocol. 
  
During the drafting of the 1928 League of Nations Models, treaty coverage of accessory charges was 
seen to best conform to the agenda of preventing double taxation. Concerns were voiced only by the 
UK Technical Expert with respect to the provision on income from shares or similar interests: “In the 
view of the British expert it is unreasonable that the financial burden of granting relief from double 
taxation in respect of the additional tax on dividends should also fall on the State of domicile.”391 It 
can indeed be argued that jurisdiction to impose tax under the treaty should not entail the right to 
impose penalties and interest for non-payment of the tax; however, this is for the treaty partners to 
agree upon during negotiations. 
 
                                                 
387 Commentary on Art. 2, m.no. 9, as amended on 21 September 1995, to state: “In contexts such as limitations on the rate of tax or 
the granting of credits for foreign tax, New Zealand would wish to make it clear that the term ‘tax’ does not include penalties, or 
interest on overpayment or underpayment of tax.”  
388 2000 Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 4; identical with the 2005 version, m.no. 4. 
389 Ernest R. Larkins, “U.S. Income Tax Treaties in Research and Planning: A Primer”, 18 Virginia Tax Review 1998, p. 133.  
390 See, e.g. m.mo. 2 (b) of the Protocol to the US–Portugal Income Tax Treaty (concluded 6 September 1994, effective 1 January 
1996). 
391 Comment by Sir Percy Thompson, Deputy Chairman of the UK Board of Inland Revenue, on Art. 4 of the 1927 Draft of a 
Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation, in: League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report 
presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Geneva, April 1927 (C.216.M.85.1927.II) 
under B.I. 
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The 1957 Commentary by the Italian Delegate of WP No. 30 contains the following clarifying 
statement: 
 
It seems clear that the proposal in the second paragraph of the draft implies that the term ‘tax’ should comprise not 
only the principal duty of tax but also all surcharges, interest, costs and all other additional duties of an accessory 
nature. As regards surcharges and money penalties, it is obvious that, like the taxes themselves, they are imposed 
by act of the taxing authority, an act which, in both cases, has the same legal character both as regards form and 
substance. As regards interest, costs, etc., these attach to the tax as an accessory attaches to its principal, and 
receive the same treatment.392 
 
On the other hand, payments of predominantly punitive character are not intended to come within 
treaty relief.393 Across nations, taxes are generally distinguished from payments that are meant as 
punishment for unlawful acts.394 Moreover, the assessment of taxes is regularly separated from the 
assessment of penalties, since most countries have codified a right not to declare against oneself. 
 
The OECD “Classification of Taxes and Interpretative Guide”, attached as an Annex to the OECD 
Revenue Statistics, states: “The term ‘tax’ does not include fines unrelated to tax offences and 
compulsory loans paid to government.”395 It may sometimes be unclear whether the main idea of the 
charge is not punishment but rather the raising of revenue. However, the assessment of taxes will in 
principle be separate from the assessment of penalties: while taxes are designed to produce revenue, 
penalties are aimed at deterring undesired taxpayer behaviour or to effect punishment; impositions of 
the latter character are generally outside the scope of tax treaties that follow the OECD Model texts. 
 
 
1.4. Payments “on behalf of” the state  
 
Art. 2(1) of the OECD Models stipulates that the treaty applies to taxes “imposed on behalf of a 
Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities”. The formulation “on behalf of” 
is also used in the context of attribution of income under the OECD Income and Capital MC.396 The 
Commentary on Art. 18, dealing with the allocation of remuneration “paid by, or on behalf of” the 
employer, states: “The phrase ‘made by or on behalf of’ is intended to apply to contributions that are 
made directly by the individual as well as to those that are made for that individual's benefit by an 
employer or another party.…”397 The focal point in the context of imposition “on behalf of” a state 
appears to be whether, from an economic rather than a formal perspective, the payments effectively 
accrue to the state.   
 
The 1925 Report submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of 
Nations speaks to this precept in describing taxation “at the source” as the assessment of the tax and 
not the method of its collection. The experts noted: “In Great Britain, as on the Continent, certain 
taxes are collected on behalf of the Treasury by a third party – for instance, the company which pays a 
dividend or interest on stock. In both cases, the tax is ‘collected at the source’”.398 Where a levy 
                                                 
392 FC/WP 3(57)1, p. 9, under 5.  
393 See also K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 28.  
394 Cf. the definition of “tax” in Larkins (ed.) International Tax Glossary, stating that taxes are generally “not imposed by way of 
fine or penalty (e.g. for non-compliance with the law).” This approach is mirrored in court cases worldwide; see e.g. the US 
Supreme Court in United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) 282 U.S., at 568: “A ‘tax’ is an enforced contribution to provide 
for the support of government; a ‘penalty’, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful 
act. The exaction here in question is not a true tax, but a penalty involving the idea of punishment.” 
395 See m.no. 2 in OECD, The OECD Classification of Taxes and Interpretative Guide (2004). 
396 See Art. 5(5), Art. 15(1)(b), and Arts. 26 and 27, as well as the Commentary to Art. 18. For a an insightful discussion of 
mentioned area, see Wheeler, “The Attribution of Income to a Person for Tax Treaty Purposes”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2005, pp. 477 et seq. 
397 Commentary on Art. 18, m.no. 49, last sentence. Cf. also the Commentary on Art. 5 para. 4, m.no. 22, speaking of “a stock of 
goods or merchandise belonging to one enterprise is processed by a second enterprise, on behalf of, or for the account of, the first-
mentioned enterprise.” 
398 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion – Report and Resolutions, Geneva, 7 February 1925, under Heading 4. 
Comments on the Resolutions.  
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accrues to the treasury of a country, irrespective of whether collection is “outsourced” to a third party, 
it is thus deemed levied on behalf of that country.   
 
Economic accrual in the sense of revenue can however not be the sole determinative factor; the 
payments must come within the purview of the sovereign powers of government. In order to serve 
government’s behalf, full discretion and control over the spending of the revenues is essential. Where 
government authorities serve only in an assessment and/or collection and enforcement capacity while 
the payments effectively accrue to agencies outside of government sovereignty, the payment cannot 
be considered a tax covered under tax treaties. Conversely, where government avails itself of private 
bodies that are under its control in the assessment and/or collection of a certain payment, this payment 
is levied according to governmental fiscal sovereignty and has the character of a tax. The same is true 
if government uses its sovereign power to earmark the tax for a special purpose, even if it aims to 
benefit non-governmental institutions serving public purposes. 
 
This differentiation will bring clarity in most cases, but sometimes, specification is necessary – e.g. 
where it is questionable whether church taxes levied in numerous European countries come within the 
treaty scope.399 While it is a constitutional principle in some countries, e.g. the United States, that 
state resources may never be allocated to religious communities, some European states, e.g. Norway 
and Greece, finance the church exclusively out of general taxation. In Italy, Spain and Hungary, a 
surcharge on the general income tax is earmarked for cultural purposes, including the church.  
 
In order to be covered under Art. 2 of the OECD Models, payments must be levied “on behalf of a 
State or its political subdivisions or local authorities”; therefore, church taxes are outside the treaty 
scope where they accrue to institutions that are different in nature from governmental political 
subdivisions or local authorities and independent of government authority in the spending of their 
accrual.400 
 
Even if the collecting and enforcement mechanism of government is used to levy such payments, as is 
the case in Germany, they do not have the character of taxes coming under the substantive scope of 
tax treaties, as the church bodies are autonomous in the spending of the accrual. However, in some 
cases, autonomous non-governmental spending power is not enough to ascertain non-coverage: tax 
treaties concluded by Denmark, Finland and Sweden regularly include church taxes in their list of 
taxes covered; so does the Nordic Convention.401 Moreover, Switzerland has sometimes agreed to 
coverage of Swiss church taxes with its treaty partner.402 In said countries, church communities decide 
autonomously on the spending of their revenues. An interesting commonality with general taxation is 
that church taxes are levied not only on natural persons, but equally on juridical persons.403  
 
The key to recognition that the payment may come within tax treaty scope seems to be the fact that 
the church authorities in these countries perform tasks serving the public as a whole like registration 
of the population; the costs thus incurred will often be covered to some extent by general taxation. 
While church authorities do have autonomous spending power over revenue from church taxes, there 
is considerable de facto government influence over the spending. Such influence, in and of itself, 
however, would not be sufficient to consider the payments to have been made “on behalf of” 
government authorities. Where non-governmental authorities consistently perform considerable tasks 
                                                 
399 See also Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, Kluwer Law International (2003) pp. 129 et seq. 
400 Such is the case, for example, with church taxes in Austria. 
401 Art. 2(3) of the Nordic Convention on Income and Capital of 23 September 1996, effective 1 January 1998. For more insight, see 
Helminen, “Scope and Interpretation of the Nordic Multilateral Double Taxation Convention”, Bulletin for International Taxation 
2007, pp. 23 et seq. 
402 Agreement between Switzerland and Germany, released by the German Ministry of Finance on 23 February 1987, with respect to 
the Germany–Switzerland Income and Capital tax treaty of 11 August 1971, effective 1 January 1972; the agreement was released 
by the German Ministry of Finance on 23 February 1987. The agreement provides for coverage of Swiss church taxes as regular 
local taxes under the treaty. 
403 For Finland, see Heikkilä/Knuutila/Scheinin, “State and Church in Finland”, European Journal for Church and State Research 
1995, Vol. 2, pp. 115 et seq. For Switzerland, see Höhn/Waldburger, Steuerrecht Band I, 8th edn. (1997) p. 135.  
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with respect to the public at large on behalf of government authorities, treaty coverage is in line with 
the object and purpose of the treaty to provide protection. 
 
Therefore, albeit not placed into the state’s general fund, payments to non-governmental authorities 
that primarily perform administrative functions benefiting the general public, may be seen to be taxes 
covered under the treaty – unless there is genuine independence from government authority as to how 
the funds are used. This basic finding also has practical relevance in the case of social security 
payments, which are dealt with separately and in more detail below. 
 
 
1.5. Local taxes  
 
Art. 2(1) of the OECD Models makes clear that the taxes covered are “imposed on behalf of a 
Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities.” The Model Commentary on Art. 
2 states: 
 
It is immaterial on behalf of which authorities such taxes are imposed; it may be the State itself or its political 
subdivisions or local authorities (constituent States, regions, provinces, ‘départements’, cantons, districts, 
‘arrondissements’, ‘Kreise’, municipalities or groups of municipalities, etc.404  
 
Such extension of the taxing power has featured in tax treaty practice since the very beginning. The 
Commentary to the 1928 Model Convention of the League of Nations states: “Taxation levied on 
behalf of subordinate public bodies (provinces, cantons or departments, municipalities, etc.) may be 
included in the list, if circumstances justify such a measure.”405  
 
Speaking of the description of the public authorities imposing the taxes as an “undoubted merit”, the 
Italian Delegate of OEEC WP No. 3 refers to the fact that “[i]t certainly answers … the need to 
determine as clearly and as fully as possible the fiscal relations of the citizens of the contracting States 
with all the fiscal authorities of such States.” Nevertheless, the Delegate also notes: 
 
It cannot be overlooked that often, under the internal laws and, sometimes, under the Constitutions of the various 
States, there are smaller political sub-divisions and certain local authorities which have autonomous taxing power, 
and that the contracting State (the largest political unit, whether it is constituted by a unitary State, a Federation or 
a Confederation) is sometimes not empowered to represent the smaller bodies or to restrict their sphere of taxation. 
However, it has been considered useful to lay down a general principle to which each State will be able to 
conform, depending on its internal law or Constitution.406  
 
The OECD Model Conventions thus do not aim to differentiate between central or decentralized 
levels of government. Impositions of federal as well as local and provincial government authorities 
are covered, including all geographical extensions of government authority as well as legal entities 
that function as political subdivisions of the state.407  
 
Under the US Model Convention, only taxes levied at federal level are covered.408 Except with respect 
to the provision on non-discrimination, US state and local taxes are not covered by the Convention.409 
From the very outset in the drafting of the OECD Income and Capital MC, the United States as well 
as Canada have made reservations to this effect. The Report of WP No. 30, under the heading “Taxes 
of political subdivisions or local authorities (local taxes)”, provides an insight: 
 
                                                 
404 Model Commentary on Art. 2 para. 1, m.no. 2 of the 2005 Income and Capital MC Commentary; m.no. 4 in the 1982 Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts MC Commentary. 
405 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on 
Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Geneva, October 1928, Commentary on Art. 1 of Draft Convention No. 1a. 
406 FC/WP 3(57)1, Commentary by the Italian Delegate, m.no. 4 (e) at p. 8. 
407 See also M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 217. 
408 There is sometimes interaction of US state laws with tax treaties in that the tax base in many US states is the adjusted taxable 
income under federal law; see thereto also Larkins, “US Income tax Treaties in Research and Planning”, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 1998, pp. 
133 et seq. 
409 Cf. the Technical Explanation to Art. 2(1)(a) of the 1996 the US Model Income Tax Treaty.  
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Under the federal system operative in the United States, the governments of the individual states (and 
municipalities) have separate tax powers not derived from the national government. Although the national 
government has over-riding authority with respect to foreign commerce, the impact, if any, of state income taxes 
upon foreign commerce is very limited. It has therefore been customary for the United States to exclude the state 
tax systems from the scope of its income tax treaties.410 
 
The question arises whether such explicit limitation of treaty coverage to taxes levied at federal level 
in the United States and Canada affects also local taxes levied in the other contracting state. WP No. 
30 recognized this as a major issue in the application of treaties; as no materials have since considered 
the issue in equal depth, the full account is provided in the following:  
 
The reserves of Canada and the United States put forward the question whether the contracting partners of these 
states should also exclude their local taxes from the scope of the Convention. The OECD Commentary on Article 2 
says in paragraph 1 that the Article intends to widen as much as possible the field of application of the Convention 
by including as far as possible and in harmony with the internal legislation of the Contracting States the taxes 
imposed by political sub-divisions or local authorities of the Contracting States. Starting from this philosophy 
standing behind Article 2 and underlying the whole Convention, it seems to be preferable that at least the one State 
(for whom it is possible and in harmony with its internal legislation) should include his local taxes in the scope of 
the Convention. 
 
However, starting from practice rather than from theory, the fact should not be neglected that a Convention for the 
avoidance of double taxation obliges both Contracting States to give up certain taxation rights; but such obligation 
should be based on the principle of reciprocity, i.e. there should be a fair and equitable balance in renounciation on 
taxation rights between both Contracting States. From that angle an exclusion of local taxes could be justified. But 
since a decision in this matter depends on so many special circumstances (e.g. the ratio), it should be left free for 
bilateral negotiations.411 
 
Usually, no conclusive statements on this issue are to be found in treaties or protocols. Some treaties 
explicitly apply to political subdivisions, but not to local authorities,412 while others mention solely 
the state or its local authorities.413 Nevertheless, treaty practice has shown that taxes levied on behalf 
of local authorities will regularly be covered on the part of most European countries. Local or 
municipal taxes are sometimes explicitly included in the exhaustive list of taxes covered. An example 
is the Income and Capital Tax Treaty between the United States and Germany, which lists, among the 
German taxes that are exhaustively covered, the Gewerbesteuer (trade tax) levied on behalf of 
German municipalities.414 Initially introduced as a fee-type addition to the German land tax 
(Grundsteuer) in 1895, the Gewerbesteuer has been a major revenue source at municipal level415 since 
1936 and is now regularly listed in treaties concluded by Germany. 
 
 
1.6. “Ordinary” and “extraordinary” taxes 
 
The Income and Capital MC Commentary on Art. 2(2) comments on the coverage of “ordinary” and 
“extraordinary” taxes in the following manner: 
 
The Article does not mention ‘ordinary taxes’ or ‘extraordinary taxes’. Normally, it might be considered justifiable 
to include extraordinary taxes in a model convention, but experience has shown that such taxes are generally 
imposed in very special circumstances. In addition, it would be difficult to define them. They may be extraordinary 
for various reasons; their imposition, the manner in which they are levied, their rates, their objects, etc. This being 
so, it seems preferable not to include extraordinary taxes in the Article. But, as it is not intended to exclude 
extraordinary taxes from all conventions, ordinary taxes have not been mentioned either. The Contracting States 
are thus free to restrict the convention's field of application to ordinary taxes, to extend it to extraordinary taxes, or 
even to establish special provisions. 
 
                                                 
410 FC/WP 30 (69) 1, m.no. 22 on p. 9. 
411 Id., m.nos. 23 through 25. 
412 See, e.g. Art. 2(1) of the Belarus–South Africa Income and Capital Tax Treaty of 2002, effective 1 January 2004. 
413 See Art. 2(1) of the Azerbaijan–China Income Tax Treaty of 2005, effective 1 January 2006. 
414 Germany–US Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1989, as amended through 2006), Art. 2(1)(b)(cc). 
415 W. Ritter et al., “Verfassungskonforme Reform der Gewerbesteuer”, BDI (2001) 7. 
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As Lang416 has noted, the position taken in the Commentary seems confusing: on the one hand, the 
parties may “restrict” the treaty scope to ordinary taxes while on the other they may “extend” it to 
extraordinary taxes. The first statement suggests that extraordinary taxes will be covered unless 
explicitly excluded by the parties; the second statement seemingly indicates that special provision is 
necessary on the part of the contracting states to draw extraordinary taxes within treaty scope. 
 
The Commentary of the Swiss Delegate to WP No. 3 to para. 1 of the 1957 Draft Art. 2 on income 
and capital, as well as on estates and inheritances (see Annex I) explains: 
 
Paragraph 1 defines the object of the Convention and its general field of application. The latter embraces 
extraordinary taxes in addition to ordinary taxes. In view of the Delegate for Switzerland, this is reasonable, for 
double taxation Conventions should put an end to all, and not just a few, cases of double taxation, irrespective of 
the nature of the taxes, the authority imposing them, the method of collection, or the prevailing circumstances (e.g. 
peace or war). Moreover, the need to prevent double taxation is increasingly felt in the case of extraordinary taxes, 
because these are in general particularly heavy charges imposed in exceptional circumstances. This view is also 
justified by the fact that Conventions are concluded for the benefit not of the taxation authorities, but of the 
taxpayers. Finally, to exclude certain categories of taxes from a Convention’s field of application would largely 
frustrate the Convention, for in that case each State would be at liberty to decide unilaterally that a particular tax 
was an extraordinary tax and thus restrict arbitrarily the concessions agreed upon.417 
 
It becomes clear that “extraordinary taxes” means any taxes levied under special circumstances, 
whichever characteristic renders them out of the ordinary; they may be of temporary character, levied 
at special rates, or on special items. From the purpose expressed also in the present paras. 1 and 2 of 
Art. 2, and with a view to the possibility of a state “arbitrarily restricting the concessions” of the 
treaty, it seems indeed prudent to generally regard exceptional taxes as being covered.418 However, 
especially as regards taxes of merely temporary character, a state might argue that coverage was not 
intended.  
 
The indecisive statements in the present Commentary can be traced back to differing views of the 
Members of the OEEC Fiscal Committee, as evidenced in the Minutes of a 1957 Session of the OEEC 
Fiscal Committee, where the suggestions of the Swiss Delegate of WP No. 3 came under scrutiny: 
 
A general discussion ensued on whether extraordinary taxes on income and capital should be provided for in the 
draft Convention, as proposed by the Delegate for Switzerland. The Delegates for Italy, Denmark and Belgium 
were in favour of excluding these taxes from the draft Convention, which would leave open the possibility of 
settling the matter through bilateral Conventions. The Delegate for Germany considered that if it was not possible 
to include all extraordinary taxes they should nevertheless not all be excluded, and that the question should be dealt 
with in the comments…. The Delegate for the United Kingdom thought it preferable that extraordinary taxes 
should be neither included nor excluded formally. The Delegate for France considered that directives should be 
established on the treatment of extraordinary taxes…. The Committee decided not to mention extraordinary taxes 
in the Draft Convention. It asked the Working Party to put the reasons for this decision in its comments and to 
indicate that it was open to Member countries to apply to extraordinary taxes the principles laid down for the other 
taxes.419  
 
The subsequently adopted Commentary to the 1957 Draft Convention contains the identical wording 
of today’s Model Commentary, with the reasons for not mentioning “extraordinary taxes” reflecting 
the inconclusive outcome of the preceding discussions.420 So does the 1969 Report of WP No. 30; WP 
No. 30 merely adds the statement that several Conventions “contain – in accordance with the 
O.E.C.D. Commentary – a specific reference to ‘extraordinary taxes’. There seems to be no practical 
need for a change of this concept.”421 
 
                                                 
416 M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 217. 
417 FC/WP 3(57)1, Commentary by the Delegate for Switzerland, p. 14. 
418 See also Büge in Becker/Höppner et al. (eds) Commentary on Art. 2 para. 1, m.no. 16, stating that extraordinary taxes are 
covered under the broad descriptions in Paras. 1 and 2 as well as under Art. 2(4). 
419 OEEC, Fiscal Committee, Minutes of the 3rd Session held at the Château de la Muette, 23-25 January 1957, FC/M (57)1, under 
Point III (emphasis in the original). 
420 Fiscal Committee, Listing and Definition of Taxes on Income and Capital, including Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, which 
should be covered by Double Taxation Agreements, FC(57)1, Point II. (Commentary on the Draft Article) m.no. 8. 
421 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 31. 
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It appears that there is at least consensus in that specific bilateral agreement may be necessary, 
depending on the specific details of the tax at issue and what can be expected in good faith by each of 
the treaty partners in balancing compromise as between their respective tax systems. In a similar 
approach, reference to “taxes of an exceptional nature” was first made in the Commentary to Art. 12 
of the 1927 League of Nations Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double 
Taxation:422 “As regards taxes of an exceptional nature, special agreements may have to be concluded, 
having due regard to the nature of these taxes.”423 
 
Although the issue cannot be resolved from the drafting history of Art. 2, the Model text is clearly 
indifferent to specific peculiarities of the tax; so long as it bears characteristic features of a “tax” and 
is levied on income and capital or estates, inheritances and gifts, the tax will be covered.  Neither does 
the Model Commentary give chapter for a distinction between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” taxes. 
 
If the parties have adopted the broad descriptions in Art. 2(1) and (2), and not made provisions with 
regard to peculiarities in their respective tax systems, broad coverage should be presumed in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty. This approach can be seen to find a showcase in 
a domestic decision concerning the coverage of the Swedish temporary tax on profit distributions 
under Swedish treaties on income and capital, where the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court 
considered the coverage of the Swedish temporary tax on profit distributions as an extraordinary 
national income tax in the sense of the provisions corresponding to paras. 1 and 2 of Art. 2 in Swedish 
tax treaties.424 The fact that a tax is of “extraordinary” character does not per se preclude it from 
qualification as a “tax on income and capital” or a “tax on estates, inheritances, and gifts.” 
 
 
1.7. Earmarked taxes 
 
As opposed to extraordinary taxes, earmarked taxes are not taxes imposed under special 
circumstances or on special incidents, but they are ordinary taxes earmarked for – meaning “set aside 
for” – a special purpose. There is no indication in the Model texts that the state or its political 
subdivisions or local authorities are barred from assigning a specific use to the revenue of a tax.  
 
The 1969 Report of WP No. 30 took a stand on this issue in response to an inquiry of the US 
Delegate: 
 
The United States raised the question whether the earmarking of taxes for particular purposes should be permitted 
to have any effect on their treatment in relation to double taxation Conventions.… The only decisive fact for the 
application of the Convention to a given tax is that the basis on which the tax is levied is considered to be ‘income 
(capital)’. But it is immaterial for which purpose this tax is collected. A tax the yield of which is allocated 
exclusively to earmarked funds, but the basis of which is ‘income’, must therefore be classified as ‘tax on income’ 
in the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the O.E.C.D.-Draft.425 (emphasis in original) 
 
The WP further illustrates this by way of example of an Austrian tax: 
 
Austria has introduced in 1966 a tax which is called ‘Contribution on income to the emergency-fund’. The basis of 
the tax is the same as for the general income tax; the yield of the tax is allocated exclusively to a special fund 
which was created for the repair and prevention of emergencies caused by natural catastrophies. Since the basis of 
that Contribution is the ‘income’ of the taxpayer the contribution was considered to be an ‘income tax’, and 
because Austria regularly adopts a provision like paragraphs 1 and 2 of the O.E.C.D. Draft, there was no doubt that 
                                                 
422 The text of Art. 12 (“Miscellaneous Provisions”) is as follows: “The principles laid down in the preceding articles shall be 
applicable mutatis mutandis, to the recurrent taxes on total wealth, capital, or increments of total wealth, according as these taxes are 
impersonal or personal.”  
423 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion, Geneva, April 1927 (C.216.M.85.1927.II) Point B. An identical statement is found in the Commentary 
on Art. 12 of the 1928 Draft Convention No. 1a. 
424 Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, Case No. 5823-1985, decision of 3 June 1986. 
425 FC/WP 30 (69)1, m.no. 17. 
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this Contribution – although it was earmarked – comes under the double taxation conventions concluded by 
Austria; respective notifications were submitted by Austria to the other Contracting States.426 
 
This interpretation goes in line with the general purpose of Art. 2 to broaden as much as possible the 
scope of the Convention. WP No. 30 stresses in this context427 that difficulties with respect to the 
coverage of earmarked taxes will arise only in the case of an exhaustive list that does not contain 
taxes that are earmarked for special purposes. Payments funding social security are often levied in the 
form of earmarked taxation; their coverage under tax treaties can thus be controversial. 
 
 
1.8. Social security charges 
 
An intricate interrelation exists between taxation and social security not only in domestic tax systems 
but also in the international context. Social security payments are a major revenue source as well as a 
core element of fiscal policy in many countries.428 Even countries that do not separately impose social 
security payments will regularly incur social security expenditure.429 Where social security payments 
are income related rather than risk related, they could be seen as a regular income tax. 
 
From the foregoing considerations, it is clear that social security contributions that are voluntary430 or 
not payable to general government or a government-controlled agency do not come within the concept 
of “tax”. However, social security charges regularly have compulsory character; moreover, they help 
to achieve a more equitable income distribution and are often administered by revenue authorities. 
The IBFD International Tax Glossary431 postulates that the term tax “may include social security 
contributions since they are compulsory.” 
 
The OECD Revenue Statistics432 define taxes as compulsory general payments for public purposes, 
including social security contributions. They are included in the total tax revenue because, like taxes, 
they can have an impact on the distribution of income.433 But even in this context, conceptual 
differences are pointed out: 
 
Compulsory social security contributions,… paid to general government, are treated here as tax revenues. Being 
compulsory payments to general government they clearly resemble taxes. They may, however, differ from other 
taxes in that the receipt of social security benefits depends, in most countries, upon appropriate contributions 
having been made, although the size of the benefits is not necessarily related to the amount of the contributions.434 
 
In the practical application of tax treaties, the issue of differentiating between taxes and social security 
payments does arise. The question whether – and if so, under what circumstances – social security 
payments come within the substantive scope of tax treaties is largely unresolved.435  
                                                 
426 Id. 
427 Id., m.no. 16. 
428 Cf. the publications on the features of social security programmes in more than 170 countries downloadable from the official 
website of the US Social Security Administration. See also Pieters, “Reflections on the Methodology of Social Security Law 
Comparison”, in Ruland et al. (eds.) Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats, liber amicorum Hans F. Zacher (1998) p. 
715. 
429 Larger countries that do not have social security levies include China, Australia, Indonesia and Thailand.   
430 An example is Peru, where the individual can choose between the governmental social insurance scheme and private schemes. In 
some countries, the system of social security payments is mixed, with some payments being compulsory and others voluntary; in 
Germany, for example, social security coverage of the self-employed is sometimes voluntary. In the UK as well as in Ireland, 
contributions are required from certain parts of the population, but those not required to pay may voluntarily enter the system and 
contribute. 
431 Larking (ed.) 4th edn. (2001). 
432 OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2005 (2006) pp. 17 and 285. 
433 See the criticism in Albeda, “Social Security and Taxation: A Note on Some Intellectual Foundations of Social Security and 
Taxation”, 10 EJLE (2000) p. 123: “Calculating the burden of the cost of operation of the state, taxation and social security levies 
are simply added together. With this development the ideology behind social security as a separate financial system within the 
nation is disappearing.” 
434 OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2005 (2006) Annex A, The OECD Classification of Taxes and Interpretative Guide, m.no. 7. 
435 The first international expert conference ever to explore the relationship between tax treaties and international social security law 
was held in Austria from 7-10 July 2005, as part of a series of High-Level Scientific Conferences supported by the European 
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While international social security law is governed by principles and objectives which are different 
from those predominant in international tax law,436 both areas intersect where persons are liable to 
taxes in one state, but work in another state, where they pay social security contributions. There is a 
global network of bilateral social security agreements; they are sometimes also called “totalization 
agreements”, which indicates their function: on the one hand, such agreements aim to relieve double 
imposition of social security payments on the same income, by establishing that only the country in 
which someone is working may levy such payments; on the other hand, they provide for a 
“totalization” of benefits, so that an individual who made payments in both countries but has not 
accumulated enough coverage to be entitled to benefits in either of them may still qualify for benefits. 
Social security agreements usually do not expressly apply to “social security contributions” but rather 
to certain areas of “social security legislation” in the contracting states, usually comprising both 
payments and possible benefits.  
 
As regards EC Member States and Members to the European Economic Area, these agreements are 
superseded437 by Council Regulation No. 1408/71.438 Similar to existing bilateral agreements, this 
Regulation coordinates the social security levies and benefits of Member States to substantiate the 
free movement of workers. In 2003, the scope of Reg. 1408/71 was extended to cover third country 
nationals legally resident in the territory of a Member State.  
 
The guiding principle underlying bilateral agreements as well as the EC Regulation coordinating 
domestic social security legislation is that the country to which the coordination rules point will be the 
sole one entitled to impose social security contributions, irrespective of either domestic law or tax 
treaty rules. As social security systems across the nations are increasingly financed at least in part out 
of general taxation, the lines between social security contributions and taxes are oftentimes blurred. 
This is aggravated by the fact that the true nature of charges used for social security does not always 
equate to the “labels” used to describe them in domestic tax laws.439 Moreover, countries have 
adopted techniques on the borderline between contributions and taxes so that it is complicated to 
distinguish between them.440   
 
Compartmentalized thinking as to the areas of international tax law and international social security 
law should therefore be avoided, as the interplay of these areas needs to be taken into consideration 
when determining the scope of tax treaties. Sometimes, treaties explicitly exclude social security 
levies in the treaty text or protocol.441 Since 1981, the US Model Income Tax Treaty has clarified that 
“social security” taxes levied under the Internal Revenue Code are excluded from treaty scope.442 
Most treaties adopting the OECD Model text are silent on the issue; only rarely are social security 
                                                                                                                                                        
Commission. The National Reports from nearly all EC Member States, as well as Israel, New Zealand, Russia and the US, are 
published in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions and Social Security Conventions (2006). 
436 See K. Vogel, “Internationales Sozialrecht und Internationales Steuerrecht im Vergleich”, in Ruland et al. (eds.) Verfassung, 
Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats, liber amicorum Hans F. Zacher, p. 1173 (1174). 
437 Individuals may still rely on more favourable clauses of a SSA if they were effective before entry into force of Reg. 1408/71 
resp. before accession to the EC. For more insight, see van Thiel, “Income Tax Payments and social security contributions from a 
Community law point of view: How the European Court of Justice could streamline its approach in the interest of the internal 
market”, in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions and Social Security Conventions (2006) pp. 37 et seq. 
438 EC, Regulation 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and their Families 
Moving within the Community, O.J. 1971 (II) No. L 149, p. 2, 5 July 1971(original reference); OJ No. L 28, p. 1, 30 January 1997 
(reprinted). The Regulation was adopted on the basis of Art. 235 of the EC Treaty (now Art 308 EC) and has been amended 
frequently since adoption: Regulation No. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Coordination of Social Security Systems, O.J. L (2004) p. 166; Proposal of 31 January 2006 for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 883/2004, COM(2006)16. 
439 Pieters, “Social Security, Taxation, and European Integration”, in Berghman et al. (eds.) Social Security Taxation and Europe 
(1993) p. 235 (239). 
440 Mouton, “Methods of Financing Social Security in Industrial Countries: An International Analysis”, in International Labour 
Office, Financing Social Security: The Options (1984) p. 3 (29). 
441 See e.g. the Germany–Spain income and capital tax treaty of 1966, which, in Art 2(3) expressly excludes “social security 
premiums”. Another example is point I. of the Additional Protocol to the Sweden–Ukraine treaty of 1995. 
442 See Art. 2(1a) of the US Model Income Tax Convention of 20 September 1996. See also Art. 2(3b) of the 2006 US Model 
Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006, not yet in force.  
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levies included in the equivalent of the listing of taxes in Art. 2(3) of the OECD Model.443 
Nevertheless, as has been established in Part I of the thesis, the descriptions in paras. 1 and 2 have 
independent meaning for purposes of the taxes covered: a levy not contained in the listing might still 
be within treaty scope, so long as it comes under the general definition of “taxes on income and 
capital”.444  
 
Social security payments throughout nations are levied either on taxable income or on a payroll basis. 
The Model Commentary states with regard to the general description in Art. 2(2): “[T]he definition 
extends to taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by undertakings (‘payroll taxes’; in 
Germany, ‘Lohnsummensteuer’; in France, ‘taxe sur les salaires’).”445  
 
Therefore, as regards treaties that contain a general description along the lines of the OECD Model, in 
the absence of an express exclusion of social security charges from treaty scope in the treaty or 
pertaining protocol they may in principle be subject to treaty protection. However, an exhaustive 
listing of “the income tax” of a treaty partner leaves uncertainty where social security is financed even 
in part by way of general taxation.  
 
The OECD Model Commentary refers to social security levies only at one point, with regard to “taxes 
on the total amount of wages”, stating that “[s]ocial security charges, or any other charges paid where 
there is a direct connection between the levy and the individual benefits to be received, shall not be 
regarded as ‘taxes on the total amount of wages’.”446 The sentence was added in the 1977 version of 
the Commentary to clarify the foregoing sentence, which postulates that “taxes on the total amounts 
of wages or salaries paid by undertakings” are to be considered taxes on income and capital in the 
sense of Art 2. It is not expressly stated that social security charges are not “taxes on income and 
capital”. More of an insight can be gleaned from the statements of WP No. 30, considering the 
deletion of the formulation “taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises”, 
following a notification of the Austrian Delegate.447  
 
WP No. 30 comments: 
 
In theory, payments made upon a legal obligation are normally qualified as ‘taxes’ if they are made without any 
specific return (‘ohne spezielle Gegenleistung’). This seems to be the case with the special tax on the sum of wages 
(‘Lohnsummensteuer’), as exists in Austria and Germany. Without going into details it could be said that the payer 
of social security fees (or the person on whose account such payments are made directly or indirectly) receives 
specific rights against the social insurance in return for these contributions. Therefore the Working Party feels that 
contributions to social security funds can in principle not be considered to be ‘taxes’ in the meaning of paragraphs 
1 and 2. 
 
To avoid a misinterpretation of Article 2 it seems to be preferable to omit the specific reference to ‘taxes on the 
total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises’. The omission would affect in no way the treatment of the 
‘Lohnsummensteuer’ since it is considered to be a ‘tax’.448 (emphasis in the original) 
 
It becomes clear that social security payments involving a “specific return” cannot be seen to be 
“taxes on income and capital” in the meaning of the Model text. However, it appears that the Report 
of WP No. 30 as well as the current Commentary refer only to such social security schemes where the 
link between payments and benefits is straightforward; this is often not the case in domestic social 
                                                 
443 Some of the older treaties concluded by Denmark list old age pension contributions; see e.g. DTC Denmark–Kenya of 1972, 
Denmark–Luxembourg of 1979, Denmark–India of 1989 or Denmark–Italy of 1980 (terminated as of 1 January 2004; the new 
version does not include old age pension contributions). However, this has always been seen as an exception; the Danish Ministry of 
Taxation has specifically stated that the Danish social security contribution is not a tax covered by Danish tax treaties. 
444 See also van Raad, “The Concept of Tax in the OECD Model”, Paper for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting on “The Concept of 
Tax” in Caserta, Italy (2005); Jiménez, “Defining the Objective Scope of Income Tax Treaties: The Impact of Other Treaties and 
EC Law on the Concept of Tax in the OECD Model”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation October 2005, p. 432. 
445 Para. 3 of the 2005 Commentary on Art. 2( 3) of the Income and Capital MC. 
446 Commentary on Art. 2(2) of the 2005 Income and Capital MC, m.no. 3.  
447 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 26: “Austria has stated that it deletes the words ‘taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by 
enterprises’ in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of its Convention, to avoid a misinterpretation which might bring any fees or duties payable 
under the social security scheme within the scope of the Conventions.” (emphasis in the original) 
448 Id., m.nos. 27-28. 
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security systems: social security schemes are commonly classified either as “funded schemes” or 
“unfunded schemes”.449  
 
In funded schemes, contributions paid by the individual are saved to fund future benefits to this 
person. It has to be factored in, though, that no country has adopted an insurance system in its “pure” 
form, where only those who have contributed to the system are entitled to benefits, since this would 
leave out an array of people: unemployed persons, children, persons on parental leave, sick and 
disabled people. Lang has pointed out that “[i]f the entitlement of others is simply an exception, the 
existence of a direct connection between the levy and the individual benefit may be assumed.”450 
States that have adopted this type of system regularly regard social security charges, though 
compulsory, as quasi-social insurance premiums and not at all as taxes.451 
 
In unfunded schemes, contributions are not retained to provide future benefits to those making the 
contributions; instead, current contributions are used to fund current benefits, which means that there 
is no economic link between an individual’s contributions and the benefit entitlement of that 
individual. This also necessitates financial participation of the state, which is why these systems are 
mainly financed through taxes. However, there will regularly be a formal link between benefit 
entitlement and contributions to ensure that only those who have contributed can benefit from the 
fund.  
 
Both types of systems therefore entail a linkage between payments to a social security scheme and 
benefits paid from the scheme. To the extent that contributions do not match the amount of benefits, 
further forms of funding are often provided through general taxation. There are thus countries where a 
classification as either “funded” or “unfunded” is difficult.452 Moreover, a state’s legislature may at 
any time change the formulas under which benefits are determined, which makes the entitlement to a 
benefit highly uncertain to the point that it is highly doubtful whether social security levies can be 
seen to be matched by a corresponding benefit they directly and identifiably give entitlement to.453  
 
Vogel pointed out that social security charges do not qualify as taxes in the sense of Art. 2 since 
“[t]hey are directly connected with the benefit of enjoying the protection afforded by the social 
security system”, but also noted that “[t]here may be problems whenever a contracting State collects 
social insurance charges as taxes and when in such cases there is no direct connection between those 
charges and the benefits claimable under the social security system.”454 No generally valid solutions 
can be presented in these cases; it may result from the context that even where a state uses the label of 
“social security taxes”, these charges are not meant to be included in tax treaties.455  
 
An example of such a case can be found in Norway, where the “social insurance tax” is regulated as 
part of the income tax. Zimmer remarked: “Indeed, it is regarded as an income tax itself (except in an 
international context).”456 Skaar stated: “It is common ground that the social insurance tax is not a tax 
in terms of the [Norwegian] tax treaties.”457  
 
Another example is Denmark, where social security contributions are considered “taxes on income” 
that are levied by the state but earmarked for a special purpose. The Danish Ministry of Taxation has 
                                                 
449 See in more detail Williams, “Social Security Taxation”, in Thuronyi (ed.) Tax Law Design and Drafting (1996) pp. 4 et seq. 
450 M. Lang, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 218. 
451 Messere, “20th Century Taxes and Their Future”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2000, p. 7. 
452 Unclear cases are the social security systems of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; for analytical and statistical purposes, they are 
mostly classified as unfunded. States like Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg are mostly seen to have funded 
schemes; the Nordic countries as well as the UK and Ireland are seen as epitomizing the unfunded scheme. 
453 See also Williams in Thuronyi (ed.) Tax Law Design and Drafting (1996) p. 7.  
454 K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 2 para. 2, m.no. 29. 
455 Vogel argues that such result will “as a rule arise from the context of the treaty.” See m.no. 29, preceding note. 
456 Zimmer, “Norway”, European Taxation 2001, p. 55 (emphasis added). 
457 Skaar, “International Aspects of the Norwegian Imputed Personal Income Tax”, Intertax 1993/2, p. 77. 
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consistently stated that the Danish social security contribution is not a tax covered by Danish tax 
treaties.458  
 
From the fact that the Commentary refers only to “taxes on the total amount of wages paid by 
enterprises”, van Raad has concluded that the Commentary refers only to social security charges 
levied on employers and not to those collected from employees income earners in general, making the 
argument that the Commentary cannot be relied upon to claim that social security charges levied from 
(wage) income earners are excluded from the notion “tax” as employed in Art. 2.459 Jiménez deems 
van Raad’s reading of the sentence to be too literal, but stresses that “[V]an Raad simply was making 
the point that the reference to social security contributions in the Commentaries to Art. 2 OECD MC 
should not be interpreted with the meaning that social security contributions are always excluded from 
the scope of income tax treaties.”460 Van Raad’s argument that the exemption concerns employer 
contributions only goes in line with the common observation that the connection between contribution 
and benefit is far greater for employee than for employer contributions, which leads to the approach in 
many states that employer contributions are not seen to be “proper” social security contributions, but 
general taxes.461   
 
Nevertheless, the wording of the Commentary on Art. 2(2) does not warrant a distinction between 
employer and employee contributions, considering that the Report of WP No. 30 speaks of “the payer 
of social security fees (or the person on whose account such payments are made directly or 
indirectly).” Where such contributions qualify as taxes within the scope of a treaty, a credit may be 
due for taxes paid by the employee, or to the employer remitting payments on behalf of the employee. 
 
The text of the Commentary, supplemented by the statements of WP No. 30, allows for the general 
conclusion that a contribution to a social security fund is a tax if there is a requirement to make 
payments to the fund of a government authority, but no conceptional element of benefit in the nature 
of a “social contract”. WP No. 30 speaks of “social security fees”, thereby implying the characteristic 
elements of fees and user charges, i.e. that they are directly linked to benefits and not pooled for 
general budgetary revenue. “Grey areas” due to increased funding of social security systems 
worldwide out of general taxation are not dealt with in either the Commentaries or the materials. The 
international context of the treaty is therefore examined more closely in the following section.  
 
 
1.8.1. Influence of EC coordination law and social security conventions 
 
Where countries finance their social security system by way of general income taxes and do not 
separately levy social security charges – be it in the form of an earmarked tax or a premium 
identifiably linked to a benefit – the application of a tax treaty to that part of the general imposition 
that effectively finances social security will be undisputed. However, even these countries conclude 
social security agreements or, if they are EC Member States, implement the provisions of Reg. 
1408/71.   
 
The importance of clarification in this area becomes apparent when considering the example of a 
person liable to worldwide income taxation in one state, but performing work in another state, where 
separate social security charges are levied. If the social security scheme in the first state is financed by 
way of general taxation, the problem of double burdens upon the same income arises. 
 
Where two EC/EEA Member States are concerned, Reg. 1408/71 provides that “a person employed in 
the territory of one Member State shall be subject to the legislation of that State even if he resides in 
the territory of another Member State or if the registered office or place of business of the undertaking 
                                                 
458 See Stokholm, “National Report Denmark”, in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions and Social Security Conventions 
(2006) p. 217 (226). 
459 Van Raad, “The Concept of Tax in the OECD Model”, Paper for the 2005 EATLP Meeting, p. 5.  
460 Jiménez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 433. 
461 See also Williams in Thuronyi (ed.) Tax Law Design and Drafting (1996) p. 11. 
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or individual employing him is situated in the territory of another Member State.”462 The Regulation 
“shall apply to all general and special social security schemes, whether contributory or non-
contributory….”463  
 
If the social security system of one of the states is financed fully or in part from general taxation, the 
distributive rules of a tax treaty might attribute jurisdiction to a person’s state of residence, as opposed 
to the state where the work is carried out. The tax treaty would thus be in violation of EC law. 
 
The European Court of Justice has drawn a conceptual boundary between taxes from social security 
charges for purposes of Reg. 1408/71 in two joined cases concerning an infringement procedure of the 
Commission against France concerning levies on all categories of income of French residents working 
in another Member State.464 The French levies concerned, called CRDS and CSG,465 accrue to social 
security bodies under state authority and are categorized under French domestic law as “taxes on 
income”.466 The CRDS and CSG are collected by the French social security authorities, in addition to 
France’s compulsory insurance scheme providing the right to social benefits; no corresponding 
benefits are granted with the payment of the CRDS and CSG. Their character as either taxes or social 
security charges is therefore not easily determinable and has been subject to debate among scholars in 
France.467 The French tax authorities consider the CRDS and CSG to come within the scope of tax 
treaties concluded by France. The European Commission has opposed this view and argued that the 
CRDS and the CSG are not “taxes” but rather social security contributions to which the Regulation on 
the coordination of social security payments applies, with the consequence that such payments may 
only be levied in the state where the work is carried out.    
 
The Advocate-General noted that “[t]hese cases concern the issue of moving gradually towards 
funding social security schemes from taxation” and proposed that in determining the nature of the 
levies involved, “the objective criterion to be adopted is … the identification of a direct link between 
the measures in issue and the French social security scheme.”468 The ECJ followed this view and took 
a broad approach in interpretation, upholding its previous case law according to which even “the fact 
that a rule is contained in a law which falls outside the scope of the Regulation does not necessarily 
imply that that rule itself falls outside the scope thereof”.469 The Court stated that “the decisive factor 
for the purposes of applying Regulation No 1408/71 is that there must be a link between the provision 
in question and the legislation governing the branches of social security listed in Article 4 of 
Regulation No 1408/71, and that link must be direct and sufficiently relevant.”470 
 
The decisive factor according to the Court is the fact that a certain levy effectively finances branches 
of the social security scheme. To quote the Court: 
 
Neither the fact that the collection is effected by way of an assessment roll, together with the income tax, nor the fact 
that the payment does not give entitlement to any direct and identifiable benefit in return can undermine that 
conclusion. Otherwise, the provisions of Regulation No. 1408 of 71 against overlapping legislation would be 
deprived of all effectiveness.471   
 
                                                 
462 Art. 13(2)(a) of Reg. 1408/71. 
463 Art. 4(2) of Reg. 1408/71. 
464 ECJ, Commission v. France, Joined Cases C-34/98 and C-169/98, decision of 15 February 2000. 
465 The French social debt repayment contribution (Contribution au remboursement de la dette sociale, CRDS) and the general 
social contribution (Contribution sociale généralisée, CSG). 
466 For further references, see Suchy, “National Report France”, in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions and Social Security 
Conventions (2006) p. 259 (275). 
467 Id. 
468 Opinion of A-G La Pergola, delivered on 7 September 1999, m.nos. 2 and 24, resp. 
469 See Rheinhold & Mahla NV v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, C-327/92, decision of 18 May 1995, 
m.no. 22. 
470 ECJ, Commission v. France, C-34/98, m.no. 35; C-169/98, m.no. 33. 
471 Decision C-34/98, m.no. 38. 
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The Court also rejected the argument made by the French authorities that in order to be considered a 
social security contribution in the sense of Reg. 1408/71, a levy has to give entitlement to a direct and 
identifiable benefit in return: 
 
[F]or the purposes of the application of Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71, the decisive criterion is that of the 
specific allocation of a contribution to the funding of the social security scheme of a Member State. Whether 
benefits are obtained or not in return is therefore irrelevant in this connection.472 
 
With regards to the coverage of the CRDS and the CSG under tax treaties concluded after the 
introduction of these levies,473 the French Conseil d’État has held that in the case of an exhaustive 
listing that does not mention the CRDS or the CSG, they will not be covered, as they cannot be seen 
to be taxes accessory to the income tax.474 However, they will be covered under tax treaties that 
contain a general description like Art. 2(1) and (2). In these cases, the coordination provisions 
contained in Reg. 1408/71 may be in conflict with the distributive rules of tax treaties.   
 
This issue was at the heart of a case decided by the ECJ on 3 April 2008. In Philippe Derouin v. 
Union pour le recouvrement des cotisations de sécurité sociale et d’allocations familiales de Paris,475 
the ECJC dealt again with the application of the coordination provisions of Reg. 1408/71 to the CSG 
and CRDS. The French levies were imposed on UK-sourced income of a French resident taxpayer, Mr 
Derouin (“the taxpayer”), a member of a UK partnership. While the taxpayer performed all work in 
France, the profits were received through the UK partnership treated as a flow-through entity for tax 
purposes. The taxpayer was taxed as a French resident for individual income tax purposes and paid 
social security contributions in France on his French and foreign-source income. He challenged the 
payment of these contributions to the extent they were based on UK-sourced income, arguing that the 
contributions paid in the form of the CSG and CRDS are taxes giving rise to protection under the 
income tax treaty between France and the United Kingdom. The French social security authorities 
rejected this proposition and argued that the CSG and the CRDS are social security contributions 
rather than taxes and should come within the scope of EC Regulation 1408/71, under which all 
occupational income is should be subject to social security levies exclusively in France.   
 
The case was thus presented to the ECJ to determine whether Reg. 1408/71 could prevent a tax treaty 
from carving out a French resident’s foreign-source income from application of the French social 
security regime. The Court, albeit not commenting conclusively on whether the CSG and CRDS 
should be classified as taxes or social security contributions, confirmed that these levies generally 
come within the scope of EC Regulation 1408/71. It stressed that the Regulation is a means of 
coordination rather than of harmonization, its primary purpose being to ensure the freedom of 
movement of workers throughout the European Union. The Court confirmed its prior rulings in 
Commission v. France in stressing that the fact that a levy is categorized as a tax under domestic law 
does not mean that the same levy cannot come within the scope of the Regulation.476 
 
Following the conclusion of a new income tax treaty between France and the United Kingdom on 28 
January 2004 (which expressly lists the CSG and CRDS among the French taxes covered under the 
Convention) treaties concluded by France have been made reference to these levies as taxes 
covered.477  
 
Moreover, France has passed legislation to the effect that CRDS and CSG apply only to income 
subject to the French income tax and social security legislation.478 Similar actions were taken in other 
countries in the aftermath of the ECJ decisions; for instance, the Austrian Federal Ministry for social 
                                                 
472 Decision C-34/98, m.no. 40; see also the decision C-169/98, m.no. 37. 
473 The CSG was introduced in 1990, the CRDS was introduced in 1996.  
474 See for more details Suchy in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions and Social Security Conventions (2006) p. 259 (276). 
475 Case C-103/06, OJ C 128 (2008). 
476 C-103/06 (Philippe Derouin) m.no. 22. 
477 An example is the non-exhaustive list in Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the France–Georgia Income and Capital Tax Treaty of 7 
March 2007 (not yet in force), which makes reference to the CSG and CRDS. 
478 See Suchy in M. Lang (ed.) Double Taxation Conventions and Social Security Conventions (2006) p. 259 (276). 
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affairs has amended the obligation of employers to make payments based on payroll into the family 
burdens equalization fund on behalf of employees working within the country or sent abroad to work 
for the employer.479 The contributions are therefore not payable if expatriates are not covered by the 
Austrian social security system according to Reg. 1408/71, as in such circumstances they are not 
entitled to family allowance payments. However, these contributions are sometimes explicitly listed in 
Austrian treaties.480 Moreover, they may come within treaty scope if the treaty contains a general 
description that mentions “taxes on the total amounts of wages and salaries paid by enterprises.”481 
 
In effect, only such charges that are not effectively used to finance social security can be seen to be 
outside the scope of Reg. 1408/71. According to consistent jurisprudence of the ECJ, the concept of 
“tax” is to be interpreted autonomously for purposes of the EC legal order, without regard to national 
definitions.482   
 
In a decision of 2001, the ECJ again confirmed that a levy may come under Reg. 1408/71 despite the 
fact that it is classified as a regular tax under a Member State’s domestic law. In an obiter dictum to 
this decision, the Court made it clear that in order to qualify as a social security contribution under the 
Regulation, the levy does not need to be imposed directly; rather, levies paid by employers, 
undertakings or industries are regularly seen to come within the scope of Reg. 1408/71.483 The Court 
thus makes no distinction whether the levies are imposed directly on the employee or to be paid by the 
employer. However, liability of third parties has been held not to bring social security payments 
within the scope of the coordination provisions of Reg. No. 1408/71.484 
 
Existing ECJ decisions imply that levies that effectively accrue to the government’s general budget 
are considered as “taxes”.485 Compulsory payments that effectively finance social security, however, 
have been ruled to fall under the EC coordination provisions. This functional approach of the ECJ 
prevents the provisions of the Regulation from being rendered obsolete at random by virtue of 
labelling charges in a certain way or attributing them to certain funds under domestic law. Moreover, 
the approach taken by the Court not to consider the receipt of benefits in return for the payment seems 
feasible, as the notion of “benefit” is fungible and lies within the realm of government control.  
 
Interestingly, the argumentation of the ECJ is consistently rather broad and does not seem to be 
confined to levies on employment and self-employment income, but appears to be applicable to 
income in general.486 
 
                                                 
479 Statutory notice (“Erlass”) of the Austrian Ministry for social affairs of 27 January 2003, GZ 51 0802/8-V/1/03, AÖFV Nr. 
56/2003 on employer contributions to the Austrian family burdens equalization fund (“Arbeitgeberbeitrag zum 
Familienlastenausgleichsfonds”). 
480 See, e.g., the 1959 Austria–Sweden tax treaty, Art. 1(4)(2)(d). 
481 Cf. the Austrian Ministry of Finance in EAS.1914 of 17 August 2001, stating that the Austria–Liechtenstein tax treaty does not 
apply to employer contributions to the Austrian family burdens equalization fund; the treaty did not contain a reference to “taxes on 
the total amounts of wages and salaries paid by enterprises.” For more on this issue, see Züger, “Kommunalsteuer, sonstige 
Lohnabgaben und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, SWI 2000, pp. 164 et seq.  
482 See ECJ C-295/84, ECR 1985 at I 03759; C-200/90, ECR 1992 at I-02217; C-197/94 and C-252/94, ECR 1996 at I-00505; C-
4/97, ECR 1998 at I-06469; C-375/98, ECR 2000 at I-04243; C-113/99, ECR 2001 at I-00471; and C-294/99, ECR 2001 at I-06797. 
For a detailed analysis of the different concepts of tax in various contexts of EC law see Kreibohm, Der Begriff der Steuer im 
Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (2004). 
483 ECJ, C-68/99, decision of 8 March 2001, m.no. 11; the case concerned the German “Künstlersozialabgabe”, a levy imposed on 
the total amount of wages paid by editors or agencies to artists and journalists. 
484 See the statements of the Court in Rheinhold & Mahla NV v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, C-
327/92, decision of 18 May 1995, m.nos. 27-30, regarding payments made by a Netherlands main contractor: “Although a certain 
link undeniably exists between the social security obligations of an employer and the liability of a main contractor … it has to be 
said that the link is indirect only. The principle established by the Netherlands legislation that the main contractor is to be liable is 
not based upon the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the main contractor and the workers in respect of 
whom the contributions are payable … Thus, … that contractor is not, strictly speaking, liable to pay social contributions.” 
485 See also Waldhoff, “Die Abgrenzung von Steuern und Sozialabgaben im europäischen Recht”, in Becker/Schön (eds.) Steuer- 
und Sozialstaat im europäischen Systemwettbewerb (2005) p. 193 (198). For more on the different concepts of tax in the various 
areas of EC law, see Kreibohm, Der Begriff der Steuer im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (2004). 
486 Pieters, “What is a social security contribution and what is a tax?”, in Pieters (ed.) Sozialrecht und Sozialpolitik in Deutschland 
und Europa, liber amicorum Bernd Baron von Maydell (2002) p. 528. 
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As between EC/EEA Member States, the distributive rules of tax treaties are superseded by the 
coordination provisions of the Regulation. If, for example, the residence state of a worker is a credit 
state, both the source state and the residence state may have jurisdiction to tax his/her income under 
Art. 15 of the OECD Model, whereas under Reg. 1408/71 only the state where the work is carried out 
is entitled to levy social security charges. The Regulation applies irrespective of whether there is a 
link between the payment and subsequent benefits granted. To avoid violations of EC law, Art. 2 in 
tax treaties concluded between EC/EEA Members States should therefore be interpreted in a way that 
excludes charges covered by Reg. 1408/71.487 
 
Such delineation may yield viable results also in the case of two states that have concluded a tax 
treaty as well as an international agreement in the area of social security. Since social security 
agreements refer to “social security legislation” and separately name specific contributions and/or 
benefits, their scope may in principle encompass charges directly linked to individual benefits as well 
as charges where the link can be seen to be indirect.488 Moreover, the fact that the ECJ did not 
attribute any relevance to the connection between the charge and subsequent benefits, one could argue 
with merit that there are no grounds for a “benefit test” with respect to the application of social 
security agreements.  
 
Thus, to the extent that the coordination rules of a social security agreement come into conflict with 
the distributive rules of a tax treaty, the levy concerned may be seen to be outside treaty scope. As 
social security agreements list in detail the branches of a country’s social security legislation that shall 
be covered, arguably these agreements are leges speciales to the provisions of tax treaties. The 
approach taken for purposes of treaties following the US Model confirms this: the Technical 
Explanation gives the following reason for the express exclusion of US social security taxes from the 
scope of tax treaties: 
 
It is expected that the issue of two countries requiring social security payments from a person resident in one state 
but working in another is dealt with in the more special provisions of bilateral social security conventions.489   
 
This line of reasoning is also used in the academic literature of countries other than the United 
States490 and appears to be feasible with respect to any country that has concluded social security 
agreements. 
 
The issue is complicated by the fact that most social security agreements as well as Reg. 1408/71 
apply to “present or future” legislation,491 a provision that is comparable in its effect to Art. 2(4) of the 
OECD Model. Unclear cases may thus arise where a state replaces its contributory social security 
system by a system that is financed out of general taxation. In the case of such substantial changes, it 
is certainly arguable that the social security agreement or the Regulation should no longer apply, and 
an examination is warranted as to whether the tax treaty may be applicable. 
 
Another aspect to be taken into account is that in most governments, the authorities negotiating social 
security agreements will not be the same authorities as those that negotiate and administer tax treaties. 
As Jiménez pointed out (see note 487), it would seem unusual to include within the scope of a tax 
treaty such levies that are outside the powers of the tax authorities. Where domestic law attributes 
competences regarding certain levies to government bodies other than the bodies associated with 
taxation, there is a strong argument that these levies should not come within the scope of tax 
treaties.492 
 
                                                 
487 See also the argument made in this vein by Jiménez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 435. 
488 At one point, the Regulation speaks of “contributions or similar payments”: see Art. 33(2) of Reg. 1408/71. 
489 Technical Explanation to Art. 2 of the US Model Income Tax Convention of 20 September 1996.   
490 See, e.g., Oberson/Hull, Switzerland in International Tax Law (2006) p. 81. 
491 Art. 1(j) of Reg. 1408/71. 
492 Cf. the argument made in Jiménez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 436. 
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As has been shown, the interpretation of Art. 2 should take into account the existence of bilateral 
agreements as well as EC legislation with respect to social security charges. Some solutions have been 
proposed that may be of use in the individual case, but it should be reiterated that there are no ultimate 
solutions at this intersection of international tax law and international social security law. 
 
 
1.8.2. A note on taxes withheld under Directive 2003/48/EC 
 
In the following, the question of how cross-border investment payments that suffer withholding tax 
under the provisions of the EC Savings Directive should be treated under tax treaties is broached, 
since cases of conflict may currently arise, albeit for a transitional period and with respect to certain 
EC Member States only.493  
 
The EC Savings Directive494 was adopted to tackle the problem of tax evasion especially incumbent 
with respect to savings income in the form of interest payments. The term “interest payment” is 
defined in Art. 6 of the Directive as comprising, “in particular, income from government securities 
and income from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, 
bonds or debentures; penalty charges for late payments are not regarded as interest payments.” The 
provisions of the Savings Directive are to ensure that said payments made in one Member State to 
individuals resident for tax purposes in another Member State are subject to taxation in that other 
state.495 The Directive enables effective taxation through an exchange of information in that the 
paying institution must report to the competent tax authorities any payments of interest to the Member 
State of which the recipient is a resident.496  
 
Due to bank secrecy laws in Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, these countries have been granted 
adoption of a special withholding tax system for a transitional period, in lieu of automatic exchange of 
information as described above. These countries have agreed to withhold tax at a rate of 15% of the 
gross interest received for the first 3 years, rising to 20% until 1 January 2008 and 35% thereafter, 
until 1 January 2011. Revenue is shared as between the source state and the recipient’s residence 
state.497   
 
The portion retained by the collecting Member State could be seen as a fee for the service of 
collecting the tax that is outside tax treaty protection. 
 
The EC Savings Directive provides for a full tax credit to be granted by the residence state for the 
special withholding tax.498 The rationale is to adequately meet the goal of the Directive to prevent tax 
evasion, yet without imposing additional burdens on taxpayers.499   
 
Since the EC Savings Directive has been transposed into domestic law in the respective countries, the 
withholding by an agent permanently resident in Austria, Belgium or Luxembourg may qualify as a 
domestic tax burden that is subject to tax treaty provisions.   
 
On its face, the amount withheld could be considered a tax on income and capital levied on behalf of 
a contracting state as per Art. 2(1) and (2). Two complications arise in this context, however. The fact 
                                                 
493 The area is under development; see further European Commission, Expert Group on Taxation of Savings, Review of the 
operation of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of income from savings, Working Paper from a Meeting on 22 March 
2007, 000701\workingdoc\en-05-08. 
494 Council Directive No. 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on Taxation of Savings Income in the form of Interest Payments, OJ L 157/38, 
effective 1 July 2005. 
495 See Art. 1 (Aim of the Directive). 
496 Art. 8 (Exchange of Information). 
497 Art. 10 (Transitional Period); Art. 11 (Withholding Tax). 
498 Art. 14 (Elimination of Double Taxation). 
499 A different issue presents itself where the tax credit to be granted by the residence state under the Savings Directive may lead to 
a net loss where that country exempts its residents from tax on interest received from domestic paying agents.  As the credit under 
the Directive is irrespective of domestic credits, resulting net losses are obviously not within the purview of the Directive which 
focuses mainly on preventing tax avoidance.  
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that the source state retains a fixed percentage of the revenue while passing on the remaining fraction 
to the recipient’s state of residence might suggest that the amount retained is a fee for providing the 
service of collecting a tax on behalf of the residence state.   
 
The second complication is closely interwoven with the first in that it is unclear whether the payment 
is levied on behalf of the source state or rather on behalf of the residence state. Lozev has compared 
the revenue apportionment under the EC Savings Directive to precedents in the area of the European 
Community’s own resources and its system of recovery of claims. He concludes that in view of the 
fact that there is no link between the percentage withheld and the cost of collection, it appears that this 
percentage amount is a tax levied for the benefit of the collecting agent. 
 
However, it is unclear whether the entire amount withheld in accordance with the Savings Directive 
could be classified as a tax levied on behalf of either the source or the residence state under a tax 
treaty. In the tax treaty context, it can arguably be concluded that the state that has jurisdiction over 
the paying agent is the one on behalf of which the tax is levied.500 Tax treaties tie in with existing 
taxing powers and there is no indication that the way that revenue is used is relevant in determining 
“on behalf of” which state a tax is levied in the sense of Art. 2.   
 
The state where the paying agent is located should therefore be classified as the source state and 
would thus be granted primary taxing rights under Art. 11 of the MC. This result is in line with the EC 
Interest and Savings Directive, as the Directive obliges the recipient’s country of residence to avoid 
double burdens. However, where a tax treaty does not follow the Model Art. 11 allocation rules, the 
result may be incoherent with the Directive’s provisions. A practical example is Art. 11 in the tax 
treaty concluded between Austria and Germany, giving exclusive taxing rights to the residence state 
of the recipient. As to payments made by an Austrian paying agent (as defined in the EC Interest and 
Savings Directive) to a recipient resident in Germany, this would mean a result under the treaty that is 
counter to EC law. As between EC Member States, EC law supersedes the tax treaty in cases of 
conflict.   
 
Nevertheless, impositions under the EC Interest and Savings Directive may generally come within the 
general description of Art.2(1) and (2) in tax treaties. In the alternative, they qualify as “substantially 
similar” to the taxes listed in Art. 2(3), as per Art. 2(4). The result is a correlation of tax treaty 
protection and the goals of the EC Interest and Savings Directive.   
 
 
2. Art. 2 in the system of the treaty  
 
The concepts underlying the formulations in Art. 2 determine the scope of the treaty for purposes of 
allocating existing jurisdictions to tax as between the states involved regarding certain taxable events 
and of eliminating double taxation with respect to these events.   
 
To enable its effective application, the tax treaty must be seen as a closed system. The following 
provides an overview from the perspective of the place Art. 2 takes within the overall system of the 
treaty.  
 
 
2.1. Relation to the distributive rules 
 
                                                 
500 For an in-depth analysis see S. Heidenbauer, “Internationale Aspekte der EU-Quellensteuer”, SWI 10/2006, pp. 459 et seq. 
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Arts. 6 through 22501 are referred to as “distributive rules”,502 “allocation rules” or “limitation 
rules”,503 to describe their function of allocating among the contracting states their respective inherent 
right to tax under domestic law. This is achieved by restricting taxation in the state of source. 
 
The relation between these rules and the provisions in Art. 2 is one of essential interdependedness: 
Any tax that is covered under Art. 2 is to be dealt with as a taxable item under one of the distributive 
rules. This is effected by the “catch-all clause” in Art. 21, which enables treaty application to residual 
taxable items.504 Moreover, the provision on the substantive scope of the treaty is determinative in the 
process of applying the distributive rules; conversely, inferences may be drawn from the distributive 
rules as to the substantive scope of the treaty. An approach neglecting the nature of the treaty as a 
closed system would gravely endanger its effective functioning.  
 
The interaction between Art. 2 and the distributive rules can play a role for purposes of determining 
the substantive scope of the treaty, as is evidenced by a case of the Austrian Supreme Administrative 
Court of 2001505 regarding the Austria–Japan tax treaty: the treaty did not provide a general 
description of taxes covered and contained an exhaustive list of taxes covered that did not enumerate 
the Austrian trade tax. However, the distributive provision equivalent to Art. 8 on shipping, inland 
waterways transport and air transport contained an explicit exemption from the Austrian trade tax for 
Japanese transport enterprises. The argument was whether this exemption extended also to the newly 
created municipal tax.506   
 
The ruling of the Court was based on the premise that the mere fact that the distributive rule dealt with 
the issue but did not provide for an automatic extension as contained in the provision equivalent to 
Art. 2(4) could in no way justify denying its application in the spirit of such latter provision. The 
Court thus analysed the treaty as a system wherein the personal and substantive scope and the 
distribution and elimination rules tie into each other to create a reliable framework for the avoidance 
of double taxation. 
 
As the taxes covered under Art. 2 necessarily correlate to their treatment under the distributive rules, 
only such taxes as come within the scope laid out in Art. 2 can be dealt with as per Arts. 6 to 22; what 
is more, any tax that can be seen to be covered under Art. 2 will in any case come within one of the 
distributive rules of the treaty, as is evinced by the “catch-all clause” in Art. 21.   
 
Therefore, in determining the substantive scope of tax treaties the fact must not be overlooked that it 
is in the nature of Art. 2 to tie into the distributive rules of the treaty; if the parties expressed their 
objective intent with regard to a tax in the distributive rules, it would go against object and purpose of 
the treaty not to align this agreement with the other provisions that are part of the functional build-up 
of the treaty.  
 
 
2.2. Relation to the elimination rules 
 
The “elimination rules” in Art. 23507 set forth the methods for effective elimination of double taxation 
in the state of residence, explicitly stating that they apply to those objects and events that “may be 
                                                 
501 Arts. 5 to 7 in the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC. The provision on associated enterprises in Art. 9 of the Income and Capital 
MC is difficult to categorize as it may function in some cases to achieve an appropriate allocation of taxing jurisdictions, and in 
others to counter deliberate tax avoidance. See also Baker, Commentary, Introductory Topics, m.no. D.01 of June 2001. 
502 K. Vogel uses this term throughout his Commentary to the OECD MC. 
503 This term is suggested in Shelton, Interpretation and Application of Tax Treaties (2004) p. 126. 
504 See also M. Lang, Einführung in das Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002) m.nos. 200 et seq. 
505 Austrian Supreme Administrative Court, case No. 2000/13/0134 regarding the Austria–Japan Income Tax Treaty of 1961, 
decision of 28 March 2001; merits of the case discussed by Urtz, “Anwendbarkeit des Art. VIII DBA Österreich-Japan auf die 
Kommunalsteuer”, SWI 2001, p. 288. 
506 Cf. the considerations in Part II, Chap. 5. of this thesis. 
507 Art. 9 in the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC. The term “elimination rules” is referred to in K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 23, 
m.no. 36a.  
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taxed in the other Contracting State”, which indicates the direct connection to the outcome of 
allocation under the applicable distributive rule. The respective first paras. of Art. 23A and Art. 23B 
are identical in providing that “[w]here a resident of a Contracting State derives income or owns 
capital which, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State, the first-mentioned State shall….”  
 
According to Art. 23, relief from double taxation is attained by two alternative methods: in essence, 
under the exemption method as provided in Art. 23A the state of residence exempts the taxable item 
described in one of the distributive rules from taxation under its domestic laws; under the credit 
method in Art. 23B, the residence state credits the tax levied in the source state against the tax levied 
under its domestic laws. As is the case with the distributive rules, there is an implicit functional link 
between the substantive scope and the elimination rules in that the latter only apply in respect of taxes 
covered under the treaty. The elimination of double taxation firmly rests upon the prerequisites 
expressed in Art. 2. 
 
In a decision of the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court regarding the question whether Swedish 
income and capital tax treaties applied to a newly imposed temporary tax on profit distributions, the 
Court held that all treaties applied to the new tax – with the exception of the treaty with Belgium, as 
the exemption provision of this treaty restricted its application to the national and municipal income 
tax only.508 In conformity with what has been stated in the foregoing section regarding the distributive 
rules, an agreement expressed in the elimination rules will have similar repercussions on the 
substantive scope of the treaty; in the majority of cases, the parties will be careful to align the 
provision on personal and substantive scope with the rules regarding distribution of tax jurisdictions 
and elimination of double taxation, so as to ensure the effective functioning of the treaty. 
 
It is worth noting another aspect in which Art. 2 and Art. 23 are intertwined. Art. 23 is directed at the 
“resident of a Contracting State”, the term being defined in Art. 4 as “any person who, under the laws 
of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any 
other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any political subdivision or local 
authority thereof” (emphasis added).509 Thus, not any taxpayer, wherever located, qualifies for treaty 
benefits. Until the 1963 OECD Model, the term “resident” was not commonly used. The 1928 League 
of Nations Model Convention referred to “fiscal domicile” in the sense of a source rule; this meaning 
was abandoned in the Mexico and London Models, where the term “fiscal domicile” was used instead 
to denote worldwide tax liability.510 Art. 2 determines the taxation authority to which the treaty 
applies in referring to the “Contracting State or its political subdivision or local authority.”  
 
In a case concerning the Luxemburg–Spain Income and Capital Tax Treaty of 1986,511 the 
relationship between the treaty’s substantive scope and the rules on elimination of double taxation 
was at issue. The Luxemburg tax authorities denied the right to credit Spanish tax against the 
Luxemburg municipal business tax (MBT) even though this tax was explicitly listed in Art. 2(3) of the 
treaty. The argument made was that the elimination provision in Art. 24(1)(b) of the treaty made no 
reference to any political subdivision or local authority; albeit a tax levied on “elements of income or 
of capital” in the sense of Art. 2, the authorities argued that no credit was possible under the treaty 
against the MBT since it is levied on behalf of the Luxemburg municipalities. The government noted 
that the inclusion of MBT in the list of taxes in the treaty was made merely to prevent conflicts 
regarding the existence of a PE and the taxation rights relating to PEs.   
 
                                                 
508 Swedish Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) Case No. 5823-1985, decision of 6 March 1986, as discussed by 
Kesti, “Temporary Tax on Profit Distributions”, European Taxation 1987, pp. 30 et seq. 
509 Art. 4(1) of the Income and Capital MC (emphasis added). Similarly, Art. 4 in the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax MC states 
that “ ‘person domiciled in a Contracting State’ means any person whose estate or whose gift, under the law of that State, is liable to 
tax therein by reason of the domicile, residence or place of management of that person or any other criterion of a similar nature.” 
510 See the in-depth analysis of Hattingh, “Article 1 of the OECD Model: Historical Background and the Issues Surrounding It”, 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, pp. 215 et seq. 
511 Cour Administrative du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg, decision of 17 January 2006, No. 20.316 C. See further Chambers, 
“Luxembourg: Why foreign tax credits cannot reduce municipal business tax”, ITR April 2006. 
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The Luxemburg Administrative Tribunal held against the government on the grounds that Art. 2(1) of 
the treaty clearly stated that it “shall apply to taxes on income and on capital imposed on behalf of a 
Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in 
which they are levied”. The scope laid out in Art. 2 was seen to carry over to the methods of avoiding 
double burdens. The Tribunal further noted that municipalities are covered by the wording “local 
authorities or political subdivisions” in Art. 2 since a municipality is not an independent body but a 
subdivision of the state of Luxemburg.512 The court of first instance in Luxemburg thus applied the 
treaty autonomously as a “closed system”. The Luxemburg Administrative Court, however, reversed 
this decision and decided that the Spanish income tax may be credited only against the Luxembourg 
individual and corporate income tax but not against the MBT. The Court reasoned that the wording of 
Arts. 23A and 23B of the OECD Model does not provide for detailed rules on how to apply the tax 
credit provided by the treaty. The Court drew on Art. 3(2) and concluded that anything not covered by 
the treaty will be treated in accordance with internal law which does not grant a foreign tax credit 
against the MBT.    
 
This decision was heavily criticized as being contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.513 
Luxemburg made no reservations to the treaty nor did parliamentary documents issued in the context 
of negotiating the treaty speak to the mechanics of the tax credit. The Court should thus have analysed 
the treaty independently of domestic concepts. Where the provision on substantive scope provides for 
the treaty to apply to taxes levied on behalf of political subdivisions and local authorities, this carries 
over to all functional aspects of eliminating double taxation under that treaty.   
 
An analysis of the treaty from its context and systematic build-up and with a view to its object and 
purpose clearly points to the fact that the article laying out the elimination of double taxation ties in 
with the provision on substantive scope. The analysis of Art. 2 of a treaty therefore has direct bearing 
on its effective functioning. 
 
 
2.3. Different concepts of tax within the treaty 
 
As was shown above, the provision on substantive scope ties into the other “functional provisions” of 
the treaty distributing tax jurisdictions and eliminating double taxation as between the contracting 
states. Within this “closed system”, the concept of tax is necessarily a homogeneous one that enables 
effective treaty application.  
 
Entirely different concepts of tax may be called for in the context of treaty articles that apply 
unattachedly to the described system, as they are meant to fulfil separate, stand-alone goals.   
 
The provisions in the treaty providing for non-discrimination, exchange of information and assistance 
in the collection of taxes (Arts. 24, 26 and 27, resp.) have a different reach as compared to the 
“functional provisions” and have different conceptual underpinnings of “tax”.514 Their relationship 
with Art. 2 will therefore be examined more closely in the following. 
 
 
2.3.1. The non-discrimination provision 
 
The non-discrimination provision in Art. 24 of the Income and Capital MC515 is a special rule of 
international law that supplements anti-discrimination rules in domestic law and in EC tax law;516 it is 
designed to implement equity principles in matters of tax treaty law.517   
                                                 
512 Tribunal administratif de Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, No. 18.793 and No. 19.298. 
513 See the in-depth discussion and criticism offered in Joosen/Taferner, “Luxembourg – Getting the (Foreign Tax) Credit One 
Deserves?”, European Taxation April 2006, p. 178 et seq. 
514 Cf. van Raad, Paper for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting on “The Concept of Tax” in Caserta, Italy (2005). 
515 An analogous provision is contained in Art. 10 of the 1982 Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC.  
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The 2008 IFA Congress in Brussels dealt with the current status of Art. 24 of the OECD Model and 
recommended changes needed to improve its legal certainty and effectiveness.518 Anything said within 
the confines of the thesis at hand would not do this topic justice. The present analysis of Art. 24 
therefore focuses on its relation to the substantive scope of tax treaties. 
 
Non-discrimination provisions can be found since the earliest tax treaties.519 Initially, such provisions 
were included in general commercial treaties such as treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation. 
The content of the non-discrimination principle is in essence the same throughout the nations: equal 
cases should be treated equally and unequal cases should be treated unequally.520 There is, however, 
no internationally recognized general rule prohibiting fiscal discrimination that could be derived from 
customary international law.521 Some countries have not included a non-discrimination article in their 
treaties due to the far-reaching scope implied by the broad formulations of Art. 24 of the OECD 
Model.522  
 
Art. 24 consists of six paragraphs, the first five of which specify the “personal scope” of the clause by 
way of naming criteria with respect to which discrimination is not permitted to the contracting states 
under their respective domestic laws. Art. 24(1) provides that the application of this paragraph to 
nationals of a contracting state shall not be restricted by Art. 1 of the MC, which refers to residents.523 
This express clarification in the treaty text was first suggested in a 1968 Report of WP No. 28 dealing 
with Art. 1. The WP suggested two possible texts for clarification either in Art. 1 (“Without prejudice 
to the provisions of Article 24, this Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both 
of the Contracting States.”) or in Art. 24 (“The provisions of this Article shall not be limited by the 
provisions of Article 1.”).524  
 
Similarly, para. 6, describing the “substantive scope” of Art. 24, reads: “The provisions of this Article 
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, apply to taxes of every kind and description.” The 
express statement that the scope of Art. 24 is in no way linked to the substantive scope of the treaty 
can be explained by the broad purpose of avoiding differential treatment that might be sabotaged if it 
depended on the scope of taxes covered under the treaty; therefore, the non-discrimination provision 
goes beyond the treaty rules allocating jurisdiction to tax.525 The US Model and the UN Model, as 
well as the Nordic Convention, each contain a largely analogous provision.526 Greece, Ireland, 
                                                                                                                                                        
516 K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 24, m.no. 5. For an extensive coverage of the provision, see Avery Jones, “The Non-
Discrimination Article in Tax Treaties”, European Taxation 1991, pp. 309 et seq.; van Raad, Non-Discrimination in International 
Tax Law (1986). The drafting history of Art. 24 is laid out by M. Lang, “Die Arbeiten der OEEC und der OECD zur Schaffung der 
Diskriminierungsverbote”, in Lang/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) Die Diskriminierungsverbote im Recht der 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2006) pp. 31 et seq. 
517 For a recent study of cases involving the non-discrimination provision, see Avery Jones/Bobbett, “OECD: Interpretation of the 
non-discrimination article of the OECD Model”, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 2 (2008) 50 et seq.  
518 Luc Hinnekens/Philippe Hinnekens, “General Report, Non-discrimination at the crossroads of international taxation”, Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international Vol. 93b (2008) 15.  
519 See, e.g., Art. 17 of the 1924 Austria–Hungary income tax treaty, relating to the same treatment in fiscal matters and the same 
judicial protection. 
520 Kuleshova, “Trends in Interpretation of Non Discrimination Clauses”, in Stefaner/Züger (eds.) Tax Treaty Policy and 
Development (2005) p. 451 (453) discussing also the relativity of the concepts of equality and inequality necessitating comparison 
on a singular case-to-case basis. 
521 Adonnino, “General Report on Non-discrimination rules in international taxation”, IFA Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 
78b, p. 25. 
522 An example is Australia, whose authorities have made it clear that disadvantages may arise from the inclusion of a broad non-
discrimination article, as the language therein is too imprecise. With respect to the US–Australia Income Tax Treaty, see the 
elaborations of Goldberg/Glicklich, “Treaty-Based Non-discrimination: Now You See It Now You Don’t”, 1 Fla. Tax Rev., pp. 51 
et seq.  
523 See the text of Art. 24(1) (“notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1”), as well as the 2005 Model Commentary to Art. 24 para. 
1, m.no. 2. 
524 OECD, WP. No. 28 of the FC, 2nd Report on Articles 1,4,14 to 20 and 21, FC/WP 28(68)2, Paris, 19 December 1968, m.no. 23. 
The Mexico and London Drafts had contained discrimination articles based on residence. 
525 See also K. Vogel, Commentary on Art. 24 para. 6, m.no. 175. 
526 The US Model makes clear that the provision extends beyond the substantive scope to apply to taxes of every kind and 
description “imposed by a Contracting State or a political subdivision or local authority thereof.” For more on the non-
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Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have made a reservation to the Commentary to maintain the 
right to restrict the application of the article to taxes covered by the Convention.527 Where no such 
reservation exists, treaties that do not contain a provision corresponding to Art. 24(6) raise questions 
as to the taxes to which the non-discrimination provisions apply.  
 
Raupach has argued that the non-discrimination provisions are by their very nature designed to apply 
to any taxes, irrespective of whether they are within the substantive treaty scope, as the purpose of 
avoiding discriminatory tax treatment goes beyond the allocation of jurisdiction to tax and the 
elimination of double taxation.528 Debatin has countered that such an expansion cannot be presumed 
where the treaty lacks a provision corresponding to Art. 24(6).529 It is the prevailing view in academic 
literature that whenever Art. 24(6) is not included, it is to be understood that the non-discrimination 
provision applies only to the taxes covered by Art. 2 of the Convention.530 
 
An interesting case in this context arose with respect to the Canada–Netherlands treaty:531 In a case 
before the Netherlands Supreme Court the question arose whether the treaty, under which the 
substantive scope in Art. 2 was limited to “taxes on income”, applied to the Dutch capital tax on 
enterprises for purposes of the non-discrimination provision.532 While the treaty did not contain a 
provision like Art. 24(6) of the OECD Model stressing that the non-discrimination clause applies to 
“taxes of every kind and description”, Art. 24(3) of the treaty referred to “any taxation”. The Lower 
Court of s’Hertogenbosch had ruled that the non-discrimination clause should apply to the Dutch 
capital tax because it prohibits discrimination with respect to “any taxation”, whereas the provision on 
substantive scope referred solely to taxes on income.   
 
Advocate-General Wattel supported this position, stating that a restrictive interpretation of the non-
discrimination clause is not in accordance with the purpose and intention of the treaty. However, the 
Supreme Court took a restrictive approach with a view to the fact that a provision similar to Art. 24(6) 
of the OECD Model was missing, disregarding the broad reference in Art. 24(3) of the treaty to “any 
taxation”.   
 
While it is generally accepted that the omission of a statement in the sense of Art. 24(6) leads to the 
confinement of the non-discrimination clause to the substantive scope of the treaty, the reference to 
“any taxation” in the Canada–Netherlands treaty at issue nevertheless can be seen as a clear indicator 
of a broad objective intent, which is why the Court’s oblivion of this formulation has met with heavy 
criticism.533 The Court’s decision lacks a sound basis and appears to signify the attempt of a domestic 
court to undermine the purpose of the non-discrimination provision to guard against discriminatory 
practices on the broadest possible scale, as evinced by the wording “any taxation”. Treaty application 
in good faith requires a purposive approach to the concept of tax in the non-discrimination article. 
 
The Commentaries, however, do not specify how broad the scope of the non-discrimination article is 
intended to be. The Technical Explanation to Art. 2 of the US Model Tax Treaty stresses that “[a] 
broader coverage applies, however, for purposes of Articles 24 (Non-Discrimination)”, in that this 
article “applies with respect to all taxes, including those imposed by state and local governments”,534 
                                                                                                                                                        
discrimination article in the Nordic Convention, see Helminen, “Non-discrimination and the Nordic Multilateral Double Taxation 
Convention”, Bulletin for International Taxation 2007, pp. 103 et seq. 
527 Commentary to Art. 24 of the 2005 Income and Capital MC, m.no. 72. 
528 Raupach, “Diskriminierungsverbote und Gleichbehandlungsklauseln in Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, AWD 1966, p. 87. 
529 Debatin, “Das Verbot steuerlicher Diskriminierung”, DStZ 1970, p. 132. 
530 See Adonnino, “General Report”, IFA Cahiers de droit fiscal international Vol. 78b, p. 38. See also K. Vogel, Commentary on 
Art. 24, m.no. 2; van Raad, Non-Discrimination in International Tax Law (1986) p. 202. 
531 Canada–Netherlands Income Tax Treaty (as amended by the 1997 Protocol) of 27 May 1986, effective 1 January 1987. 
532 Netherlands Supreme Court, P.N.D., Case No. 35.398, decision of 1 November 2000; discussed by Offermanns, “Non-
Discrimination Clause in Canada-Netherlands Tax Treaty Not Applicable to Capital Duty – Decision of the Supreme Court of 1 
November 2000”, European Taxation 2001, pp. 106 et seq. 
533 See the considerations of De Bont, “Tax Treaty Interpretation in the Netherlands”, in M. Lang (ed.) Tax Treaty Interpretation 
(2001) pp. 241 et seq., as well as the criticism of Offermanns, European Taxation 2001, pp. 106 et seq. 
534 US Model Technical Explanation accompanying the US Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, explanation to 
Art. 2, introductory passage. 
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which clearly broadens the scope of Art. 24 as opposed to Art. 2, as the latter only covers federal 
taxes.   
 
The OECD Model Commentary does not take a stand on whether a broader scope can be assumed for 
Art. 24 than is foreseen in Art. 2; it is merely reiterated that Art. 24 “applies to taxes of every kind and 
description levied by, or on behalf of, the State, its political subdivisions or local authorities.”535 Van 
Raad advocates instant reference to domestic law under Art. 3(2), as 
 
[d]ifferent from Article 2, the OECD Commentary on the Articles 24, 26 and 27 does not provide any further clue 
as to the meaning of the term ‘tax’ used in these Articles. Therefore, any government levy that is considered a ‘tax’ 
under the domestic (tax) law of the treaty states is included in the scope of these Articles.536 
 
This view is not followed in the present thesis; as will be laid out in the following, further insights as 
to the meaning of “taxes of every kind and description” can be gained from the context of the 
treaty.537 
 
The present wording of Art. 24 dates back to the 1958 draft version of WP No. 4 of the OEEC Fiscal 
Committee.538 The Commentary provided by WP No. 4 states with respect to para. 6: 
 
This paragraph states that the word ‘taxation’ used in the preceding paragraphs of the articles means taxes of every 
kind and description levied by or on behalf of the state, its political and administrative subdivisions, or any 
institutions or agencies whatsoever. It does not call for any special comment.539 
 
This speaks for the assumption that the provision is intended to encompass the widest possible 
spectrum of taxes.  
 
Prior to the adoption of para. 6, the scope of the term “taxation” in para. 1 of the Draft Article on non-
discrimination was subject to discussion: in a Supplementary Report of 1957, Working Party No. 4, in 
response to written comments submitted to it by the Belgian, Swedish and Swiss Delegations, 
elaborated with respect to the envisaged article on tax discrimination: 
 
The Article proposed by the Working Party relates to taxes on income, on capital, on estates and inheritances and 
on gifts. The Swiss Delegation has suggested that this limitation should not be sustained but that taxes and 
contributions in general should be covered … by the use of the term ‘taxation’, subject to this term being defied in 
an additional clause, as follows: “In this Article the term ‘taxation’ means contributions of every kind and 
description levied by any authority whatsoever.” In principle, the Working Party’s view is that the aim should be to 
prevent discriminatory treatment in relation to all taxes whatsoever. It feels, however, that it must leave to the 
Committee’s judgment the question whether such a widely drawn provision should be adopted, and it has restricted 
itself in its draft to the taxes which have so far been discussed in the Committee.540  
 
The Committee consented to the proposal of the Swiss Delegation: 
 
After a discussion on the field of application of the draft Article, the Committee decided that paragraph 1 ought to 
apply to taxes and contributions in general, as proposed by the Delegate for Switzerland supported by the Delegate 
for Denmark.541 
 
                                                 
535 Commentary to Art. 24(6) of the 2005 Income and Capital MC, m.no. 60. See also the 1982 Commentary to Art. 10(4) of the 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, m.no. 23. 
536 Van Raad, Paper for the 9th Annual EATLP Meeting (2005) p.6. 
537 See especially with respect to the drafting history of Art. 24 the elaborations by M. Lang, “Die Arbeiten der OEEC und der 
OECD zur Schaffung der Diskriminierungsverbote”, in Lang/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) Die Diskriminierungsverbote im Recht der 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2006) pp. 31 et seq. 
538 OEEC, WP No. 4 of the Fiscal Committee (Netherlands and France) Final Report on Tax Discrimination on Grounds of 
Nationality or Similar Grounds, FC/WP 4(58)1, Paris, 19 February 1958. The text was adopted by the Council that same year: 
OEEC Council, C(58)118 Part I Annex IV. 
539 FC/WP 4(58)1, II. Commentary on the Draft Art., p. 9.  
540 WP No. 4 of the Fiscal Committee, Supplementary Report on Tax Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality or Similar Grounds, 
FC/WP 4(57)2, Paris, 10 May 1957, pp. 1 et seq.  
541 OEEC, Minutes of the 4th Session of the Fiscal Committee, 4-7 June 1957, FC/M(57)2, p. 3. 
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Following this clarification by the Committee, WP No. 4 called on the Fiscal Committee to include an 
express clarification in this vein in the text of the provision: 
 
In June, the Committee decided that the provisions for the prevention of discrimination should apply to taxes and 
contributions in general. The Working Party is of opinion542 that this clarification should be inserted in a separate 
paragraph.543  
 
Although this suggestion was never realized, the materials paint a clear picture of the object and 
purpose of Art. 24 to cover any and all levies that can be qualified as taxes. 
 
With respect to taxes on estates and inheritances, WP No. 4 noted that “only very little discrimination 
arises in connection with these taxes.”544 In 1963, in the context of drafting a Model Convention with 
respect to the taxation of estates and inheritances, the scope of the word “taxation” in the non-
discrimination provision corresponding to Art. 24 of the Income and Capital MC did not give rise to a 
lot of discussion. The Delegate for Switzerland proposed that the scope of the term “taxation” should 
be seen to be identical with the term as already adopted in the draft Convention on Income and 
Capital;545 this view was followed throughout the further drafting process of the Estates and 
Inheritances Tax Model Convention.546   
 
Clarity in this respect had been attained much earlier; the Commentary to the provision on Equality of 
Treatment in the Draft Model Tax Conventions of Mexico and London stated: “There is no doubt that 
these provisions are also intended to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the taxes on property, capital or 
increment of wealth…, though this is not specifically stated in the Model Convention.547  
 
In drafting the Income and Capital MC of 1977, WP No. 4 sent out a questionnaire on the 
interpretation of Art. 24 to the Representatives of the OECD Member States.548 With regard to Art. 
24(6), the following feedback was received: 
 
The Austrian Delegation considers that the scope of Article 24 should be restricted to the taxes to which the 
Convention applies and that paragraph 6 of that Article should be deleted accordingly. In contrast, the Spanish 
Delegation would like it made clear that the term "taxation" covers taxes of every kind, including those not 
governed by the convention. The Swedish Delegation, for its part, suggests merely that a discussion be held on this 
point, in order to determine once and for all what taxes are covered by the term ‘taxation’.549 
 
WP No. 4 believed it impossible to make changes to the Model text on account of the diversity of 
opinions among the Delegates: “It appeared to the Working Party that it was not possible, at present, 
to consider the majority of the amendments proposed by Member countries.… [I]t has been seen 
above that the Member countries expressed conflicting views on the majority of them.”550 
 
The purpose of Art. 24 to infuse equity into tax treaty law is best effected when it is independent of 
the mutual bargaining of the treaty partners. Any burden that qualifies as a “tax” under domestic law 
is within the umbrella of discrimination protection of a tax treaty, irrespective of the scope of taxes 
covered agreed upon by way of a mutual compromise.  
 
                                                 
542 Sic. 
543 OEEC, WP No. 4 of the Fiscal Committee, Second Supplementary Report on Tax Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality or 
Similar Grounds, FC/WP 4 (57)3, Paris, 13 September 1957, p. 14, under the heading “Paragraph (6) – Field of Application of the 
Provisions as Regards Taxes”. 
544 OEEC, FC/WP 4(57)1, Paris, 11 January 1957, p. 4. 
545 OECD, Fiscal Committee, Minutes of the 10th Session, Paris, 14-17 May 1963, FC/M(63)4, p. 5. 
546 OECD, Fiscal Committee, Draft Report to the Council on the Draft Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances, 
FC(66)1, Paris, 16 March, 1966. 
547 League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions – Commentary and Text, Geneva, November 
1946, Ad Art. XVI. 
548 OECD, WP No. 4 of the Fiscal Committee (France-Japan-Spain) Questionnaire on Art. 24 (Non-Discrimination) of the OECD 
Draft Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, FC/WP 4(68)1, Paris, 15 October 1968. 
549 OECD, WP No. 4 of the Fiscal Committee (France-Spain-Japan) Report on Amendments Which Might Be Made to Article 24 of 
the Draft Convention Relating to Non-Discrimination, FC/WP 4(69)1, Paris, 21 November 1969, p. 12. 
550 Id., at p. 15. 
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2.3.2. Provisions on exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes 
 
In addition Art. 2(4), which provides that the treaty partners shall notify each other of significant 
changes in domestic tax laws that may affect treaty application,551 most treaties contain a provision for 
reciprocal exchange of information upon request of the tax authorities of either treaty partner. Art. 26 
of the OECD Income and Capital MC deals with international exchange of information between the 
tax authorities of the contracting parties. Although the Convention generally applies only to residents 
of one or both of the contracting parties, this article does cover the exchange of information relating to 
persons who are not residents of either of the treaty partners.   
 
Moreover, information may be requested by either party with respect to “taxes of every kind imposed 
by a contracting state”, i.e. not only the taxes otherwise covered by the treaty under Art. 2. For 
example, the competent authority of a contracting party may request information used in examining 
an estate tax return even though the substantive scope of the treaty does not encompass estate taxes. 
 
The current OECD Art. 26 is identical in wording with the corresponding provision in the US Model, 
which has been applied to any information relevant to carrying out the provisions of the treaty or the 
domestic laws of either contracting party.552   
 
The idea for standardized reciprocal exchange of information was developed by the Technical Experts 
of the League of Nations, who commented in their 1925 Report to the Fiscal Committee: “Our 
investigation into the question of double taxation and the few treaties existing between some of the 
European States has suggested to us the idea of the exchange of information on taxation matters, an 
idea which has been clarified and defined in the course of our deliberations.”553 The Experts further 
noted: “What will be the scope of the information to be given? Here we have drawn no distinction 
between the various taxes and have merely reviewed the various categories of wealth or income which 
a taxpayer may possess.”554 
 
The provision on exchange of information was from its inception thus seen to tie in with the 
substantive scope of the treaty and limited to matters of taxes on income and capital. The 1963 OECD 
Model adopted this approach in providing that the parties “shall exchange such information as is 
necessary for the carrying out of this Convention and of the domestic laws of the Contracting States 
concerning taxes covered by this Convention insofar as the taxation thereunder is in accordance with 
this Convention.”555 The Model Commentary read: “In order to keep the exchange of information 
within the framework of the Convention, a limitation to the exchange of information is set so that 
information should be given only insofar as the national tax in question is covered by the 
Convention….”556   
 
In an observation on the Commentary, Mexico and the United States clarified that they reserved the 
right to “extend the application of this Article to all taxes imposed by a Contracting State, not just 
taxes covered by the Convention pursuant to Article 2.”557 
 
A revision of the OECD Model in 2000 broadened the reach of Art. 26:  contracting parties adopting 
the revised wording can exchange information under the treaty as to “taxes of every kind and 
description”, a formulation that had been in use in the 1981 U.S. Model.   
 
                                                 
551 See the discussion of Art. 2(4) supra at II.5. 
552 See e.g. US Department of the Treasury Press Release hp-1076 of 10 July 2008, in the context of proposed new treaties with 
Bulgaria, Canada and Iceland. 
553 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report and Resolutions, Submitted by the Technical Experts to the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations, Geneva, 7 February 1925 (F.212) Part I. 
554 Id. at III.2. 
555 Art. 26(1) of the 1963 OEEC Income and Capital MC.  
556 Model Commentary to Art. 26 para. 1, m.no. 5 as it read from 1963 up to the revision of the Model in 2000. 
557 Observation on the Model Commentary to Art. 26 para. 1, m.no. 25. 
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Further explanations were inserted in the 2005 Model Commentary: 
 
[T]he present Article embodies the rules under which information may be exchanged to the widest possible extent, 
with a view to laying the proper basis for the implementation of the domestic laws of the Contracting States 
concerning taxes covered by the Convention and for the application of specific provisions of the Convention. The 
text of the Article makes it clear that the exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2, so that the 
information may include particulars about non-residents and may relate to the administration or enforcement of 
taxes not referred to in Article 2.558 
  
Customs duties are the only charges explicitly excluded from the broad reach of Art. 26: the Model 
Commentary notes that exchange of information with respect to customs duties “has a legal basis in 
other international instruments.”559 With respect to social security levies, the situation is unclear. On 
the basis of conclusions earlier in this study on the nature of social security contributions, the 
following is proposed: Where a social security levy can be seen to be a “tax” as per Art. 2, it is 
certainly covered under the broad reference to “taxes of every kind and description.” This is the case 
where a country finances social security predominantly out of general taxation.   
 
On the other hand, where there is a closed system of contributions and corresponding benefits, such 
levies clearly come within the realm of social security totalization agreements. However, they may 
still come within the exchange of information provision of a tax treaty if this is in line with the object 
and purpose of both international instruments. Para. 5.2 of the 2005 Commentary to Art. 26 is a 
verbatim transcription of Art. 27(1) of the OECD/Council of Europe Convention on Exchange of 
Information, the 1989 Technical Explanation to which reads:   
 
The Convention also covers compulsory social security contributions paid to social security agencies governed by 
public law, even if the latter do not, strictly speaking, constitute general governmental departments. What is 
important in this case is the nature of the contribution, whereas the structure or method of operation of the agency 
managing the service in question is immaterial for the purpose of the instrument. On the other hand, compulsory 
contributions to private law institutions do not fall under this instrument even if the said institutions are under 
public inspection.560   
 
Given this history of Art. 26, the conclusion can be drawn that irrespective of whether there are other 
instruments for administrative cooperation in the field of social security, Art. 26 applies to social 
security contributions as this article is not limited by other international instruments. In countries 
where the administration and collection of taxes and social security levies, respectively, is allocated to 
different governmental entities or bodies, practical results ultimately hinge upon the coordination of 
competences under domestic laws. 
 
It remains unclear whether fees, i.e. payments directly in exchange for public services, are 
encompassed by information exchange. In line with the above deliberations on the concept of “tax”, 
arguably such payments are not “taxes” and are therefore not addressed by the reference in Art. 26 to 
“taxes of every kind and description.” Based on the considerations earlier in this study on grey areas 
between taxes and fees, it can be concluded that payments made to general revenue without a 
corresponding benefit will come within the “taxes of every kind and description” aimed at in Art. 26.   
 
The same conclusions apply to Art. 27, which provides for assistance in the collection of taxes.  Art. 
27 was added as an entirely new provision in the OECD Income and Capital MC in January 2003.561 
Prior to its inclusion in the Model text, contracting parties had sporadically included a provision 
referring to assistance in collection; the earliest example seems to be the income and capital tax treaty 
concluded between Germany and Italy in 1925, which provided in its Art. 18: “The Contracting 
Parties undertake to assist each other reciprocally in levying and collecting direct taxes.  The manner 
in which such assistance is to be given shall be defined in a separate convention.” The 1927 League of 
                                                 
558 Preliminary remarks to the 2005 MC Commentary on Art. 26 para. 1, m.no. 2. 
559 2005 OECD Model Commentary on Art. 26 para. 1, m.no. 5.2. 
560 Para. 25 of the 1989 Technical Explanation to the OECD/Council of Europe Convention.  
561 See further Végh, “The 2003 OECD Model”, European Taxation 2003, pp. 244 et seq. 
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Nations draft texts contained a Draft Bilateral Convention on Judicial Assistance in the Collection of 
Taxes,562 which provided:   
 
Article 1: The Contracting States undertake to give each other mutual assistance in the collection of the following 
taxes [Footnote1]: (a)…, (b)…., (c)….  Article 2:  The assistance in question shall apply both to the principal of 
the tax and to charges incidental thereto (costs, interest) [Footnote2]. 
Footnote 1: The Contracting States shall decide in agreement with one another whether the Convention is 
applicable to State taxes only or to provincial, communal and other taxes also.  Footnote 2: Penalties of a fiscal 
nature, etc., may also be inserted. 
 
The Commentary to Art. 1 of this Draft stresses: “The taxes which it is desired to collect will be 
enumerated, so that no doubt will exist as to the scope of the Convention. Moreover, this method 
enables States to include …, if they deem it desirable, all kinds of taxes in addition to direct taxes.”  
 
The drafters of Art. 27 of the OECD Model made a conscious choice not to refer to “taxes”, but to 
rather speak of an obligation of the contracting parties assist each other in the collection of “revenue 
claims”. The term is defined as encompassing all amounts owed in respect of taxes, as well as interest, 
administrative penalties, and costs of collection or conservancy related to such amounts.563   
 
Assistance between the contracting parties is not restricted by Arts. 1 and 2: the revenue claims 
concerned do not need to be made from persons who are residents. The term “revenue claim” as 
defined in Art. 27(2) covers all amounts owed in respect of all kinds of taxes imposed on behalf of the 
state, its subdivisions or local authorities, and not merely the taxes envisaged in Art. 2. The definition 
also includes interest on unpaid tax, administrative penalties and the costs of collection or 
conservancy. Moreover, Art. 27 is not expressly limited to taxes which fall due after the treaty enters 
into force. This article might thus potentially have an element of retrospective application to taxes 
which have fallen due before the convention was concluded or entered into force.564   
 
Not only is assistance in the collection of taxes under Art. 27 not limited by Art. 2, but assistance is 
permitted even with respect to taxes that do not exist in the country receiving the request for 
assistance.565 The purpose of facilitating the collection of revenue claims by the treaty partner’s 
government is independent of the taxes covered by the respective treaty. Art. 27 can thus be seen to 
cover interest, administrative penalties and any other costs whose collection would otherwise be 
frustrated. 
 
 
B. Taxes on income and on capital 
 
“The only decisive fact for the application of the Convention to a given tax is that the basis on which 
this tax is levied is considered to be ‘income (capital)’.”566 
 
The foundational premise of domestic income tax systems and the application of income tax treaties 
alike is to conceptualize items that constitute income and capital for tax purposes. Certain items may 
be classified as “income” under the tax laws of one treaty partner but not the other; therefore, when 
applying a treaty covering “taxes on income” as between two countries, it is key to determine whether 
a certain taxable item can be considered “income” subject to taxes within the scope of the treaty. 
 
 
1. The concept of income in tax treaties 
 
                                                 
562 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion, G.216.M.85.1927.II, Geneva, April 1927, IV. 
563 Further Baker, Commentary on Art. 27, 27B-01 et seq. 
564 Para. 14 of the OECD Model Commentary; see also Baker at 27B-04. 
565 Para. 18 of the OECD Model Commentary to Art. 27. 
566 FC/WP 30(69)1, m.no. 17 (emphasis in the original). 
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Income tax is the internationally most widespread form of taxation. However, centuries of debate in 
economic fiscal theory have illustrated that the contours of a possible universal concept of income are 
murky, if not altogether elusive. The objective of the following considerations is to seek a route 
towards the practical application of a basic concept of income in resolving possible points of 
contention among contracting parties.   
 
Drawing on practical examples, the question to be answered is whether it is useful in the light of the 
object and purpose of income tax treaties to see the application of income tax treaties as being 
founded on a comprehensive, all-encompassing concept of income. The core question in this context 
is whether the domestic classification of taxes as “taxes on income” is determinative in the application 
of tax treaties.  
 
 
1.1. The schedular system of tax treaties 
 
At the early stages of development of the League of Nations Model Conventions ultimately leading to 
the OECD Model texts, a considerable number of countries used a schedular rather than a global 
approach in their domestic income tax systems. A schedular income tax system is one in which 
separate taxes are imposed on different categories of income, while in a global income tax system, a 
single tax is imposed on all income, whatever its nature.567   
 
The Model Conventions have taken what could be called a “basket approach”, with different types of 
income and capital dealt with under the respective distributive articles. This schedular nature of the 
Model Conventions has been a fixture in tax treaties. It has recently faced criticism and calls for 
reform, however. Vogel has argued that the types of income in the Model texts and in existing treaties 
follow no logical order or systematic conception.568 This tax treaty structure gives rise to conflicts of 
classification in that the “income baskets” do not seem to be clearly mutually exclusive. Rosenbloom, 
on the other hand, has questioned whether there is a persuasive case for radical change in the way tax 
treaties are constructed.569   
 
While the depths of this issue are beyond the scope of the present study, it allows for an important 
conclusion as to the concept of income in tax treaties: Art. 2 contains a very broad global definition of 
the income items to which the treaty applies. The main reason the Model texts allocate income in a 
schedular manner seems to be to enable a case-by-case compromise between capital importing and 
capital exporting countries.570 It seems there is only a very basic common notion of income 
underlying the Model texts; whatever a country’s domestic system declares to be a certain type of 
income seems to be covered under the respective “basket” in the treaty. This will be further examined 
below in an analysis of the treatment of income fictions under tax treaties. In a first step, common 
features of the basic concept of income are elicited from the system adopted in treaties following the 
OECD Model text. 
 
 
1.2. Basic common consensus on the concept of income 
 
Most domestic tax systems do not define income as clearly as one would expect;571 existing 
definitions are usually very broad. In the United States, Sec. 61 of the Internal Revenue Code plainly 
                                                 
567 See further Lee Burns/Richard Krever, “Individual Income Tax”, in Victor Thuronyi (ed.), Tax Law Design and Drafting (1998) 
Chap. 14. 
568 Vogel, “The Schedular Structure of Tax Treaties”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation June 2002, 260 (260). 
569 Rosenbloom, “Comments on the Schedular Structure of Tax Treaties”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation “Tax 
Treaty Monitor” June 2002, p. 262. 
570 See also Genschel/Rixen, “International Tax Cooperation and National Tax Sovereignty”, conference paper (2005), on file with 
the author. 
571 Yarif Brauner, “An International Tax Regime in Crystallization”, 56 Tax Law Review (2003) 259. 
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defines gross income as income from any source.572 The US Supreme Court, in the classic and oft-
cited decision Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, defined income as (1) accession to wealth, (2) that is 
clearly realized and (3) over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.573   
 
Legislative authority then has the “power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross incomes 
in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax.”574 These basic maxims appear to hold true in most 
income tax systems. 
 
With a view to the basic maxims of income taxation in the various countries, Thuronyi has noted: 
“The degree of commonality in income tax is striking”575 Income tax regimes in the various countries 
generally adopt the Schanz/Haig/Simons economic definition of income, named after early 20th 
century economists advocating its use as the most accurate reflection of the taxpayer’s economic 
capacity, i.e. “ability to pay”. Under this definition, income is the money value of the net accretion to 
one’s economic power between two points of time.576 Some countries expressly invoke the ability-to-
pay principle of taxation in their constitution as a limitation on the government’s power to tax.577   
 
Austrian scholar Hans Georg Ruppe proffered the fundamental observation that cash-basis market 
transactions are the primary focus of income taxation.578 Non-market and/or non-cash economic 
activity is regularly excluded from the notion of income in domestic tax systems. This phenomenon 
can thus be seen as a basic guiding principle in conceptualizing the notion of income in a domestic as 
well as in the international context.    
 
The concept of income in tax treaties is to be viewed from its international context as well as from the 
perspective of the object and purpose of tax treaties and the functioning of the treaty as an expression 
of mutual agreement.   
 
Vogel argued that equity in taxation in the international context has the same conceptual 
underpinnings as domestic equity in taxation.579 This view has been criticized in that taxation of 
income in the domestic context is to be distinguished from the sharing of interests in international 
income.580 Nevertheless, Vogel’s basic approach is sound; the object and purpose of tax treaties points 
to a concept of income that ties in with the concept of income as a tax base in the respective country.   
 
While the Schanz/Haig/Simons principle of income as “accession to wealth” generally encompasses 
also unrealized gains, most income tax systems provide for a basic realization requirement as an 
indication of taxpayers` ability to pay.581 Nevertheless, income taxes throughout the nations are 
predominantly “hybrids”: frequent abandonment of realization in favour of mere accretion can be 
found where certain easily valued assets are “marked to market” or, in the context of taxation of 
                                                 
572 Sec. 61 IRC (“Gross income defined”) reads: “(a) General definition – Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for 
services …; (2) Gross income derived from business; (3) Gains derived from dealings in property; (4) Interest; (5) Rents; (6) 
Royalties; (7) Dividends….” 
573 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
574 Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934); Helvering v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 84 (1938). 
575 Victor Thuronyi, “Introduction”, in Victor Thuronyi (ed.) Tax Law Design and Drafting (1998). 
576 See Henry C. Simons, “Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy” (1938) 50: “Personal 
income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the 
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.” A general treatise on the significance 
of economic concepts in domestic tax law and in the tax treaty context is given by Louan Verdoner, “Major Economic Concepts in 
Tax Treaty Policy”, 31 Intertax 147 (2003). 
577 Examples of explicit reference to the ability-to-pay principle can be found in the constitutions of Italy, Spain and Germany. 
578 See also Ruppe’s considerations in “‘Übertragung’ – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Übertragung von Einkunftsquellen als 
Problem der Zurechnung von Einkünften”, in Tipke (ed.) Übertragung von Einkunftsquellen im Steuerrecht (1978) 7 et seq. See 
further Rolf Wittmann, Das Markteinkommen (1992). 
579 Klaus Vogel, “World-wide vs. Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part 1)”, Intertax 
(1988) 216. 
580 See Nancy H. Kaufman, “Fairness and the Taxation of International Income”, 29 Law and Policy in International Business 
(1998) 145 et seq.  
581 See Kevin Holmes, The Concept of Income – A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis, IBFD Publications (2001) 16. 
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interest, “deemed accrued” in interest-free loans.582 Income has been held to imply dominion or 
control of the taxpayer over the amount received.583  
 
The notion of ability to pay thus remains unclear even in the international context.584 However, it may 
certainly serve as a starting point in gauging items of income allocated under tax treaties. It is an 
integral part of the commonality in domestic tax provisions that there is a myriad of exceptions to the 
basic taxation principles, a major part of which are effected by way of what could be called “income 
fictions”. The following deliberations deal with these most common “deviations” from what could be 
seen as a basic common concept of income underlying underlie income tax treaties. Upon conclusion 
of this practical analysis, the thesis goes on to delimit the concept of taxes on income from that of 
taxes on capital. This distinction is relevant since a considerable number of treaties apply solely to 
taxes on income because at the time of conclusion of the treaty neither contracting state levies “taxes 
on capital”. 
 
 
1.3. “Fictitious income” in tax treaties 
 
Rosenbloom stated that “it would be practically impossible for any jurisdiction to disregard fictions 
altogether in shaping its rules of taxation.”585 
 
When a country presumes that there is income to a taxpayer and levies taxes accordingly, should the 
tax levied on such “fictitious” income be given effect also in applying bilateral income tax treaties 
concluded by that country? The analysis of this seemingly simple, yet unresolved, practical question 
may shed more light on the concept of income in tax treaties. 
 
Discrepancies in income tax systems in terms of taxing a notional or actual increase in wealth may 
lead to double taxation in cross-border situations. Where one country taxes fictitious income, while 
another country characterizes taxable income differently, questions arise as to the extent to which 
income tax treaties provide relief. The treaty provisions allocate taxing rights with respect to specified 
items of income “paid” or “derived”, so that one could call into question their application to situations 
where income is deemed to be paid or derived by the taxpayer under domestic law. On these grounds, 
it has been argued that domestic “income fictions” are not covered by the specified allocation 
provisions, but rather fall under the residual “Other Income” article (Art. 21).586   
 
In contrast, the basic approach taken in this thesis is that income tax treaties are in principle 
indifferent as to whether the taxable event is “fictitious”, as treaty protection ties in with domestic tax 
burdens.  
 
 
1.3.1. Income fictions in domestic tax systems 
 
The term “fictitious income” as used in the following is intended to describe situations that involve no 
determinable or measurable increase in wealth to the taxpayer. The premise taken is that no solid 
distinction is possible between full-fledged fictions, where there is no actual money income stream, 
and mere “approximations of reality” where governments assume or calculate taxable income for the 
simple reason that any actual shift of economic power is hard to measure. Arguably, “every actual 
                                                 
582 See, for example, Sec. 1256 of the US IRC, as well as the provisions for “original issue discount” in Sec; 1273 IRC. 
583 Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972). 
584 Cf. the criticism in Deborah A. Geier, 3Time to bring back the ‘benefit’ norm?”, Tax Analysts Worldwide Daily February 2004, 
41. 
585 David H. Rosenbloom, “Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt”, 
26 Sidney Law Review (2004) 17 (19). 
586 See Peter J. Wattel/Otto Marres, “Characterization of Fictitious Income under OECD-Patterned Tax Treaties”, European 
Taxation (2003) 66. 
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advantage (every increase in wealth, every shift or increase in property, including unrealized capital 
gains)” should be treated differently from “fictitious earnings and fictitious capital increases”.587  
 
However, it is virtually impossible to draw a bright line between “fiction” and “reality” in the context 
of the income tax; notional approximations to a taxpayer’s income will often not correspond to market 
prices and may thus be far from reality.588 More generally, one could call into question whether there 
is such a thing as “real income” for purposes of the income tax. A common feature of income tax 
systems across the nations appears to be the fact that taxable income is derived by way of exemptions, 
legal presumptions, accelerations and deferrals, almost to a point where one could view income tax 
provisions as the most imaginative fiction ever written. In fact, it seems like an inherent characteristic 
of tax laws that they are abundant with fiction. 
 
In the following, some examples are presented that display what could be characterized as fictitious 
taxable income in domestic tax laws. These examples will serve as a backdrop to all further analyses 
regarding the treatment of “income fictions” under income tax treaties. 
 
 
1.3.1.1. Imputed interest, imputed income from owner-occupied housing 
 
Imputed income has been defined as “a flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned and used by 
the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his 
own behalf.”589 A distinguishing characteristic of imputed income is treated as if it were derived in the 
ordinary processes of the market.   
 
In a dispute between the United States and Canada, imputed interest on the taxpayer’s sale of stock 
interest for a non-interest bearing note was upheld at the reduced tax treaty rate. The treaty and 
protocol thereto were seen not to preclude the United States from taxing imputed interest income 
under its domestic tax law (IRC Sec. 483). The US Tax Court noted in its analysis that income under 
the tax treaty includes interest and that the term “interest” is not defined exhaustively in either the 
treaty text or the Protocol, as the wording in the Protocol provided that “‘interest’ … shall 
include….”590   
 
The taxation of owner-occupied housing is frequently cited as the prime example for imputed income; 
imputed rental income was in fact explicitly included in treaties from the 1930s onwards.591 Although 
the taxation of net imputed income to homeowners is a commonly invoked demand in terms of tax 
policy,592 most countries do not impose taxes on such personal dwellings. Currently, however, OECD 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain 
and the United Kingdom tax homeowners on imputed income to varying degrees.593 In Europe, 
                                                 
587 Wattel/Marres, European Taxation (2003) 66 (67). 
588 See the considerations of M. Lang, “‘Fictitious Income’ and Tax Treaties”, in Arendonk/Engelen/Jansen (eds) A Tax Globalist - 
The Search for the Borders of International Taxation, Essays in Honor of Maarten J. Ellis (2005) 34. 
589 Laurie L. Malman/Linda F. Sugin/Lewis D. Solomon/Jerome M. Hesch, The Individual Tax Base – Cases, Problems and 
Policies in Federal Taxation (2002) 136. 
590 US Tax Court, Crow v. Commissioner, decision of August 26, 1985, 85 TC 376. 
591 See Annex II for the following treaties:  Belgium–France 1931, Belgium–Italy 1931, France–Italy 1931, Belgium–Netherlands 
1933. 
592 For the United States, see the arguments made by James R. Follain/David C. Ling/Gary A. McGill, “The Preferential Income 
Tax Treatment of Owner-occupied Housing: Who Really Benefits?”, 4 Housing Policy Debate 1 (1993); Steven C. Bourassa and 
William G. Grigsby, “Income Tax Concessions for Owner-Occupied Housing”, 8 Housing Policy Debate 3 (2000) 521. Although 
not part of the tax base in the United States, income from owner-occupied housing is imputed by the US Department of Commerce 
in estimating gross domestic product. 
593 See further OECD, Economic Survey of the Euro Area 2005: Illustrative Estimates of the Impact of Owner Occupied Housing 
costs on inflation. See also the data provided in International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Supplementary Service to 
European Taxation, IBFD, Amsterdam (2005). 
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approximately two thirds of the households own the dwellings that they occupy and the share of 
owner-occupied dwellings has been on the increase.594  
 
An illustrative example is the Spanish deemed rental income tax (Rendimientos del capital 
inmobiliario), which is levied on real estate that is neither rented out nor used as a primary residence. 
The Spanish local authorities in such cases presume rental income amounting to 2% of the ratable 
value (valor catastral) of the Spanish property and a tax of 25% is imposed on this “income”, equal to 
0.5% of the valor catastral. 
 
To give an example: When owning Spanish property with a valor catastral of EUR 100,000 and not 
renting it out, the taxpayer will still be liable to pay 25% of EUR 2,000 in income taxes.595 There is no 
actual money income stream; homeowners are taxed on “non-cash income” regardless of the existence 
of any liquid funds.   
 
While it is questionable whether such a tax is in line with the ability-to-pay principle, it demonstrates 
the fundamental leeway countries have in exerting tax sovereignty within the realm of the income tax. 
As tax treaties tie in with existing tax burdens and are not concerned with taxation principles like 
ability to pay to justify taxation, a tax levied on “income” per domestic law that does not entail 
measurable accretion to wealth will be within the substantive scope of the treaty unless the parties 
state otherwise or either party could, by way of treaty application in good faith, expect otherwise. 
 
 
1.3.1.2. Provisions on controlled foreign companies 
 
Most countries have enacted provisions regarding controlled foreign companies (CFCs).596 The policy 
rationale for such legislation is to prevent resident taxpayers from interposing foreign corporations in 
low-tax jurisdictions to derive income in this way instead of remitting it to the home country. CFC 
regimes regularly provide that passive income of a CFC, e.g. interest and dividends received from 
investments in securities, is “deemed distributed” and therefore immediately taxable in the residence 
country – irrespective of whether actual payments are being made. Income that could just as easily 
have been earned by the parent company is treated as a deemed dividend to the parent. Taxes are thus 
levied on a notionally determined advantage from shares held in the non-resident entity.  
 
The United States was the first country to introduce CFC legislation, often referred to as “Subpart F 
legislation”.597 In 1962, when the US Congress enacted the Subpart F provisions taxing shareholders 
on undistributed profits of their controlled foreign corporations, there were concerns in both the 
House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees that this violated the realization 
requirement laid down in the Supreme Court decision Eisner v. Macomber.598 Various nations have 
since modelled their CFC legislation on Subpart F; constitutional requirements are seen to be met in 
that taxpayers have sufficient dominion and control over the undistributed funds to effectuate receipt 
of payments.  
 
 
1.3.1.3. Minimum corporate income tax 
                                                 
594 For an extensive comparative analysis with respect to EC Member States, see Peter M. van der Hoek and Sarah E. Radloff, 
“Taxing owner-occupied housing: Comparing the Netherlands to other European Union countries”, 7 Public Finance and 
Management 4 (2007) 393. 
595 For more on the Spanish tax on owner-occupied housing, see Raquel Arévalo and Javier Ruiz-Castillo, “On the Imputation of 
Rental Prices to Owner-occupied Housing”, 4 Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (2006) 830. See also Miguel-Angel 
Lopez-Garcia, “Housing, Prices and Tax Policy in Spain”, 6 Spanish Economic Review (2004) 29. 
596 For a comparative overview of CFC legislation existing in OECD Member countries see OECD, Working Party No. 2 on Tax 
Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income – Controlled 
Foreign Company Legislation (2000). 
597 Subpart F, Part III of Chap. 1, Subchap. N of the US IRC. 
598 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, “The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of Realization”, in Paul C. Caron (ed.) Tax Stories: 
An In-Depth Look at Ten Leading Federal Income Tax Cases (2003) 90, with further references.  
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Domestic taxes on a deemed minimum income amount currently exist primarily in corporate tax 
systems in Latin America; within Europe, a tax of this kind is levied on companies resident in 
Austria.599 In Argentina, Peru and Colombia, taxes are levied on “minimum presumptive income” of 
corporations on a percentage of a company’s net assets.600 In Peru, a marginal rate system is applied 
with rates varying from 0% to 0.5% depending on the net value of assets of the company; this tax can 
be credited against the regular corporate income tax. In Colombia, the presumptive corporate income 
tax is levied in the amount of 3% of a company’s net assets; the rate used to be 6%, but it was lowered 
in 2006 following heavy protests of companies. Colombia still applies the highest aggregate corporate 
tax rate throughout Latin America.601  
 
A different approach is taken in Austria, where, aside from a regular corporate income tax rate of 
25%, corporations sustaining losses have an obligation to pay taxes on presumed profits in the amount 
of 5% of the minimum statutory amount of registered capital as required under the Austrian law of 
corporations.602 The current annual minimum tax is EUR 3,500 for public companies and EUR 1,750 
for limited liability companies.603   
 
Since this tax is creditable only against such corporate taxes in subsequent years that are paid on 
earnings exceeding the minimum capitalization requirement, the principle of ability to pay seems to 
be neglected: while the tax is creditable against corporate taxes paid upon profits made, there is no 
relief whatsoever from the burden of the minimum corporate income tax in the case that a company 
exclusively incurs losses.604 The Austrian Supreme Court has upheld this tax on the grounds that it 
serves the sound policy goal to prevent an abuse of corporate form merely for tax purposes; the 
minimum tax is seen to function as the equivalent to interest that would have to be paid on long-term 
capital investment.605  
 
 
1.3.1.4. Notional personal income tax 
 
In 2001, an unusual tax on presumed personal capital income606 was introduced in the Netherlands 
that has been called “unique in the industrialized world”,607 as it stands in stark contrast to the 
realization-based capital gains taxation prevailing in most countries. Capital income from personally 
held assets such as deposits, stocks and bonds is taxed in an amount equal to 4% of the net value of 
the underlying asset, subject to a flat 30% rate; any actual economic gains, losses, or expenses 
incurred are not taken into account.608  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that this tax was enacted to replace the previously existing progressive tax on 
actual personal capital income, its character as an “income tax” could be contested. Although the 
express legislative intent was to create an income tax, this tax bears close resemblance in character to 
                                                 
599 For current data and analysis, see Jude Amos/Fraser Dickinson/Ephraim Fuks/Carlos Gutiérrez Puente/Juhani Kesti/Mei June 
Soo (eds), Global Corporate Tax Handbook, IBFD (2007).  
600 See fundamentally Richard M. Bird, “Tax Reform in Latin America: A Review of Some Recent Experiences”, 27 Latin 
American Research Review 1 (1992) 7; Charles E. McLure/John Mutti/Victor Thuronyi/George R. Zodrow, “The Taxation of 
Income from Business and Capital in Colombia”, in Malcolm Gillis (ed) Fiscal Reform in the Developing World (1990). 
601 For recent data, see Ephraim Fuks and Carlos Gutiérrez Puente (eds), Latin America Tax Handbook, IBFD (2007).  
602 The minimum statutory amount of capitalization in Austria is EUR 70,000 for public companies and EUR 35,000 for limited 
liability companies. 
603 See the recent figures in Austrian Business Agency, Tax Aspects of Industrial Investment in Austria (2007). 
604 For criticism in this vein in Austrian academic literature see Sabine Kirchmayr, “Mindestkörperschaftsteuer verfassungsrechtlich 
unbedenklich?”, RdW (1994) 364. 
605 Austrian Supreme Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) B 138694, decision of 29 August 1994. 
606 The Dutch presumptive personal capital income tax (vermogensrendementsheffing) is incorporated in Arts. 5.2 and 7.7 of the 
2001 Income Tax Act of the Netherlands. 
607 Sijbren Cnossen and Lans Bovenberg, “Fundamental Tax Reform in the Netherlands”, 7 International Tax and Public Finance 
(2001) 471. 
608 For a comprehensive analysis of this tax, see Henk Vording/Allard O. Lubbers, “The Netherlands Presumptive Income Tax on 
Portfolio Investment: Background, Aims and Effects”, Bulletin for International Taxation 2006, 327. 
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net wealth taxes on the capital itself. Furthermore, its character is rare in that it is clearly not an 
attempt to approximate any actual income, but operates on the basis of a “pure fiction”.609   
 
 
1.3.2. Inferences from the income allocation provisions 
 
The allocation provisions with respect to the various items of income in the US Model Income Tax 
Treaty largely correspond to the provisions of the OECD Model in terms of their location in the treaty 
(Arts. 10 to 20) and their effects. What these allocation provisions have in common is that they 
consistently use the words “derived”, “paid”, and “payments”, which seems to indicate that “income 
fictions” are not covered. One could argue that “fictitious income” does not qualify as “income” as 
specified in the allocation provisions, as it is not actually “derived” or “paid”.   
 
Wattel and Marres610 have taken the position that income deemed to have been paid or derived under 
domestic law is to be subsumed under the “Other Income” provision (Art. 21 in both the US and the 
OECD Model Conventions); this article does not contain the language “paid” or “derived” but refers 
to “items of income beneficially owned by a resident of a Contracting State.”  
 
While this argument appears to be sound under a literal reading of the treaty text, it is doubtful 
whether such an approach does justice to effective treaty application and to the very object and 
purpose of tax treaties. The residual “Other Income” Article gives exclusive taxing rights to the state 
of residence, which may give rise to inexpedient results in some cases. Moreover, some treaties do not 
contain an “Other Income” provision,611 which would mean that there is no treaty protection despite a 
possible actual double tax burden.   
 
On the grounds of what has been stated so far, the allocation provisions of tax treaties should be seen 
to cater to domestic income tax burdens. To adopt too literal a reading in determining whether income 
has been “paid” or “derived” not only hinders effective treaty application, but it would be inconsistent 
with the predominant basic concept of income in domestic tax systems worldwide. Stronger 
arguments speak in favour of subsuming “fictitious income” under the allocation provisions dealing 
with the specific subject matters instead of resorting to the “catch-all” provision laid down in Art. 21. 
 
As stated at the outset, no feasible distinction is possible between “fiction” and “approximation of 
reality” for purposes of the income tax. While the allocation provisions concededly do not deal with 
“fictions”, the OECD Model Commentary does comment on the “calculation” of income, stating that 
the contracting parties retain full authority to determine the method of calculating items of income 
allocated to them.612 Moreover, the Model Commentary to the article on interest (Art. 11) states that 
“the term ‘paid’ has a very wide meaning, since the concept of payment means the fulfilment of the 
obligation to put funds at the disposal of the shareholder…”,613 while the Commentary on Art. 12 
(Royalties) notes that “the word ‘payment’ … has a very wide meaning, since the concept of payment 
means the fulfillment of the obligation to put funds at the disposal of the creditor….”614   
 
Wattel and Marres interpret this to mean that “in any case a fulfillment of an obligation is required, or 
at least a real shift of assets or value from one taxpayer to another.”615 The Commentary does not 
further elaborate, so it stands to reason whether an actual accretion to the taxpayer’s wealth or assets 
                                                 
609 Wattel/Marres, European Taxation (2003) 66 (78). 
610 Wattel/Marres, id., at 66. 
611 Contracting parties will oftentimes find this article unnecessary; for a thorough analysis of Art. 21, see David A. Ward et al., 
“The Other Income Article of Income Tax Treaties”, 38 Canadian Tax Journal 2 (1990) 233. 
612 See m.no. 4 of the 2005 OECD Model Commentary on Art. 6 (Immoveable Property): “It should … be noted that the provisions 
of the Article do not prejudge the application of domestic law as regards the manner in which income from immoveable property is 
to be taxed.” See also m.no. 28 of the Commentary to Art. 7 (Business Profits): “[E]ach country concerned would have to be given 
the right to compute the profits according to the provisions of its own laws.”  
613 M.no. 7 of the OECD Model Commentary on Art. 11. 
614 M.no. 8 of the OECD Model Commentary on Art. 12. 
615 Wattel/Marres, European Taxation (2003) 66 (68). 
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is required. It is the view taken in this paper that this is not the case; to the contrary, the Commentary 
clearly conveys a functional approach.  
 
A different interpretation may be warranted where the treaty text refers to the term “gain”: Art. 13 
deals with gains from the alienation of property but no definition of the term is provided. A valid 
argument can be made that “gain” implies an actual shift in assets or wealth.616 The allocation 
provisions speak of “payments” and of assets “put at the taxpayer’s disposal”, which calls for a broad 
reading.   
 
The Commentary on Art. 10 (Dividends) further corroborates this purposive approach: 
 
The requirement of beneficial ownership was introduced in paragraph 2 of Article 10 to clarify the meaning of the 
words ‘paid … to a resident’ …  The term ‘beneficial owner’ is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it 
should be understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.617 
 
The above considerations allow for the conclusion that tax treaties are generally indifferent to any 
type of “income fiction” existing in a country’s domestic tax provisions. Unless the treaty parties have 
expressed their objective intent to the contrary, the adoption of the broad terminology as contained in 
the Model conventions warrants for “income fictions” to be treated as covered under the specified 
income allocation provisions. Protection from possible abuses is afforded by the general international 
legal principles of good faith and the permanency of commitments (pacta sunt servanda).  
 
Moreover, if either of the contracting parties were to make changes to its income tax provisions after 
the conclusion of the treaty, there is a requirement in the last sentence of Art. 2(4) in both the US and 
OECD Models that “[t]he competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of 
any changes that have been made in their respective taxation or other laws that significantly affect 
their obligations under this Convention.” This will in most cases prevent newly introduced “fictions” 
from treaty coverage without the other party’s consent. Due to these workings of international law, 
and due to the fact that contracting nations will usually expect and be aware of elements of “fiction” 
in the treaty partner’s income tax system and make corresponding adjustments based on reciprocity, 
“fictitious income” will often not be a contested point under tax treaties. However, there is one aspect 
of “income fictions” that gives rise to double tax burdens without there being an adequate remedy 
under tax treaties; this problem may arise in cases involving a “timing mismatch”. 
 
 
1.3.3. Fictitious income and timing mismatch – “exit taxes” 
 
A taxpayer may face problems of international double taxation where a domestic “income fiction” 
affects the timing of the taxable event. Where one country deems income to have been accrued to the 
taxpayer and levies taxes accordingly, any change in circumstances concerning the same taxable basis 
that leaves another state with taxing rights under a tax treaty may give rise to unrelieved double 
taxation. The latter country, disregarding any earlier taxation on the basis of “fictitious income” in the 
first country, is in full compliance with the treaty text upon taxing income that is “derived” under its 
domestic tax laws at this later point in time. Such economic double taxation due to a mismatch in the 
timing of taxable events effectively escapes the ambit of tax treaties.  
 
Since income taxes are imposed as a function of the person producing the income, the transfer of 
residence of individuals and the change in tax jurisdiction this entails have led to problems in treaty 
application by the respective former and new residence states vying for taxing powers.   
 
                                                 
616 M. Lang, Hybride Finanzierungen im Internationalen Steuerrecht (1991) 102. 
617 M.no. 12 of the OECD Model Commentary on Art. 10(2). 
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Countries have increasingly implemented deemed disposition rules to tax unrealized gains at the 
moment an individual or company transfers its residence or assets to another country.618 These so-
called “exit tax” regimes usually measure the amount of unrealized gains on a notional basis that 
approximates income that would have been derived had the assets been sold in the marketplace. The 
rationale for such taxation on unrealized gains is that a country would otherwise forgo its taxing rights 
with respect to the appreciation in value that occurred in this country: t he allocation provision on 
gains in Art. 13 of the OECD Income and Capital MC gives exclusive taxing rights to the residence 
state.619   
 
It is debatable whether the introduction of “exit taxes” constitutes a treaty override. The main 
argument advanced in favour of such taxes as permissible under tax treaties is that at the time of 
imposition, i.e. the transfer of residence, the taxpayer is a resident of the country levying such a tax 
rather than the other contracting state, meaning that no conflict can arise under the treaty. Moreover, 
an argument can be made that tax treaties tie in with an actual event of alienation, which does not 
include “deemed dispositions”. Another argument is that the application of tax treaties is triggered 
only where double taxation may arise as to the same income and the same taxable period. However, 
such a narrow view of the concept of double taxation could be attacked with a view to the object and 
purpose of treaty obligations as per the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda laid down in 
Arts. 26 and 27 of the VCLT.620   
 
It should be noted, however, that exit taxes do not necessarily invoke problems of double taxation. An 
interesting example presented itself in a case involving the income tax treaty between Sweden and 
Austria. In that particular case the lack of exit taxation led to “double non-taxation” in that it created 
the opportunity for an alienation of participations in Swedish companies free of tax where sales 
contracts were signed after a transfer of residence from Sweden to Austria.621  
 
The compliance of domestic “exit tax” legislation with supranational rules such as EC law providing 
for non-discrimination and the free movement of capital has been called into question; both the 
European Commission622 and the European Court of Justice623 have taken a firm stand against “exit 
taxation”. A growing number of member countries have ruled exit taxes levied under their domestic 
tax laws incompatible with the EC Treaty.   
 
A recent example is Sweden. On 24 April 2008, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court held exit 
taxes levied under Swedish domestic law on the transfer of residence of a Swedish company from 
                                                 
618 For an in-depth discussion of similarities and differences of such provisions in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States, see Luc de Broe, “General Report”, in IFA, Cahiers de droit fiscal international 
Vol. 87b, “The Tax Treatment of Transfer of Residence of Individuals” (2002) 19. See also International Chamber of Commerce, 
Exit taxes: Serious Obstacles for International Business Restructurings and Movements of Capital, Policy Statement Prepared by the 
Commission on Taxation, Document 180-488 Final, Paris, 16 June 2006.  
619 Tax treaties will sometimes provide that the former residence state retains taxing rights for a certain period of time; an example is 
the tax treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium, which grants the Netherlands taxing rights with respect to certain 
shareholdings during a 5-year period following the emigration of the shareholder to Belgium. 
620 See further De Broe, “General Report” p. 66. 
621 For more on this case see Helmut Loukota and Wolfgang Nolz, “Das Ende der schwedischen Steuerflucht nach Österreich”, SWI 
(2006) 397 (389): “Although … the tax treaty with Sweden has allocated the entire taxing right to Austria …, only capital gains 
generated in the period of Austrian residence are taxable under the Austrian ‘exit-tax-concept’, this being so in the case of 
emigration but also in the case of immigration. Consequently, Sweden was prevented from taxing the capital gains because of the 
tax treaty, whereas Austria did not tax the capital gains because of its domestic law. Such an opportunity to escape capital gains 
taxation has now been terminated through a revising protocol providing for a taxation right to the (former) residence country with 
regard to the capital gains generated prior to the transfer of residence.” 
622 OECD, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of Member States` tax policies, COM(2006) 825 Final, Brussels, 19 
December 2006. 
623 In Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant, Case C-9/02, decision of 11 March 2004, European Court Reports 2004 Page I-02409, the 
ECJ held that the French “exit tax” regime was in violation of the principle of freedom of establishment as laid down in Art. 52 of 
the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Art. 43). For a topical analysis of the EC fundamental freedoms in the context of tax treaties, 
see Georg W. Kofler and Ruth Mason, “Double Taxation: A European ‘Switch in Time’?”, 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 
1 (2007). For an account of various EC Member States, see Cécile Brokelind (ed) Towards a Homogeneous EC Direct Tax Law – 
An assessment of the Member States’ responses to the ECJ’s case law (2007). 
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Sweden to Malta incompatible with EC law.624 The company was a Malta resident under the tax treaty 
between Malta and Sweden and did not have a PE in Sweden since all its assets were located in the 
United Kingdom. The court held that the exit taxation on the assets in the form of deemed capital 
gains hindered the company’s exercise of freedom of establishment under Art. 43 of the EC Treaty. 
The court’s verdict was that immediate exit taxation would be disproportionate and that taxes should 
be levied only upon actual disposition of assets. This conclusion was drawn irrespective of whether 
such taxation is permitted under domestic tax rules or under a tax treaty. Disproportionality of the 
Swedish rules was found in that the Sweden–Malta tax treaty does not prevent Sweden’s right to tax 
profits that arose prior to the transfer of residency.       
 
The fact that the former residence state has already taxed part of the gain does not oblige the new 
residence state to take account of such taxes by limiting its taxation right to the value accrued in its 
country or by granting a tax credit for the taxes paid in the former state. Tax treaties do not contain 
any such obligations and do not explicitly address “exit taxes”.625 The prevailing view in academic 
literature is that the fictitious realization event cannot come under the allocation provision dealing 
with gain from the alienation of property (Art. 13), as the notion of “gain” in the context of this article 
is believed to presuppose an actual change in the taxpayer’s wealth; consequently, the “Other Income” 
provision in Art. 21 is commonly seen to be applicable.626 
 
One might also consider a subsumption under the article dealing with taxes on capital (Art. 22 of the 
OECD Model; the US Model does not contain a corresponding provision); this argument is weak, 
however, in that “exit taxes” are levied not on capital itself, but rather on an (albeit deemed) increase 
in value. As tax treaties do not prevent the new residence state from taxing also the portion of 
appreciation that occurred in the former residence state, double taxation with respect to this portion 
can only be avoided if a country provides for unilateral relief.  
 
Failure to do so might well be seen as a violation of the principles of international law, but no 
deterring sanctions are in place either at the international level or at the EC level. In the European 
context, a strong policy argument can be made for the enactment of a Regulation dealing with this 
issue.  
 
 
1.3.4. Treatment of domestic income fictions under tax treaties 
 
In a last step, “income fictions” of the types introduced above will be revisited and examined in the 
tax treaty context to substantiate the position taken that an application of the specified allocation 
provisions will regularly lead to workable results. 
 
In the case of a non-resident alien owning property in a country that levies taxes on imputed rental 
income from owner-occupied housing, the classification of such income as being “derived” in the 
sense of the allocation provision dealing with income from rental property (Art. 6 in the US and 
OECD Models) will attribute exclusive taxing rights to the country where the property is located, 
which is the country using the “fictional” tax base. Conversely, if one were to argue that there is no 
actual benefit “derived”, the position could be taken that there is nevertheless an “item of income” 
within the meaning of the broad clause of the “Other Income” provision (Art. 21). An application of 
the latter provision, however, would result in exclusive taxing rights on the part of the taxpayer’s state 
of residence. This result will likely be unsustainable in most bilateral tax treaty negotiations, as the 
                                                 
624 Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, Case No. 6639-06, decision of 24 April 2008. 
625 For a recent analysis of the topic from the perspective of “exit tax” legislation enacted in Austria see Florian Brugger, 
“Wegzugsbesteuerung und Abkommensrecht – Exit Taxation and Tax Treaty Law”, 11 SWI (2007) 510. 
626 See the basic argument earlier, note 61; see also Gerald Toifl, “National Report Austria”, in IFA, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international Vol. 87b (2002) 149 (169). This approach has also been adopted by Advocate-General Juliane Kokott of the ECJ in N 
v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo, Case C-470/04, decision of 7 September 2006, European Court Reports 
2006 Page I-7409; in this case the ECJ ruled that the Dutch tax on the deemed alienation of shares (including the possibility to defer 
the payment) violated the freedom of establishment.  
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value of any actual advantages derived from the property has largely been created where such 
property is situated. This is an example of a case where the object and purpose of the treaty is best 
served if the notion “derived” is seen to encompass situations where income is deemed to have been 
derived by the taxpayer. 
 
An interesting case with respect to deemed payments under CFC provisions arose before the UK 
Court of Appeal; at issue was whether the CFC provisions existing in UK tax law are covered under 
the Netherlands–United Kingdom income tax treaty.627 The taxpayer was a company that was resident 
in the United Kingdom under domestic law and had a wholly owned subsidiary in the Netherlands. Due 
to loans made by the Dutch subsidiary to the UK parent company, interest was received which was free 
from withholding tax under Art. 11 of the tax treaty. However, since the Dutch company was a CFC for 
UK tax purposes, the UK parent was taxable on an apportionment of the Dutch company’s profits under 
UK domestic law. The taxpayer company took the position that the United Kingdom was prohibited 
under the treaty from imposing taxes on the deemed interest payments. The main issue was whether the 
amount deemed derived by the UK company was “income arising in one of the states which is 
beneficially owned by a resident of another” within the Interest Article of the treaty.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that 
 
the profits attributed to the taxpayer under UK law have lost their character as the type of profits which would 
qualify for exemption under the Convention – the actual foreign profits, which might have been exempt from UK 
tax, simply provide the measure of the notional sum which is apportioned to the taxpayer and on which UK tax is 
charged. 
 
The court thus held in favour of the Commissioners, who had stated that 
 
the ‘chargeable profits’ … are a purely notional sum. They do not represent any profits … nor do they represent 
any actual payments or receipts…, whether of interest or anything else. [They] exist only as a measure of 
imputation. What is apportioned to the taxpayer and subjected to tax is not … actual profits but a notional sum 
which is the product of an artificial calculation.628 
 
It is debated among scholars whether “fictitious” distributions under CFC provisions are within the 
scope of the Dividend, Interest and Royalty Articles of income tax treaties.629 Only a few tax treaties 
expressly mention domestic CFC regimes in the treaty text or in protocols.630 The OECD Model 
Commentary notes that domestic CFC regimes may in principle be applied in tax treaty situations 
with respect to companies subject to very low tax burdens even though no reference is made in the 
treaty to the CFC regime.631  
 
Therefore, in keeping with what has been laid out so far, in situations where a CFC regime provides 
for a deemed dividend distribution, the “Dividends” article of tax treaties may require the 
shareholder’s state of residence to exempt such CFC income. As insinuated in the OECD Model 
Commentary, the term “paid” should be understood in a broad sense. Some guidance to this effect 
may also be taken from the prevailing view that the concept of “dividends paid” in Art. 5 of the EC 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive632 includes payments classified as a distribution of profits under the laws 
                                                 
627 Bricom Holdings Ltd v. IRC, decision of 25 July 1997, STC (UK Court Reporter) 1179. The Netherlands–UK treaty was 
concluded in 1980 and amended in 1989, but no comments were included with respect to the treatment of the CFC legislation that 
had been introduced into UK income tax law in 1984.  
628 Cited in the appeal as STC (SCD) 228 (1996). 
629 For a comprehensive analysis see Michael Lang et al. (eds) CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, Kluwer Law 
International (2002). 
630 Protocols or Notes of Exchange to tax treaties concluded by the United States frequently clarify that “Under U.S. law (Section 
902 of the Internal Revenue Code), when a U.S. parent receives dividends from its Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), the taxes 
paid to the foreign government by the CFC are ‘deemed-paid’ by the U.S. parent. These deemed-paid taxes are added to the direct 
foreign withholding taxes paid for purposes of calculating the foreign tax credit.” (Memorandum of Understanding of 31 May 1996 
on the Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Austria for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, signed on May 31, 1996). 
631 See m.no. 23 of the Commentary to Art. 1 of the 2003 OECD Model Income Tax Convention. 
632 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation applicable in the case of Parent companies 
and Subsidiaries of different Member States, Official Journal L 225, 20/08/1990, 0006 – 0009. 
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of the state of source, whether they be actual or deemed.633 Moreover, especially in the case of 
dividends, it becomes obvious that payments are mostly a taxable rather than an economic event.634 A 
comparative look at the tax treatment of dividends in different countries brings forth a common 
characteristic in that payments do not qualify as dividends when deductible to the payor.  
 
Another aspect to be considered in this context as regards tax treaties concluded between EC Member 
States is the fact that under ECJ jurisprudence, payments whose imposition violates the fundamental 
freedoms cannot be considered “taxes” within the meaning of tax treaties concluded between EC 
Member States.635   
 
A final point to be made is that the treatment of “fictitious income” under tax treaties hinges upon the 
functioning of the treaty as a “closed system” applying to “taxes on income”. The income allocation 
provisions are firmly intertwined with the provision on substantive scope as laid out in the article as 
well as with the provision on the effective method to prevent double taxation (Art. 23). However, 
there are no ultimate solutions as to where “fictitious income” stands in the international context; nor 
can there be a lasting and universal concept of “income” for purposes of tax treaty application.  
 
Changes in a country’s treaty practice are not uncommon. For many years after the inception of the 
Austrian “minimum corporate income tax” described earlier, the Austrian tax authorities had taken a 
position that was favourable to taxpayers; foreign taxes paid were considered to be creditable against 
the minimum corporate income tax under Art. 23, which provides relief from double taxation 
regarding “taxes on income”.636 Two decisions of the Austrian Fiscal Tribunal have brought about a 
radical change in treaty practice. The tribunal held a credit under Austrian tax treaties to be without 
legal cause on the grounds that the minimum corporate income tax is not a “tax on income” within the 
meaning of tax treaties, as it is in fact levied independently of any actual corporate income.637 The 
Austrian tax authorities followed suit and have since disallowed a credit for this tax.638   
 
Information exchange under Art. 2(4) may serve as a last resort to resolve international double 
taxation where domestic “income fictions” are introduced. Mutual notification of major changes in 
domestic legislation, however, will only resolve the problem where the treaty is successfully 
renegotiated as between the parties in this respect. Often, the start of negotiation processes will result 
in a “deadlock”, impairing progress on the issue at hand and might also perturb existing compromise. 
 
 
1.3.5. Conclusions  
 
The concept of income in international tax law hinges upon the concept of income as a tax base in 
each respective country. However, the concept of income in tax treaties cannot be equated with 
domestic concepts.639 The primary purpose of income taxes under domestic law is to derive revenue, 
while bilateral tax treaties aim at preventing double tax burdens on the same income. Moreover, the 
key question to be asked when applying income tax treaties is not whether there is any “actual” 
economic gain; tax treaties tie in with taxable events as defined under domestic tax laws. Where a 
taxable event with respect to “income” gives rise to possible double tax burdens, the application of the 
                                                 
633 See Helminen, “Is There a Future for CFC regimes in the EU?”, 33 Intertax 2005, 117; Cécile Brokelind, “Ten Years of 
Application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive”, EC Tax Review (2003) 161. 
634 Charles E. Kingson, “The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions”, 7 The Yale Law Journal 85 (1976) 861 (864). 
635 In Cadbury Schweppes plc. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Case C-196/04, decision of 12 September 2006, European 
Court Reports 2006 Page I-07995, the ECJ held the UK CFC regime to be in violation of the freedom of establishment unless it can 
be shown that the CFC structure is “wholly artificial”. Given the fact that the Irish subsidiary concerned conducted virtually no 
activity, CFC rules in EC Member States might be on the decline. See further Philip Simpson, “The ECJ sets strict test for CFC 
legislation”, 6 British Tax Review (2006) 677; Clemens Philipp Schindler, “What Cadbury Schweppes reveals about legal 
presumptions and economic substance”, Tax Notes International 29 June 2006. 
636 See e.g. the statement of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, EAS No. 1981 of 16 January 2002. 
637 Austrian Fiscal Tribunal (UFS) decision of 29 June 2004, RV/0158-L/04; decision of 25 January 2005, RV/0256-G/04. 
638 Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, EAS No. 2652 of 30 August 2005. 
639 Differing Schaumburg, Internationales Steuerrecht Vol. 2 (1997) at 15.3., stating that the concept of income in tax treaties is to 
be based on the respective domestic concepts. 
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specific income allocation provisions will lead to workable results that are in line with the object and 
purpose of tax treaties to prevent double taxation and tax evasion. Income tax treaties thus apply 
irrespective of whether the taxable event is triggered by a domestic “income fiction”.  
 
Not only is a clear-cut distinction between “real” and “fictitious” income virtually impossible but it is 
also generally unnecessary at both domestic and international levels. A tax treaty requires “more than 
a mere exchange of paper in order for treaty protection to apply”.640 Whereas the allocation provisions 
of the US and OECD Models use words like “paid” and “derived”, too literal a reading would fall 
short of the objective of tax treaties. Income that is deemed to be paid or derived under domestic tax 
laws can thus in principle come within the specific income allocation provisions of tax treaties.  
 
Nevertheless, tax treaties do not prevent double burdens in situations where one country taxes 
“fictitious” income, but a subsequent change in circumstances concerning that same taxable base 
leaves the other state with taxing rights under the treaty that are exercised upon actual realization. 
Such “economic double taxation” can only be prevented by way of unilateral action. There are, 
however, no adequate measures available at the international level to ensure that a country will take 
such action. However, the context of the treaty and its effective application require that there be a 
basic common consensus on the concept of income that provides a foundation vital to treaty 
negotiations. The following considerations therefore call into focus basic conceptual foundations that 
may be determinative in treaty application. 
 
 
2. Delimitation between taxes on income and taxes on capital 
 
“We find, in the statutes, very different attempts to define income. Rather do they assume the meaning 
of that term … to be self-evident. Consequently the meaning of the statutes themselves is always 
vague and varying. The growing precision and progress toward a truer concept consists chiefly in the 
gradual disentangling of income from capital.”641 
 
The preceding chapter has shown that the domestic notion of income as a dynamic concept that is 
subject to social and legislative change is a fundamental precept of treaty application in practice. 
Conceptual purity is not attainable in this context. Income taxes are regularly imposed on “fictitious” 
gains and non-existing benefits; the resulting burdens are very real, however. 
 
While most treaties presently in force, in keeping with the OECD, US, and Nordic Conventions, apply 
to “taxes on income and on capital”, some treaties merely apply to “taxes on income”. Direct taxation 
on capital in the form of wealth taxes has come under heavy criticism in numerous countries. Critics 
argue that taxes on personal wealth cannot be justified where the personal income tax is based on a 
comprehensive notion of income as per because under a notion of income from capital based on 
Schanz/Haig/Simons, wealth is the result of income that has been taxed already.  Seen from that 
perspective, the combination of individual income taxation and wealth taxation leads to juridical and 
economic double taxation.642   
 
Among the writers taking the position that an income tax on savings is double taxation was Prof. 
Luigi Einaudi, member of the League of Nations group of Technical Experts that drafted the first 
international Model Tax Convention.  Interestingly, Sir Josiah Stamp, second of the three Technical 
Experts, strongly opposed this view.643 
 
                                                 
640 See US Tax Court, Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 56 TC 925, decision of 5 August 1971. 
641 Irving Fisher, “Are Savings Income?”, American Economic Association Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 9 (1908) 21. Fisher’s classic 
deliberations on the economic foundations of income, still relevant today, are beyond the scope of this study.   
642 See this argument made by Sacchetto/Castaldi, EATLP Congress Cologne 12-14 June 2003, Congress papers p. 164. 
643 See for further references regarding these positions The Economic Journal - Quarterly journal of the Royal Economic Society, 
Macmillan (1914) 60. This view was also endorsed by economists Arthur C. Pigou, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham.  
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In principle, such economic double taxation under domestic law carries over into tax treaty 
application: tax treaties fundamentally tie in with domestic tax burdens as per the treaty’s system of 
distributive articles and the classifications therein. From the tax treaty perspective, fairness 
considerations, e.g. as to whether a capital tax is justified under a comprehensive concept of income, 
are moot. 
  
The conceptual difficulties of distinguishing between income and capital have been a “classic” topic 
in economic theory.644 Where a country levies taxes on capital, they typically tie in with any kind of 
economic ownership interest, the decisive factor being the taxpayer’s power to control the capital 
asset. The term “capital”, however, is not defined in the Model conventions; neither is it defined in 
actual bilateral treaties. The OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms defines capital taxes as “levies on 
the values of the assets or net worth levied at irregular, and very infrequent, intervals of time.” 
Regularity in fact is taken to be a common characteristic of the imposition of income taxes. 
 
An example from recent treaty practice shows the difficulties in distinguishing between taxes on 
income and taxes on capital. Under the 2006 tax treaty between Mexico and Canada that replaced the 
earlier treaty signed in 1991, the Mexican “asset tax” (IMPAC) is no longer covered by the treaty. 
Art. 2 of the 1991 treaty, however, made reference merely to “income taxes”, stating that: 
 
1. This Convention applies to income taxes imposed by each of the Contracting States. 
2. There shall be regarded as taxes on income all taxes imposed on total income or any part of income, including 
tax on gains derived from the alienation of movable or immovable property. 
3. The existing taxes to which this Convention shall apply are: 
(a) in Mexico: -- the income tax imposed by the Income Tax Law. 
 
The tax as covered under the old treaty was calculated by computing the Mexican company’s net 
assets and multiplying that base amount by 1.8%. The IMPAC had been created in 1989 as a 
minimum tax based on assets held, which supplements the federal income tax. In essence, the tax was 
levied only on taxpayers who do not generate income tax. It was therefore classified as an income tax 
under Mexican domestic law as well as for treaty purposes. This changed effective January 2007, 
when the IMPAC was changed so as to apply to the net assets of the corporation with no possibility of 
reducing the tax base for the company’s liabilities, which effectively eliminated any link to the 
income tax.645   
 
Another example of types of taxes that do not clearly fall under either category are “minimum 
corporate income taxes”, analysed in the context of “fictitious income” above. Where the tax on 
“fictitious income” is determined on the basis of the corporation’s assets, it is unclear whether, for tax 
treaty purposes, it is a tax on income or rather a tax on capital.646 Where an “income fiction” existed 
under a treaty partner’s domestic income tax system at the time the treaty was concluded, it is 
presumptively acknowledged and accepted by the other contracting party and thus covered by a treaty 
that makes reference to that country’s “income tax”. After conclusion of the treaty, however, in order 
to come within its substantive scope the tax must be “substantially similar”, i.e. similar in substance to 
the already covered taxes. Where there were no “income fictions” in either treaty partner’s domestic 
tax system at the time of conclusion, the newly imposed ”tax on income” that is levied based on the 
value of a corporation’s assets might be classified as a tax on capital and thus covered. 
 
Aside from the fact that income and capital are often hard to delineate, from the earliest tax treaties 
onwards there has been awareness of the fact that the basis of taxes will often be a combination of 
income and capital elements.   
 
                                                 
644 John Hicks, Value and Capital – An Inquiry into some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory, Oxford University Press, 
2nd edn. (1946). 
645 See further Roberto del Toro/Diana González, “Mexico: Important changes made to the Asset Tax Law”, International Tax 
Review February 2007. 
646 See Lang, “‘Taxes Covered’ - What is a ‘Tax’ according to Art. 2 OECD Model Convention?”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2005, 216 (219). 
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An example of a combination of income and capital elements of the tax base are business franchise 
taxes levied on corporations for the right to be chartered or do business in certain areas; such taxes are 
sometimes based on a combination of income as well as assets or capital stock of a company.    
 
In a case before the US tax authorities, the application of the discrimination article (Art. 24) to the tax 
liability of a French corporation under US provisions governing the Texas franchise (margin) tax was 
at issue.647 While US taxes levied at the state rather than the federal level are outside the scope of tax 
treaties under Art. 2,648 Art. 24 applies to “taxes of every kind and description”, including taxes levied 
at the state level. The French corporation claimed to be exempt from the Texas franchise tax pursuant 
to Art. 1(4) of the France–US Income Tax Treaty. The case was settled in favour of the argument 
made by the US tax authorities that the treaty as such is an income tax treaty and therefore does not 
apply to the Texas franchise tax due to the capital component of the tax base.649 However, the 
character of the tax has been disputed, albeit only in the US domestic context of the constitutionality 
of its legislative origins. The Texas State Comptroller has publicly argued that the fact that the margin 
tax allows deductions makes it an income tax.650 The deductibility of regular expenses is certainly a 
strong indication of taxation on income; this criterion can be helpful also in determining the character 
of a tax for purposes of income tax treaty application.  
 
 
2.1. “Personal” and “impersonal” taxes 
 
The English common law view of capital as a res, a thing, has been a universal fundament of legal 
and economic income theories.651 Wealth taxes in the sense of taxes on the value of assets as well as 
property taxes are prime examples for taxes that will regularly be covered under income and capital 
tax treaties as “taxes on capital”.  
 
While taxes on income are typically imposed on periodic accruals to a taxpayer’s wealth, taxes on 
capital are levied on the capital itself. This basic distinction appears to be the rationale for the 
different distributive rules governing the allocation of taxing rights for taxes on income on the one 
hand and taxes on capital on the other; it was the basis of the consensus reached by the drafters of the 
Model tax treaty as to the appropriate division of the income tax base among nations. Taxes on 
income are dealt with in Arts. 6 through 21 of the OECD Model, whereas taxes on capital are dealt 
with in Art. 22. Arts. 6 through 21 favour source taxation, a tendency that present-day nations have 
been moving away from, especially with respect to income from capital assets.652 
 
Seligman was one of the Technical Experts whose Report laid the foundation for the basic framework 
used to this day in international tax treaty negotiations. In one of his treatises he lays out the essence 
of a distinction between income, capital, and capital gains: “Mere advance in value in no sense 
constitutes … gains, profits, or income…. It constitutes and can be treated merely as increase of 
capital.”653 When applied to tax treaties that refer to income, capital and capital gains, this distinction 
is a useful conceptual starting point.    
 
The 1923 Report submitted by the Technical Experts made a basic distinction between “taxes on 
global income” and “other taxes”. In 1925, based on the feedback of the representatives of various 
nations¸ the Technical Experts presented a report incorporating a “compromise” that was endorsed by 
                                                 
647 Texas State Comptroller, Notice number 9312L1276G04 of November 12, 1993. 
648 Article 2(3(b)) of the 2006 US Model Income Tax Convention specifies “Federal” taxes only.  
649 The earned surplus component of the franchise tax was seen to be too marginal to present an issue.   
650 See press release dated April 21, 2006, in which Texas Comptroller Carole Keeton Strayhorn requested that the Attorney General 
issue a formal opinion addressing the constitutionality of the tax; available at: www.window.state.tx.us/news/60421statement.html 
(last accessed May 2010). 
651 G. C. Harcourt/N. F. Laing (eds.) Capital and Growth (1973) 9. 
652 See further William B. Barker, “Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions”, 22 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (2002) 161.  
653 Principles of Economics (1926) 66. 
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the ICC. This compromise appropriated the 1923 distinction between taxes on global income and 
other taxes, but made the general distinction one between “personal” and “impersonal” taxes.654   
 
In 1925, seven experts were appointed (nationals of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the then Czechoslovakia). The experts observed that taxes based on 
origin were very common particularly in the form of impersonal taxes, and were “impressed by the 
advance made by the concept of personal taxation based on residence.… To avoid difficulties, the 
experts decided not to propose a single solution applicable to all classes of taxes whatsoever.”  
 
For “impersonal or schedular taxes” they accepted the primary taxing right of the source state, i.e. a 
concept of origin, while with respect to personal taxes, the experts sought to assert primary taxing 
rights for the state of permanent residence (“fiscal domicile”) of the taxpayer. The “personal or 
general income tax” was described as “a tax (which may be at a progressive rate) charged upon the 
whole income of a taxpayer, from whatever source derived.” 
 
By 1927, the Committee of Technical Experts was expanded to include members from Germany, 
Poland, Japan, Venezuela, Argentina and the United States. The Commentary to the 1927 Draft 
Convention states: 
 
After stating the general purpose of the Convention, Article 1 defines its scope: it governs direct impersonal or 
personal taxes. Desirous of avoiding any controversy on matters of doctrine, the experts have not defined the two 
great categories of direct taxes…. The Contracting States will themselves decide which of their direct taxes they 
regard, for the purposes of the Convention, as being impersonal or personal taxes. 
  
The 1927 League of Nations Draft Convention contained distributive rules under the heading of 
“impersonal taxes” for “income from immovable property, i.e., that which corresponds to the actual or 
presumed rental value of such property, as well as any other income from such property…”655, thus 
notably explicitly including income taxes on the basis of imputed rental value.656   
 
Also included under the heading of impersonal taxes were: “Income from public funds, bonds, 
including mortgage bonds, loans and deposits or current accounts…”657 and “Income from shares or 
similar interests.” Mentioned under the heading of “personal taxes” is “the personal tax on the total 
income” (Art. 10). The distributive rule in Art. 10 provides that personal taxes shall be levied by the 
state in which the taxpayer has his fiscal domicile and provides for deductions from the personal tax if 
the state of domicile does not impose impersonal taxes. The Commentary to the Report stated: “This 
Convention applies to direct taxes, whether impersonal or personal. The Contracting States are 
required to state which of their taxes they regard as impersonal and which as personal.”658 
 
The final article, preceding a provision on mutual agreement between the treaty partners, points out: 
“The principles laid down in the preceding articles shall be applicable mutatis mutandis, to the 
recurrent taxes on total wealth, capital, or increments of total wealth, according as these taxes are 
impersonal or personal.”659   
 
The express reference to “recurrent” taxes apparently aims to delineate taxes on income and capital 
from taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts, the latter being “one-time” type events rather than 
recurring impositions. The distinction between personal and impersonal taxes was later abandoned, 
since for nations with “unified” tax systems rather than schedular systems, the personal/impersonal 
distinction raised a spectre of uncertainty in the treaty. Broad language was chosen (“taxes on income 
                                                 
654 See Annex I for the texts of the 1927 and 1928 drafts, Art. 1 respectively. 
655 Geneva, April 1927 League of Nations Double Taxation and Tax Evasion Report, presented by the Committee of Technical 
Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation, Art. 2. 
656 Cf. the above discussion of “fictitious income” in tax treaties and the case of owner-occupied housing. 
657 1927 Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation, Art. 3. 
658 Report submitted by the Committee of Technical Experts on double taxation and tax evasion at London on 12 April 1927, 
League of Nations C.216, M.85, 1927, II, Draft of a bilateral Convention for the prevention of double taxation, Comments on §§ 1 
and 2. 
659 Id., Art.12. 
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and on capital”) and categorizations avoided to retain an autonomous understanding of the Model 
texts.   
 
The separate distributive rule (Art. 22) dealing with capital arose from early treaties which provided 
that certain provisions relating to income should also apply to capital taxes. The London Draft 
similarly provided that the provisions relating to income taxes should also apply to taxes on property, 
capital or increments of wealth. The OEEC’s Second Report of 1959, however, pointed out that this 
approach needed refinement and specified the treatment for immoveable property, permanent 
establishments, and shipping and aircraft.660   
 
The OECD and US Model Conventions have adopted conforming rules, with the exception that the 
US Model replaced the term “immoveable property” used in the OECD Model with the term “real 
property”. Art. 22(2) deals with movable business and non-business property, including “incorporeal” 
property such as goodwill and includes debts, thus in balance signifying net property.661 Neither 
“capital” nor “immoveable property” and “movable property” are defined in the Model texts. The 
distinction between business property and non-business property provided in the Model should be 
seen to be autonomous from domestic concepts for purposes of applying the treaty’s allocation 
provisions, as the domestic law of the contracting state applying the treaty may not know such 
distinction, or conceptual distinctions may differ as between the parties. Para. 3 deals with capital, i.e. 
movable and immovable property, pertaining to the operation of ships or aircraft. Para. 4 is a catch-all 
provision dealing with “all other elements of capital” not covered in paras. 1 through 3. 
 
The Model Commentary clarifies that Art. 22 applies only to taxes on capital within the meaning of 
Art. 2 MC. However, similar to the concept of income, academic debates over the concept of capital 
have not yielded clear results. The system of the Model treaty seems to see capital as property 
controlling gain over time. The term refers to any kind of ownership interest in such property. Mere 
controlling power is sufficient if such is the basis underlying domestic tax burdens on property. The 
Model Commentary refers to mutual agreement among the contracting parties in cases of double 
taxation and “double non-taxation” as a result of differences in domestic provisions where the holder 
of legal title to capital and its beneficial owner are residents of different countries.    
 
 
2.2. Capital gains taxes 
 
Capital taxes in the sense of Arts. 2 and 22 are such taxes that are levied on the capital itself, the most 
common example being wealth taxes. Capital gains taxes, on the other hand, are not levied on capital 
as such, but on gains derived from property. The universal idea behind capital gains taxation is that 
such incomings should be a taxable event to the same event as “regular” income. Capital gains taxes 
are essentially taxes on income flows rather than capital and are therefore included in the income tax 
base in many countries. It should be noted, however, that capital gains taxes have been seen as an 
alternative to capital taxes since, like the latter, they have been introduced to secure yields from the 
personal income tax yield and to improve horizontal and vertical equity.662 When Australia and 
Canada introduced capital gains taxes during the 1970s, it was made clear that the introduction of a 
capital gains tax (including capital gains tax on death in Canada) was sufficient justification to abolish 
taxes on bequests and refrain from imposing net wealth taxes.663  
 
                                                 
660 Avery Jones et al. (eds.) “The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model and their Adoption by States”, 
Bulletin for International Taxation June 2006, 220 (225).   
661 Vogel, Commentary to Art. 22 (2), m.no. 21. 
662 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960) 31. 
663 See further Herbert G. Grubel, “The case for the Elimination of Capital Gains Taxes in Canada”, as well as John Freebairn, 
“Indexation and Australian Capital Gains Taxation”, in Herbert G. Grubel (ed.) International Evidence on the Effects of Having No 
Capital Gains Taxes, pp. 3 and 123, resp. 
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Due to the fact that capital gains taxation differs vastly from one country to another, both the OECD 
and the US Models contain a separate provision (Art. 13) dealing with such gains. The OECD Model 
Commentary notes: 
 
The Article does not specify to what kind of tax it applies. It is understood that the Article must apply to all kinds of 
taxes levied by a Contracting State on capital gains. The wording of Article 2 is large enough to achieve this aim and 
also to include special taxes on capital gains.664   
 
Capital gains are considered income in some countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) while in others, 
they are classified as profits rather than regular income (an example is Japan). Due to different 
approaches in domestic tax systems, the concept of capital gains in tax treaties is ambiguous in many 
respects. Seligman took the position that capital gains are income as soon as they are realized in the 
sense that the taxpayer has economic value at his/her disposal.665 
  
A recent decision of the High Court of Australia dealt with the long-standing issue of how to treat 
capital gains under treaties concluded before the introduction of a separate capital gains tax as part of 
the Australian income tax. In a decision of 10 October 2008,666 the Court affirmed that the Australia–
Switzerland tax treaty protects Swiss residents from the imposition of Australian capital gains tax. 
The case involved a Swiss resident holding company that reported capital gains on the disposal of 
shares in an Australian subsidiary during the 2004 tax year. The applicable treaty was concluded at a 
time when Australia did not have a separate capital gains tax. Tax treaties concluded by Australia 
before and after the introduction of the capital gains tax defined the “taxes covered” to be the 
Australian income tax. In its assessment of tax, the competent tax authority (the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO)), included the net capital gain in the assessable income of the company, as the tax is 
construed to include the gain as assessable income.   
 
Art. 2 of the Australia–Switzerland treaty did not contain a general description analogous to Art. 2(1) 
and (2) of the OECD Model texts. Rather, Art. 2(1) of the treaty listed “the Australian income tax” as 
part of the existing taxes to which the agreement apples and stated in para. 2 that the treaty shall also 
apply to any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed after the date of signature of 
the treaty.   
 
The Court disagreed with prior rulings667 issued by the ATO as to whether treaties concluded by 
Australia before the inception of the Australian capital gains tax (CGT) in 1985 were applicable to 
this tax by way of its classification as “substantially similar” to the income tax. The ATO took the 
position that the CGT was not a substantially similar tax for purposes of treaties concluded before 
1985; the ruling states in pertinent part: 
 
It is the ATO’s view that there was no agreement in Australia’s pre-CGT treaties to cover capital gains (other than 
'borderline gains') and that an application of the rules of treaty interpretation adopted internationally and by 
Australian courts demonstrates this. Australia did not have a comprehensive CGT regime at the time the pre-CGT 
treaties were negotiated and such a regime was not in contemplation. While the treaties provide a mechanism for 
extension of treaty coverage to taxes not in existence at the time of signature, that extension is limited to similar 
taxes. The ATO considers that Australia’s CGT is not a substantially similar tax. Even if this is not the case, the 
distributive rules of pre-CGT treaties do not limit domestic law taxing rights over capital gains. 
 
Aside from the ATO’s main argument that Australian capital gains taxes were not substantially 
similar to the income tax, for some treaties the argument was made that the treaty did not contain a 
                                                 
664 OECD Model Commentary to Art. 13, m.no. 4. 
665 Plehn, “Review of  The Income Tax. A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad by 
Edwin R.A. Seligman, 5 The American Economic Review. 1, March 1915, 114 (117). 
666 Virgin Holdings SA v. Commissioner of Taxation, High Court of Australia, FCA 1503, 10 October 2008. While the decision is 
now largely of historical value from an Australian tax perspective following changes to the CGT law (from December 2006, 
Australia broadly exempts foreign residents from Australian CGT on the sale of shares in an Australian company), the case will still 
be of interest to foreign residents who seek treaty relief in respect of pre-December 2006 disposals. 
667 ATO, Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2000/D12 of 2000, followed by Taxation Ruling TR 2001/12, entitled “Income Tax and Capital 
Gains Tax: Capital Gains in Pre-CGT Tax Treaties”, issued 19 December 2001. See the discussion in Deutsch/Sharkey, “Australia’s 
Capital Gains Tax and Double Taxation Agreements”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2002, pp. 228 et seq. 
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distributive article on the alienation of property, which was seen to suggest that no agreement was 
reached by the parties to bring capital gains within treaty scope.  
 
Justice Gzell noted in his article “Treaty Application to a Capital Gains Tax Introduced after 
Conclusion of the Treaty”668 that many treaties concluded before introduction of the Australian capital 
gains tax actually did apply to capital gains, as their allocation provisions referred to “income or 
gains”, “income or profits”  or “income from alienation”. The concept of income as envisaged by the 
drafters of the OECD MC is certainly broad enough to encompass capital gains, unless the specific 
treaty language suggests otherwise. Where the parties do not include a provision on capital gains, such 
a tax may still be covered where it is “substantially similar” to the income tax of either contracting 
party. The Court seems to confirm this approach by holding that the term “Australian income tax” in 
Article 2(1) of the Australia–Switzerland treaty encompassed, at the time of the conclusion of the 
Swiss treaty, the taxation of capital gains even though Australia did not have a CGT regime at the 
time, since the broad basis of Australian income tax had always encompassed gains of that kind as 
well.  
 
Vogel described the issue of capital gains taxes under tax treaties as follows: “Taxation of capital 
gains is normally dealt with in income tax laws, though in some instances separate legislation is 
devoted to that subject. Consequently, any new capital gains tax will for Treaty purposes normally 
have to be considered as being at least similar to income taxes.”669 Irrespective of whether the treaty 
refers to taxes on gains analogous to the general description in para. 2 of the OECD Model, and in fact 
even where no explicit mention is made of capital gains taxes in the list of taxes covered, such taxes 
will still be covered if they had been taxed as part of the income basis.   
 
In a case that arose in Denmark,670 the issue was whether a flat rate tax on capital gains introduced 
after the entry into force of the Denmark–France treaty of 1957 was a similar tax to the income tax 
(which was expressly covered by the treaty). The Danish High Court held that a flat-rate tax on the 
gross amount of payment on the purchase of a pension was not a substantially similar tax to income 
tax. The French tax authorities accepted the view of the Danish authorities published on the basis of 
this decision that the treaty did not apply to such as tax as it cannot be seen as a tax on gains. Capital 
gains taxes as per Art. 13 are such that are levied on gains or profits. 
  
The aspect of gains is what distinguishes capital gains taxes from inheritance taxes: both inheritance 
taxes and capital gains taxes are levied upon the movement of capital from one person to another. 
However, while inheritance tax charges tax on the entire amount of capital that is transferred, capital 
gains tax is levied only on the gain, i.e. the difference between the value at the time of transfer and the 
value at the time it was last moved (e.g. its purchase). In accordance with what appears to be an 
internationally unanimous understanding, Art. 13 covers gains resulting from the sale or exchange of 
property and also from a partial alienation, the expropriation, the transfer to a company in exchange 
for stock, the sale of a right, and even the passing of property at death.  Regarding these gifts and 
transfers at death mentioned in the context of the capital gains article, Vogel pointed out that this 
means gains taxable to the transferor, e.g. where untaxed reserves are freed up by the transfer. Gains 
to the transferee (gift and inheritance) and on the estate (estate taxes) on the other hand may be 
covered by separate tax treaties on gifts, estates and inheritances. Where a jurisdiction imposes capital 
gains taxes and inheritance taxes (e.g. the United Kingdom), death is usually exempted from the 
capital gains tax. Where capital gains are taxed at death, a factor in delimiting inheritance taxes from 
income/capital gains taxation, albeit not determinative, is whether the taxpayer is entitled to a basis 
step-up regarding any future transfer of the property received.  
 
Capital duties are typically not covered by income tax treaties (cf. the above deliberations on stamp 
duties and taxes like the Italian IRAP). Some countries levy taxes upon contributions of capital to a 
                                                 
668 Justice Gzell, “Treaty Application to a Capital Gains Tax Introduced after Conclusion of the Treaty”, ALJ 76 (2002) 309. 
669 K. Vogel, Double Taxation Conventions (1998) Commentary to Art. 13, m.no. 6. 
670 Danish High Court of the Eastern District, Case No. 300/1998. 
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corporation; these are usually outside the scope of tax treaties. An example is the “capital transfer tax” 
(Kapitalverkehrsteuer) levied on Austrian corporations where a corporation issues stock in 
consideration for a capital contribution, or in cases where the contribution is likely to increase the 
value of the contributor’s interest in the corporation. As regards Member States of the European 
Community, there is an EC Directive on Capital Duties (69/335/EEC) that looks to regulate capital 
duties.671 
 
While capital (wealth) taxes on the value of assets as levied in many countries are typically measured 
by the ability-to-pay principle, which states that the amount of taxes paid should relate to the 
taxpayer’s income or wealth, capital transfer taxation ties in with a transfer event between individuals. 
Nevertheless, as estate and inheritance taxes are based on the value of the property rather than the 
income generated from it, conceptually they could quite well be covered by Art. 22, were it not for 
their explicit exclusion in para. 1 of the OECD Model Commentary to Art. 22. Drawing the borderline 
between these taxes is not an easy task especially where the parties qualify the same event differently. 
Problems at the intersection of income and capital taxes on the one hand, and gift, estate and 
inheritance taxes on the other hand are dealt with in more detail subsequently.   
 
 
C. Taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts 
 
1. Context of the 1982 OECD Model Convention 
 
Treaties on “death duties” are among the oldest bilateral tax treaties concluded.672 The 1923 League of 
Nations Report prepared by the Technical Experts noted with respect to estate or inheritance taxes 
(then referred to as “death duties”) that the country of situs should have exclusive taxing rights in the 
case of real estate and moveable property closely connected with real estate, but that the claim of the 
country of domicile was preferred regarding corporate shares, corporate bonds, and general credits. 
The area was pushed to the sidelines in the League of Nations’ 1925 Report, dealing with “general or 
personal taxes on income (to the latter may be added succession duties and taxes on capital).”673  
 
Consecutive meetings of the OEEC and OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs/Fiscal Committee led 
to the 1966 OECD Draft Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances, last updated and 
expanded in scope in 1982 to include gifts.674 The Committee on Fiscal Affairs revised the 1966 
Estate Tax Draft “with the aim of bringing it into line with the 1977 Income Tax Model and to 
improve it wherever the need arose.”675 The main amendment focused on the fact that gifts among 
living persons (transfers inter vivos) are treated essentially the same way as transfers at death: 
 
The reasons for avoiding double taxation in respect of death duties also hold true for taxes on gifts inter vivos since 
such taxes are in some respects very similar to, and are moreover closely interconnected with, death duties in many 
countries. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs decided therefore that the time had come to include taxes on gifts inter 
vivos within the framework of a Model Convention.676  
                                                 
671 For a detailed analysis see Arvind Ashta, The EC Directive on Capital Duties (69/335/EEC), SSRN Research Network, January 
2007. 
672 Examples are the 1922 Treaty between the Czechoslovak Republic and the German Reich for the Purpose of Preventing Double 
Taxation in respect of Death Duties (publication date: 18 March 1922; effective date: 21 April 1923); the 1926 Convention 
Concluded between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Poland with a view to avoiding the double collection of Succession 
Duties (publication date: 24 November 1926; effective date: 6 June 1928); the 1924 Treaty Between Austria and Hungary for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation in Respect of Death Duties (publication date: 8 November 1924; effective date: 10 November 1925); 
the 1926 Agreement between France and Luxemburg regarding reduction in Taxes and Duties granted to French and Luxemburg 
Nationals taxable in the Territory of the Other State (publication date: 16 January 1926). 
673 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion (1925) Part I, Introduction. 
674 Cf. Commentary on the Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates, Inheritances, and on Gifts, Introductory Report by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, m.no. 3: “The main feature of the new Model, when compared with the former Draft, is that taxes on 
gifts inter vivos are now included within the scope of the Convention.” 
675 Commentary on the Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates, Inheritances, and on Gifts, Introductory Report by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, m.no. 10. The relationship of the Estate Tax Model with the Income Tax Model is dealt with in more 
detail below. 
676 Preceding note, m.no. 11. 
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The rationale of treating bequests at death and lifetime gifts alike under domestic tax laws is usually 
that persons distributing substantially all of their wealth before their death in order to avoid estate and 
inheritance taxes should not escape taxation.   
 
The 1982 Model and Commentaries have so far not been amended or updated, presumably due to the 
lack of treaties in this area. Governments globally have focused more on treaty negotiations 
concerning income and capital, which can only in part be explained by the fact that these are areas 
that promote trade between the parties involved.677 In fact, the likelihood of unrelieved double or 
multiple taxation in the area of estate, inheritance and gift taxes is considerable.   
 
A basic example illustrates this point. A national of the Netherlands dies in Belgium, where (s)he had 
emigrated. Among his/her assets is a piece of real estate in France. The only heir lives in Spain. Both 
the Netherlands and Belgium levy inheritance taxes on the basis of residence of the decedent. Spain, 
on the other hand, levies inheritance taxes on the recipient where the recipient is a resident of Spain. 
France levies inheritance tax on real estate located in France. While there is an estate, inheritance and 
gift tax treaty between Belgium and France, with the result that no tax is levied in Belgium, no treaties 
in this area have been concluded between Belgium and Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands, or France 
and the Netherlands. The same economic event, i.e. the transfer of the piece of real estate to the heir, 
will thus be subject to tax in three countries.   
 
The Model Commentary notes: 
 
Although taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts are imposed only on specific events, the burden of taxation 
resulting from the simultaneous levy of the taxes imposed under the domestic laws of several countries is certainly 
prejudicial to the development of economic relations and in particular to movements of private capital between 
Member countries.   
 
Nevertheless, the number of treaties concluded in this area is very low as compared to the expansive 
network of income and capital tax treaties. The primary reason, it is submitted here, is that countries 
are apprehensive of unclear and adverse results caused by parallel application of both an income and 
capital and an estate, inheritance and gift tax treaty. Throughout the 19th century, bilateral tax treaties 
were prevalently concluded with respect to “death duties”/“succession duties”. Even countries that, at 
present, do not have active treaties in this area did have active treaties regarding estate and inheritance 
taxation in the late 19th century; examples are France and the United Kingdom.678   
 
The rise of income taxation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries brought about a growing number 
of treaties in this area as well as efforts of harmonization by the League of Nations and OEEC/OECD 
primarily with regard to taxes on income and capital; double taxation with respect to taxes on estates, 
inheritances and gifts has since been addressed only secondarily in treaty practice, as a supplement to 
treaty protection provided in the area of income and capital taxation. The number of treaties 
concluded in the area of estates, inheritances and gifts is considerably lower than the number of 
treaties regarding income and capital taxes.   
 
The Model Commentary, however, stresses the fact that 
 
[a]lthough the network of double taxation conventions applying to taxes on estates and inheritances is smaller than 
that covering taxes on income, the 1966 Estate Tax Draft has also had significant repercussions since Member 
countries have largely conformed to it when concluding or revising bilateral conventions. The importance of the 
work of the Fiscal Committee and now of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs should not be measured merely by the 
number of conventions concluded between Member countries but also by the fact that, in accordance with the 
Recommendations of the Council of the OECD, these conventions follow the pattern and, in most cases, the main 
provisions of the Model Conventions. These Model Conventions have facilitated bilateral negotiations between 
                                                 
677 Willem van der Berg identifies this reason in “Future of Inheritance and Gift Tax Treaties”, in M. Stefaner/M. Züger (eds.) Tax 
Treaty Policy and Development (2005) 517 (526).  
678 For an in-depth – now historical – perspective, see A. Boes, Das Wesen der Doppelbesteuerung -  geschichtlich und positiv-
rechtlich (1928) 28 et seq. 
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Member countries and achieved a desirable harmonization in bilateral conventions for the benefit of both taxpayers 
and national administrations. Moreover, the Commentaries have facilitated the interpretation and application of 
bilateral conventions along common lines.679   
 
Art. 2 in the 1982 Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC is similar in structure to the Income and Capital 
MC: the general description in Art. 2(1) refers to “taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts 
imposed on behalf of a Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, 
irrespective of the manner in which they are levied”, and thus corresponds to Art. 2(1) in the Income 
and Capital MC.   
 
Art. 2(2) reads: 
 
There shall be regarded as taxes on estates and inheritances taxes imposed by reason of death in the form of taxes 
on the corpus of the estate, of taxes on inheritances, of transfer duties, or of taxes on donations mortis causa. There 
shall be regarded as taxes on gifts taxes imposed on transfers inter vivos only because such transfers are made for 
no, or less than full, consideration.   
 
As laid out above in the analysis of the structure of Art. 2, the main functional difference between the 
Income and Capital Model text and the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model text lies in para. 3: the 
list of taxes on estates, inheritances and on gifts is exhaustive rather than demonstrative, unless the 
parties specify otherwise, e.g. by inserting the words “in particular”.   
 
Where, as between two contracting parties, both a treaty modelled after the OECD’s Income and 
Capital MC and an Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax treaty were concluded, broad concepts in either 
treaty are likely to cause confusion and unclarities in treaty application. It seems that therein lies a key 
reason why so few treaties have been concluded in the area of estate, inheritance and gift taxes. 
However, the existence of both types of treaties suggests that no overlaps in substantive scope were 
intended by the contracting parties, and inferences can be drawn from the concepts in one type of 
treaty to the scope of application of the other.   
 
Following an analysis of the concepts of estates, inheritances and gifts, as compared to income and 
capital, the study analyses the interrelation of treaties in the area of income and capital on the one 
hand and estates, inheritances and gifts on the other hand, and aims to develop an interpretive 
approach to possible overlaps in substantive scope of these two types of treaties. 
 
 
2. Estates, inheritances and gifts 
 
The OECD Model text and Commentary do not give a definition of estates, inheritances or gifts. The 
key phrases in the description of taxes covered are: taxes imposed on transfers of property by reason 
of death, on the one hand, and taxes on transfers for no, or less than full, consideration.   
 
The phrase “by reason of death” is very broad, but appropriately so in that it captures situations where 
countries add gifts that are made within a certain period of death to the value of the decedent’s assets 
for purposes of estate and inheritance taxes. The phrase “for no, or less than full, consideration” 
describing gifts indicates that transfers that are really in consideration of services provided cannot 
come within the scope of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax Model, but would be governed by the 
Income and Capital Tax Model (Art. 15, dealing with services). 
 
The most straightforward common feature of taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts is that they are 
levied upon the transfer of property: the terminology employed throughout the Model refers to 
unilateral transfers to heirs, legatees, donees or other beneficiaries.  
 
                                                 
679 1982 Commentary on the Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts, Introductory Report by 
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs - Implementation of the 1966 Estate Tax Draft, m.no. 7 (with reference to a table of existing 
treaties) and m.no. 8. 
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Art. 1 of the OECD Model lays out the estates, inheritances, and gifts covered, providing that “the 
treaty only applies to those estates and inheritances where the deceased was domiciled in one of the 
states, or in the case of gifts, where the donor was so domiciled.” The treaty thus focuses on property 
rather than persons, namely property which forms part of the estate of, or a gift made by, the resident 
of a contracting state. Under the Income and Capital MC, on the other hand, the focus is on persons 
who are residents.   
 
Estate, inheritance and gift taxes in various countries are levied on the basis of nationality of the 
deceased/donor.680 Some countries use the concept of residence of the donor/deceased to determine 
the jurisdictional basis of inheritance and gift taxes.681 Yet other countries see the residence of the 
recipient as the basis on which to levy inheritance or gift taxes.682 Conversely, tax burdens in several 
countries tie into the location of immovable property transferred upon death or by way of a gift.683   
 
Pursuant to the text of Art. 1(2) (“taxes on the corpus of the estate”), estate taxes are such taxes that 
are levied on the estate itself. This approach is taken in countries like the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Korea and New Zealand, and is rooted in the frequent use of testamentary trusts in these 
countries, where determining the value of each beneficiary’s interest may be difficult.684   
 
While estate, inheritance and gift taxes share the features of transfer taxes, estate taxes distinguish 
themselves in that the estate tax is levied on the entire taxable estate, which will usually include the 
money used to pay the tax, while gift taxes and inheritance taxes apply only to the value that is being 
transferred. The estate is often treated as a legal person under domestic law and the tax is based on 
value transferred, with graduated rates depending on the value. The deceased’s property is thus not 
taxed at the beneficiary level but rather before transfer of the property is complete. Estate taxes as 
levied on the transferor are seen to be based upon the power to transmit in that their basis is the net 
value of the transferor’s estate.   
 
Inheritance taxes tie in with the transfer event as well, but may be levied either at the transferor or at 
the beneficiary level. They are calculated based on the decrease in value at the transferor level, or the 
family or marital relationship between transferor and beneficiary and/or value received by the 
beneficiary.   
 
Some countries blend elements of both estate and inheritance taxes; examples are Italy and Greece.685 
Furthermore, estate/inheritance and gift taxes are oftentimes interlinked in domestic tax systems.686 In 
a number of countries that levy an inheritance tax, the gift tax is based on similar principles. In some 
countries, such as Belgium and Luxembourg, gift taxes are levied independently in the form of a 
registration tax.687   
 
Inheritance and estate taxes are often linked to gift taxes; the respective rules are usually coordinated 
in order to prevent gift-giving as a method to evade estate and inheritance taxation. An example is 
France, where the value of any gifts given by the deceased to his/her heirs during a six-year period 
prior to his/her death is added to the value of the bequeathed amount.  
 
The phrase “transfers for no, or less than full, consideration” in Art. 1 of the Estates, Inheritances and 
Gifts MC indicates that a gift exists where the value of the property transferred exceeds any 
                                                 
680 Examples are the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. 
681 Examples are Luxembourg and Italy. 
682 An example is Spain. 
683 This is the case in Denmark. 
684 Wolfe D. Goodman, “General Report”, in International double taxation of inheritances and gifts, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international Vol. 70b, 15 (20). 
 
686 An example is the Unified Estate and Gift Tax, a federal tax imposed in the United States on the net value of the decedent’s 
estate and on gifts of certain amounts. 
687 See further F. Sonneveldt and J.W. Zwemmer, “Avoidance of multiple inheritance taxation within Europe”, General Report for 
the Annual Congress of the EATLP, Maastricht (2000).  
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consideration to the donor. Nothing in the Model text or the Commentary indicates that the donor 
cannot be a legal person. The same principle should hold true in the context of estate and inheritance 
taxation: the direct distributor on occasion of the transferor’s death need not be a natural person. 
Transfers can be indirect in that the decedent is free to determine the method of distribution. A will 
may, for example, compel heirs to transfer property to a specified legatee. 
 
The definition of “domicile” in Art. 4 includes “place of management”. It is thus made clear that gifts 
made by corporations, trusts, and similar entities other than individuals come within the scope of the 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model Convention. The donee is not addressed in the Model text; 
however, there is nothing to suggest that the donee cannot be a legal person as well.   
 
Provided that the taxes are imposed by reason of death, it is immaterial whether they are imposed on 
property bequeathed by the deceased or on property transferred during the transferor’s lifetime where 
under the law of one or both of the contracting states, the property transferred is subject to estate tax 
at the moment of death of the transferor.688 Such transfers are thus not classified as gifts under the 
Model treaty, as the treaty ties in with the point in time at which the tax arises.   
 
The basic concept of tax seems to be identical in both the Income and Capital and the Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts Tax Models. Therefore, stamp duties or registration or recording fees levied 
“by reason of death” generally do not qualify as taxes covered by the OECD Estates, Inheritances and 
Gifts MC. Where taxes levied “by reason of death” are levied also on other occasions, a conclusion as 
to their coverage under Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax Treaties will be less straightforward.   
 
 
2.1. Conditional transfers, usufruct, fideicommissum   
 
From the phrase “heirs, legatees, or other beneficiaries” (emphasis added) it can be concluded that the 
transfer does not have to be direct. Legatees, for example, receive a legacy by way of the decedent’s 
last will and testament, giving them merely a claim against the estate or the heirs, but no entitlement 
to decedent’s property itself.   
 
Art. 2(2) also mentions “donationes mortis causa”, i.e. the transfer of property by a person who faces 
impending death. Such transfer only takes effect upon death, before which it may be revoked at any 
time. The donee thereby becomes the owner of the property subject to the condition of the owner’s 
death and absent revocation by the owner. 
 
Moreover, the Model Commentary includes the conditional transfer of property at death or inter vivos 
subject to the condition that the property, or what is left of it, has to be passed on to a new beneficiary 
on the occurrence of a specified event.689 Therefore, the treaty concept of the treaty concept of estates, 
inheritances and gifts encompasses all types of conditional transfers, whether they be subject to a 
condition precedent or a condition subsequent. 
 
The Commentary specifically mentions usufructs as being covered under the Model treaty and 
describes usufructs as a temporary division of economic and legal ownership rights that may be 
created by operation of law, by gift or by will. The usufructor is given the right to use property and 
derive profits from it, while the legal right to same property is with another person.    
 
Also explicitly included is the creation of a fideicommissum. The fideicommissum is known in many 
countries as a disposition either by law, by gift or on death by which property is transferred to several 
persons successively, subject to the condition that a successor nominee be alive at the moment of the 
death of the preceding nominee. Where it is instituted by law, the successor is usually deemed to 
acquire the property from the creator of the fideicommissum, but for tax purposes some countries may 
                                                 
688 1982 OECD Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC Model Commentary on Art. 2, m.no. 5. 
689 OECD Model Commentary on Art. 2(22). 
 111 
 
view the property as acquired from the previous beneficiary. This again showcases the danger of 
unrelieved double taxation.     
 
In the above-mentioned or similar cases involving “chains of transfer”, different countries may 
classify the transfer as one between the respective “middleman” and the beneficiary, which may also 
mean that no transfer by reason of death is recognized, as the event is seen as a gift from 
“middleman” to beneficiary. Given that a large number of treaties apply solely to estates and 
inheritances and do not include gifts, this issue needs to be considered during treaty negotiation.   
 
 
2.2. Trusts and foundations 
 
In addition to conditional transfers and arrangements like usufructs and fideicommissa, the Model 
Commentary explicitly includes trusts and foundations, which constitute arrangements to transfer the 
right to enjoy the benefits of property without change in formal legal ownership.690 The ways in which 
Member countries levy taxes regarding trusts (usually countries that adopted English “common law”) 
or foundations (“private law” countries) vary considerably.   
 
Trusts and foundations typically feature a two-tier system of taxation: t axes are levied on income to 
the trustee on the one hand and to the beneficiaries on the other hand. Common law countries like 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand 
have adopted a concept of trust where a right of property is held by one person (the trustee) for the 
benefit of another person (the beneficiary); the person giving up the property is called the settlor. 
Trusts can be created by gift during the life of the settlor (inter vivos trusts) or by last will and 
testament (testamentary trusts).   
 
The Model Commentary distinguishes between trusts where the beneficiary has an immediate right to 
the whole of the income and capital of the trust, trusts where an identified beneficiary or beneficiaries 
have a right only to the whole or part of the income or enjoyment of the property but not the capital, 
and trusts where the instrument does not specify the rights of the potential beneficiary or 
beneficiaries, and the trustee is given discretion as to whether and for whose benefit property or 
income is to be distributed.691 Income from the assets held by the trust is usually taxable to the trustee. 
Where taxes are imposed at the level of the trust, the beneficiary is not usually taxed.   
 
Most countries levy taxes not only upon creation of the trust or foundation by way of gift or on death, 
but also upon a change of beneficiaries and whenever property is distributed from the trust or 
foundation to the beneficiaries. Moreover, in addition to the charge on distributions, taxes may also be 
imposed at periodic intervals during the existence of the trust, as is the case, for example, in the 
United Kingdom.   
 
The Commentary notes that 
 
the Article may have to be modified to cover charges imposed by some States on events occurring subsequent to the 
creation of a trust, usufruct, fideicommissum or foundation because some States may take the view that the terms 
‘estate’ and ‘gift’ are not sufficiently comprehensive to cover such charges.692   
 
The drafters thus envisaged broad coverage under the terms “estate” and “gift”, subject to limiting 
specifications in the particular treaty.  The Model Commentary remarks: 
 
Due to the differences in the civil and taxation laws of Member countries, it was not possible to insert in the Convention 
provisions which would be acceptable to all States. It is easier to decide in bilateral negotiations whether and to what 
                                                 
690 OECD Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, Art 2(2), m.no. 2 et seq. 
691 Id on Art. 1, m.no.16. 
692 Id. on Art. 1, m.no. 28. 
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extent two States may need special rules. Contracting States are, therefore, left free to insert special provisions in their 
bilateral conventions to deal with these problems.693   
 
No guidance is provided as to whether such transactions may fall under either estate, inheritance and 
gift tax treaties, or income and capital tax treaties – or possibly both. This lack of guidance in the 
Model Commentary, however, does not diminish the importance of using all available materials to 
derive autonomous meaning for the respective treaty. 
 
The Model text and Commentary provide no guidance as to the distinction between income and 
gifts/inheritances in the case of distributions from trusts and private foundations to beneficiaries. 
Where payments are made from a trust or foundation established in one country to a beneficiary 
resident in the other country, the country of residence of the beneficiary might treat the distribution as 
income from capital, while the country of establishment of a foundation treats distributions as 
donations. Most treaties try to avoid such conflict of classification at the stage of treaty negotiations. 
The tax treaties of Austria with Germany, Ireland and Australia, for example, regard all distributions 
from Austrian foundations as dividend income if the income is categorized as such by the contracting 
party’s domestic law.694 The founder’s country of residence, however, may also levy gift taxes.   
 
It is thus clear that the object and purpose of tax treaties is best effected by way of interpretation 
attempting to realize common conceptual premises underlying the Model treaty texts. Inferences 
should be drawn from the scope of application of the Income and Capital MC to determine the scope 
of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, and vice versa. Although there are vast discrepancies in 
terminology and concepts in domestic laws, interpretation should to the largest possible extent seek to 
derive autonomous concepts for purposes of treaty application and avoid application of more than one 
treaty between the same contracting parties where irreconcilable results in terms of the allocation of 
taxing rights may be the consequence. 
 
 
2.3. Income/capital vs estates/inheritances/gifts 
 
At first glance, it does not appear to be a challenge to grasp the different areas of taxation that led to 
the introduction of a separate OECD Model text dealing with estates, inheritances and (subsequently) 
gifts. The concepts of estates, inheritances and gifts as well as income and capital are universally 
known. However, tax systems around the world are vastly different in structure and often do not 
distinguish when it comes to the imposition of taxes.   
 
Some countries include gifts as part of taxable income, while others even tax gifts in the same manner 
as capital on the theory that gifts do not constitute regularly accruing gains. Countries that do not levy 
estate taxes sometimes impose taxes on a “deemed” disposition on death; an example is Canada.695   
 
The Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model Commentary gives no substantive guidance, but merely 
notes: [I]t is obvious that the effort to eliminate double taxation between Member countries needs to 
go beyond the field of periodic taxes on income and capital.”696 It goes on to state that “taxes on 
estates and inheritances and on gifts are imposed only on specific events.”697 
 
The 1927 Draft Bilateral Convention submitted by the League of Nations Technical Experts, after 
laying down the allocation provisions regarding the various items of income giving rise to “direct 
impersonal or personal taxes”, stated the following: “The principles laid down in the preceding 
articles shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the recurrent taxes on total wealth, capital, or 
                                                 
693 Id. on Art. 1, m.no. 29. 
694 See further Feyl/Helbich/Leitner/Tanzer, “‘Privatstiftungen’- The Austrian Version of Trust”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2004, 435 (441). 
695 See Sec. 70(5) of the Canadian Income Tax Act. 
696 1982 Commentary on the Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts, Introductory Report by 
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs - Implementation of the 1966 Estate Tax Draft, m.no. 5 (emphasis added). 
697 Id., m.no. 6. 
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increments of total wealth, according as these taxes are personal or impersonal.” (emphasis added) 
Taxes on income and capital are thus delineated from estate and gift taxes in that the latter are 
typically levied on a singular rather than a regularly or sporadically recurring event such as income.   
 
From this it can be concluded that periodicity is considered a characteristic element of taxes on 
income and on capital. Income as covered under income and capital tax treaties is usually a recurring 
item, with the exception of capital gains per the separate capital gains article, which also includes a 
single inflow.698   
 
In the case of the Canadian tax on a deemed gain in the event of death, unless said tax is included via 
Art. 2(2), the result of autonomous treaty interpretation is that this tax comes within the scope of the 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC. The fact that no treaty was concluded that would deal with estate, 
inheritance and gift taxes cannot be determinative. Expanding the scope of an existing income and 
capital tax treaty would go against the express object and purpose of the Model texts 
 
that also in the case of taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts that persons in each Member country who engage 
in commercial, industrial or financial activities in the other Member countries, or more generally, who own property in 
such countries, should have their fiscal situation clarified, standardized and made secure through the application by all 
Member countries of common solutions for eliminating double taxation.699  
 
Not least, such practice of expanding existing income and capital tax treaties would be against the 
consensus reached by the parties concerned.   
 
The Model Commentary mentions that “Member countries desirous of concluding bilateral 
conventions applying to both taxes on income and capital, and taxes on estates and inheritances and 
on gifts, may combine the two Model Conventions.”700 Treaties have rarely pursued this option; an 
example of a treaty combining both income tax and estate and inheritance taxes is the 1995 Denmark–
Germany Tax Treaty. This treaty is unusual in that Art. 2 is headed “Scope of the Convention” and 
deals not only with the taxes covered but also the persons covered as regards income taxes and estate 
and inheritance taxes covered. Moreover, the taxes covered are not listed but rather described 
generally – a practice that is very uncommon in current treaties. 
 
The distinctions that prompted the creation of a separate Model Convention for estates, inheritances 
and gifts should be given effect even where the parties involved have chosen not to conclude a treaty 
in the area of estates/inheritances and gifts. Delineating the relevant factors, however, is not an easy 
task. Frequency or periodicity of incidence is not a reliable factor, as it is not unthinkable that gifts 
might be made periodically; periodic payments may, for example, come in the form of distributions 
from a trust or foundation as per instructions of the grantor. Policy considerations may be helpful to 
tip the scale towards either type of tax, but can only give general guidance. Economist F. A. Hayek 
noted that the transmission of assets after death is part of the family’s role in transmitting society’s 
standards and traditions, and that inheritances in this sense are redistributive, aiding the equalization 
of wealth. The same principle applies to transfers among the living. Income taxes, on the other hand, 
primarily serve the purpose of providing revenue.701   
 
A distinctive factor of income was identified by the League of Nations Technical Experts, Professors 
Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Stamp, discussing the allocation of taxing rights under the League of 
Nations Model, the principles of which are reflected also in the current OECD-based treaty network: 
“the origin of income is where the intellectual element among the assets is to be found…. The yield or 
                                                 
698 However, the Commentary notes that taxes on capital gains on the transfer of immovable property, of securities, of shares or the 
like, irrespective of whether or not such transactions are made for full consideration, are not regarded as gift taxes.  Capital gains of 
this nature are thus singled out to come exclusively under the Income and Capital Model.   
699 Preceding note, m.no. 8. 
700 1982 Commentary on the Model Double Taxation Convention on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts, Introductory Report by 
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs - Presentation of the 1982 Estate Tax Model, m.no. 14. 
701 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960) 91 et seq. 
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acquisition [of wealth] is due … not only to the particular thing but to the human relations which may 
help creating the yield.”702  
 
The intellectual element is thus the key component in the production of income.703 Income is 
“earned”704 and most commonly derived on the market.705 
 
The Model Commentary on Art. 22 of the Income and Capital MC speaks of taxes on capital “to the 
exclusion of taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts and of transfer duties.” The term “taxes on 
capital” therefore does not encompass taxes on estates, inheritances or gifts.706 The OECD Model 
Commentary to Art. 22 (Capital) comments on the scope of the article as follows: “Art. 22 applies 
only to taxes on capital within the meaning of Art. 2. This term does neither include taxes on estates, 
inheritances or gifts (for which there are separate tax treaties in some instances) nor transfer 
duties.”707 The primary point of distinction between taxes on capital and estate taxes is thus that the 
latter are triggered in the event of death. Where the parties have chosen to conclude a separate treaty 
on estate, inheritance and gift taxes, delimitation of the respective scope of each treaty is necessary. 
As these two types of treaties are intended to complement each other with respect to the areas 
covered, effective treaty application presupposes that there be no overlaps in substantive scope.   
 
Another factor to delimit taxes on capital from estate, inheritance and gift taxes is to recognize that 
the common characteristic of the latter is the transfer of value, measured by the diminution in value of 
the transferor’s property or estate, or, in some countries, by the increase in value of the transferee’s 
property. Taxes on capital, on the other hand, are typically based on the possession of wealth rather 
than its transfer. 
 
The Model text or Commentary do not provide clear parameters to delimit gifts from income. In fact, 
as noted previously, various countries do not levy separate gift taxes, but include transfers in the 
nature of gifts in the income basis. Where “the income tax” is listed in the treaty, and either 
contracting party subjects gifts to the same tax treatment as income, factors commonly used to 
identify a gift are the isolated nature of the receipt, its general unpredictability and a lack of control 
over its receipt on the part of the recipient. These factors are helpful in the treaty context as well, as 
neither the Model text nor the Commentary define “gifts”. The question of whether to classify a 
transfer either as income or as a gift, and the consequences of this classification for treaty application, 
are particularly relevant in the context of instruments like trusts and foundations, which have as their 
purpose the transfer to one or more beneficiaries.   
 
Taxes on gifts inter vivos referred to in the Model Commentary include all taxes which are levied on 
gifts (other than mortis causa) “or other gratuitous transfers of property”.708 Gratuity appears to be 
satisfied where there is a transfer for “no, or less than full, consideration”. Intent of the donor or the 
beneficiary are not considered but may be a useful factor in delimitation. Where no gift was intended 
(a concept referred to in some countries as the donor’s animus donandi, i.e. intent to confer a gift), 
there presumably is a bargain that cannot be classified as a unilateral gift from a donor to a 
beneficiary.   
 
While the donor’s intent may influence the analysis, its core is the determination that there is an 
accretion to wealth to the beneficiary (and corresponding decrease in wealth on the part of the donor). 
The accretion occurs gratuitously, i.e. it is not “earned” by the recipient. Payments under life 
insurance or pension plans, for example, would qualify as gifts if paid to a third party beneficiary. 
                                                 
702 Bruins et al., Report on Double Taxation, submitted to the Financial Committee, League of Nations, Geneva, 5 April 1923, 
E.F.S. 73 (F. 19), at 20 and 23. 
703 See also Kemmeren, “Source of Income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based 
Approach”, Bulletin for International Taxation 2006, 430 (434). 
704 O. Bühler, Prinzipien des Internationalen Steuerrechts: Ein systematischer Versuch, 2nd edn. (1964) 155. 
705 Cf. above deliberations and further references to Ruppe’s “Markteinkommenstheorie” in Part III, Chap. B.1.2. of this thesis. 
706 Vogel, Commentary to Art. 22 (1), m.no. 6. 
707 Para. 6 of the OECD Model Commentary to Art. 22. 
708 See also the OECD Glossary of Tax Terms, which defines “gift” as a gratuitous transfer of property. 
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Where the recipient is the person paying premiums, the payments are certainly not gifts for tax treaty 
purposes and their treatment under income tax treaties versus social security conventions should be 
discussed.709 
 
 
D. Delimitation between the OECD Model Conventions on Income and Capital and on 
Estates, Inheritances and Gifts 
 
The preceding analyses have delineated differences in concepts that enable subsumption of a taxable 
event under either the Income and Capital MC or the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC. In his article 
“Taxes covered”,710 Lang identified possible concurring applicability where the parties have 
concluded both types of treaties and calls attention to the fact that this may lead to incoherent 
allocation of taxing rights or “double non-taxation” of the same event. The earliest comprehensive 
study of cases of overlaps in the material scope of estate, inheritance and gift tax treaties and income 
and capital tax treaties was provided by Franz Philipp Sutter.711 More recently, Adolfo Jiménez dealt 
with examples of such overlaps and how to resolve them.712 The following considerations aim to add 
to the discussion and draw conclusions based on the concepts analysed in the preceding chapter.   
 
While the estate, inheritance and gift tax aspect of the avoidance of double taxation is intended to 
complete protection in the area of income and capital, each of the OECD Model Conventions stands 
on its own. The texts are not coordinated in that parallel application of both treaties to the same 
taxable event may lead to contradictory results. In cases where both types of treaties appear to be 
potentially applicable, subsumption of the levy at issue under the treaty concepts of “income and 
capital” or “estates, inheritances and gifts”, respectively, should lead to the application of one of the 
treaties. Even where the parties have concluded only one type of treaty, it is important to interpret the 
treaty as part of the international tax regime and give effect to the international concepts and basic 
delineations that led to the adoption of two separate Models.   
 
The Income and Capital MC can generally be seen to aim at events that involve the taxpayer’s 
exposure to the market and an “intellectual element” or enjoyment of his/her capital. The Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts MC, on the other hand, deals with “windfall gains”, which are based on a 
gratuitous transfer rather than “earned”. 
 
Elements of the common international concept of estate, inheritance and gift taxes can be derived by 
way of contrast to the Model Commentary description of taxes on income and capital: the Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts MC covers gratuitous transfers that trigger taxation upon the transfer event 
rather than on a regular (yearly) basis. Ambiguities can often be resolved by way of adhering to these 
general principles: 
 
 
1. Resolving overlaps in substantive scope  
 
At first blush, nothing suggests that there might be overlaps in substantive scope as between income 
and capital tax treaties and estate, inheritance and gift tax treaties. However, the seemingly 
straightforward distinction in scope is deceiving. As was laid out in the preceding chapter, several 
countries do not distinguish between income and gifts and tax the recipient of a gift on the value of 
the gift received at the respective applicable rate. Some countries levy capital gains taxes on occasion 
                                                 
709 See the deliberations supra in Part III, A., 1.8. 
710 M. Lang, “‘Taxes Covered’ - What is a ‘Tax’ according to Art. 2 OECD Model Convention?”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2005, pp. 216 et seq. 
711 Sutter, “Der sachliche Anwendungsbereich des ErbSt-Musterabkommens”, in Aigner et al. (eds.) Erbschaftssteuern und 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (2002) 41. 
712 Jiménez, “Defining the Objective Scope of Income Tax Treaties: The Impact of Other Treaties and EC Law on the Concept of 
Tax in the OECD Model”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation October 2005, p. 432. 
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of death rather than estate or inheritance taxes. Some countries levy “exit taxes”713 where a 
transferor’s death leads to the shares being transferred to foreign beneficiaries.   
 
Where the countries do not specify what is meant by “income taxes” as listed in Art. 2(3) and/or 
described in paras. 1 and 2, it seems the scope of the income tax treaty might also cover gifts taxed as 
part of the income tax under internal law. On the other hand, one could argue that capital gains taxes 
or an “exit tax” levied at death should fall outside the scope of an income and capital treaty when 
levied at death. However, if internal classifications were given effect in this way in treaty 
interpretation, if one of the contracting parties later were to introduce a separate gift tax regime and 
carve out what was formerly part of the income tax basis, or introduce an estate and gift tax, disputes 
among the contracting parties could erupt as to whether such taxes classify as “substantially similar” 
in basis to the taxes covered under the existing treaty. 
 
This thesis submits that the reference to “substantially similar” taxes in treaty provisions 
corresponding to Art. 2(4) of the OECD Model texts cannot transgress the conceptual boundaries set 
by way of the basic delineation between common international concepts of “taxes on income and 
capital” and “taxes on estates, inheritances, and gifts” in the OECD Model texts. 
 
There is a clear intention by the drafters of the Commentary to the 1982 Estates, Inheritances and 
Gifts Model that there be a close relationship between the Income and Capital MC and the Estates, 
Inheritances and Gifts MC: the Model Commentary, describing the process of creating a second 
Model Convention dealing with the area of estate, inheritance, and gift taxes, states that 
 
although there are many analogies between the two … [i]t seemed advisable in 1966 to establish a Draft 
Convention for estate and inheritance taxes which would constitute a self-contained document with no references 
to the 1963 Income Tax Draft. The same was true of the Commentaries on the Articles, which only exceptionally 
contained references from one draft to the other.714   
 
The Model Commentary to the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax Treaty further stresses that 
“concepts which are expressed by the same words in both Model Conventions must each be taken to 
have the same application, due regard being had, wherever appropriate, to the different nature of the 
forms of taxation in question.”715 The concept of “tax” in both Model treaties can be seen to be 
identical. Therefore, unless the parties express otherwise, “requited” levies like registration fees or 
stamp duties are outside the substantive scope of tax treaties.   
 
“Exit taxation” regarding the value of shares being transferred716 may be triggered as part of income 
taxation717 where a transferor’s death leads to the shares being transferred to foreign beneficiaries. 
Disputes may thus arise as to whether such transfers are covered by an estate and gift tax treaty rather 
than an income and capital tax treaty. Parallel application of both treaties may cause conflicts, as Art. 
7 of the OECD’s Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC gives exclusive taxing rights to the residence 
state of the transferor, while Art. 21 of the Income and Capital MC confers exclusive taxing rights on 
the state of residence of the beneficiary.   
 
It is therefore vital to recognize that the tax burden underlying an “exit tax” of this type is not imposed 
on the accretion to wealth at beneficiary level. The aim of such taxation is to capture any inherent gain 
preserved in the basis of the stock, and thus in fact to tax an accretion to wealth to the transferor. Tax 
treaties tie in with existing tax burdens, so that it can be concluded that such taxes cannot come within 
an estate, inheritance and gift tax treaty that may exist between the parties concerned. The result is in 
principle independent of the denomination of taxes of this kind under a contracting party’s internal 
law. 
 
                                                 
713 See supra the analysis of “exit taxation” in the context of income and capital tax treaties. 
714 1982 Commentary to the OECD Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Tax Model, Presentation of the 1982 Estate Tax Model, m.no.13. 
715 Id., at m.no. 14. 
716 See supra the analysis of “exit taxation” in the context of income and capital tax treaties, Part III, Chap. B. 1.3.3. 
717 An example is Austria; see further Toifl, Wegzugsbesteuerung, p. 60.   
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This approach seems contrary to the above-discussed case regarding the introduction of capital gains 
tax in Australia, where a recent Australian court decision718 held these taxes to be “substantially 
similar” in nature to the income taxes covered under its existing treaties. The Australian capital tax, 
however, was introduced as part of the domestic income tax law and provided that an indexed part of 
certain gains was included in “assessable income”, defined under domestic law also to include 
ordinary income, and in fact forming, after certain deductions, a part of taxable income. The Court’s 
decision thus stands on solid grounds. Conversely, where a country carves out a part of its income tax 
base to then subject it to different tax treatment, there is arguably no substantial similarity; in 
consequence, gift taxes introduced in this way would not come within treaty protection unless the 
parties decided to amend the existing treaty accordingly or conclude an estate, inheritance, and gift tax 
treaty.   
 
The respective treaties were intended to operate independently of each other, which suggests that 
overlaps in substantive scope need to be resolved not only where the contracting parties have 
concluded both types of treaties, but also where there is only one type of treaty. As noted above, the 
frequent decision in treaty practice not to conclude an inheritance and gift tax treaty cannot lead to an 
existing income and capital tax treaty being interpreted to encompass also estate, inheritance and gift 
taxes. 
 
Nevertheless, problems of genuine overlaps may arise in the context of trusts and foundations: 
distributions of a trust or foundation to its beneficiaries may be taxed under a country’s income tax 
law while exempted from gift taxation. An example is Austria, where private foundations have existed 
since 1993. At that time, the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act was amended to exempt distributions to 
beneficiaries, which otherwise would have been subject to the inheritance and gift tax; the Individual 
Income Tax Act was amended correspondingly to include a special income tax liability. The 
distributions are subject to income tax at the level of resident as well as non-resident beneficiaries.719 
In the case of foreign beneficiaries, the withholding tax may be reduced by a tax treaty. Although such 
distributions are taxed under Austria’s Individual Income Tax Act, it is not at all clear that income and 
capital tax treaties are applicable. The fact that taxes are levied under the banner of an individual 
income tax is not per se sufficient for tax treaty application purposes.  
 
Coverage can be presumed where the list in Art. 2(3). refers to the individual income tax and this tax 
contained the tax liability with respect to distributions from private foundations to beneficiaries at the 
time the treaty was concluded. However, as regards inheritance and gift tax treaties concluded before 
1993, distributions from private foundations to beneficiaries could be seen to be covered as donations 
inter vivos or by reason of death. Moreover, it could be argued that the tax liability created under the 
Austrian Income Tax Act in respect of these distributions are “substantially similar” to parts of the 
inheritance and gift tax as per Art. 2(4) of the inheritance and gift tax treaty.   
 
This is an example of situations envisaged in Art. 2(4), last sentence, according to which the parties 
are to notify each other of changes in their respective domestic tax laws. It used to be subject to 
dispute between Austria and its treaty partners whether distributions from an Austrian foundation to 
the foreign beneficiary qualify as dividends under Art. 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention or 
whether they qualify as other income under Art. 21 of the OECD Model. The prevalent view, which 
seems to be accepted by the Austrian tax authorities, is that such distributions do not fall under Art. 10 
but qualify as other income under Art. 21, which exempts the distributions from Austrian withholding 
                                                 
718 Virgin Holdings SA v. Commissioner of Taxation, High Court of Australia, FCA 1503, 10 October 2008. 
719 Considerable changes in the taxation of private foundations were recently effected under Austrian law; in the past, distributions 
of an Austrian private foundation to the founder or other beneficiaries were subject to a 25% Austrian withholding tax, even where 
the substance of the assets that had been originally transferred to the foundation was redistributed. As of 1 August 2008, 
distributions are generally subject to Austrian withholding tax only to the extent profits and capital gain have been generated in the 
foundation. 
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tax.720  Some of Austria’s tax treaties, however, regard all income as dividend income if the income is 
categorized as such by the domestic tax law of the beneficiary’s state of residence.721   
 
In accordance with the above analysis on the character of dividend income, the characterization as 
dividend income appears to require only that the payment not be treated as deductible to the private 
foundation. Some of the treaties that subsume distributions by private foundations under Art. 21 
(other income) provide that they are subject to tax in the source state (Austria), but that credit must be 
given in the residence state.722 Under Art. 21 of Austria’s treaty with the United Arab Emirates, 
Austria has exclusive taxing rights. Under all its other treaties, Austria has no right to tax distributions 
by a private foundation to individuals or companies resident in the other state under a provision 
comparable to Art. 21 of the OECD Model.723 However, were an inheritance and gift tax treaty 
applied (e.g. due to the fact that the residence state of the beneficiary treats the distribution as a gift, 
or under a “substantially similar” argument where the estate, inheritance and gift tax treaty precedes 
changes to the Income Tax Act), the result would be that Austria is afforded exclusive taxing rights 
under a provision corresponding to Art. 7 of the OECD Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC.      
 
Depending on the treaty, contradictory results or double non-taxation may be the result. Lang made 
the point that double non-taxation may be perfectly in line with the object and purpose of tax treaties 
when one contracting state does not have taxing rights and the other contracting state does not 
exercise its taxing rights for domestic reasons, but that it is not reconcilable with the object and 
purpose of tax treaties to arrive at double non-taxation due to the simultaneous application of both 
OECD Models.724   
 
Where the treaty partners concluded an income and capital tax treaty modelled on the OECD Model 
Convention, and neither of the contracting parties’ internal tax laws impose estate, inheritance and gift 
taxes, but subject “any accession to wealth” to income tax, such broad internal concepts would appear 
to suggest coverage of taxes levied on gifts and inheritances. Such interpretation, however, is wrong 
and potentially causes problems regarding future developments of tax treaty dynamics between the 
parties. If one of the parties later decided to introduce an inheritance and gift tax, the state of 
residence of the donee/beneficiary could argue that the tax is “substantially similar” to the income tax 
under the existing treaty, and that Art. 21 of this treaty confers exclusive taxing rights to the 
recipient’s residence state. An estate, inheritance and gift tax treaty modelled on the OECD Model, 
however, would provide for donation at source under Art. 5 or Art. 7, depending on where the 
transferor resides. 
 
Therefore, an application of the income and capital treaty to taxes that qualify as inheritance/gift taxes 
per common international concepts underlying the OECD Models would give rise to double taxation 
where a treaty partner does not agree to the other’s argument that a newly introduced tax is 
“substantially similar” to taxes covered under an existing treaty.   
  
Similar problems could arise where the parties have concluded both an income and capital and an 
estate, inheritance and gift tax treaty, and either party subsequently changes its tax laws: a contracting 
party may subject beneficiaries of distributions from a trust to income tax, but subsequently change its 
legislation to subject the beneficiary to inheritance and gift taxes. Double taxation may be the result 
where one of the parties sees the income and capital treaty as applicable, while the other party applies 
the estate, inheritance and gift tax treaty. Feasible results can only be achieved by way of treaty 
interpretation that looks to the common international concepts expressed in international tax language: 
                                                 
720 Cf. Feyl/Helbich/Leitner/Tanzer, “‘Privatstiftungen’- The Austrian Version of Trust”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2004, 435 (441). 
721 Examples are Austria’s treaties with Australia, Germany and Ireland. 
722 This is provided in Austria’s treaties with Brazil (Art. 21), Malaysia (Art. 21), Thailand (Art. 22), Japan (Art. 19) and Pakistan 
(Art. 17(1)). 
723 See e.g. Austria’s income tax treaty with India (Art. 17) as well as the treaty with the United States (Art. 21). 
724 M. Lang, “‘Taxes Covered’ - What is a ‘Tax’ according to Art. 2 OECD Model Convention?”, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2005, 216 (218). 
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Did the beneficiaries receive the payments gratuitously, i.e. as third party beneficiaries without prior 
corresponding obligations that might point to “earned income”? Are the payments made “by reason of 
death”, e.g. under a will as distributions from a testamentary trust? Are the payments recurring or do 
they constitute a transfer on special occasion? Such are the factors to be analysed so as to attain 
proper treatment under either of the international treaties.  
 
As previously mentioned, the function of Art. 2(4) cannot be to change the substance of what is 
covered under the treaty; it is geared towards accommodating situations where the same taxable item 
is taxed in substantially the same way. 
 
A unique yet very feasible approach is taken in the US–Canada Income Tax Treaty of 1980, as 
amended in 1995. It is the first tax treaty to address estate tax inequities that arise between a country 
that levies estate or inheritance taxes and a country without estate or inheritance taxes.725 The United 
States imposes an estate tax on the value of assets transferred at death, whereas Canada imposes an 
income tax on 50% of the unrealized gains on capital property deemed sold at death. To further 
complicate matters, the US estate tax applies to both US citizens and residents, while Canada's 
income tax is based only on residence. A US citizen who is a resident of Canada at death is subject to 
tax in both countries on all assets. In addition, each country taxes non-residents on transfers of certain 
assets considered located within that country. Due to the conceptual difference between income taxes 
on the one hand and estate/inheritance taxes on the other hand, neither contracting party's tax laws 
allow a credit for the taxes imposed at death by the other party. The US-Canada treaty mitigates 
resulting inequities with provisions that provide a foreign tax credit for the Canadian income tax on 
some or all of the US estate tax paid on assets situated in the United States.726 For US estate tax 
purposes, it also provides a foreign death tax credit for the Canadian income tax assessed on the 
deemed sale at death of assets located in Canada. However, the treaty does not provide gift tax relief.   
 
An interpretation that recognizes the distinction in international tax treaty concepts between “income 
and capital” and “estates, inheritances and gifts” provides consistent results that are in line with the 
object and purpose of tax treaties. This approach leaves room for the parties to make provisions for 
ambiguities that may arise in treaty application due to discrepancies in domestic tax laws. The 
international treaty network and its coherence in terms and policies deserves an interpretive approach 
that seeks to give effect to existing common international concepts and advances the goal to 
harmonize international taxation. 
 
 
2. A note on the non-discrimination provisions 
 
Art. 10 of the OECD Model Treaty on Estates, Inheritances and Gifts provides that nationals of a 
contracting state, wherever they are domiciled, shall not be subjected in the other contracting state to 
any taxation which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to 
which nationals of the other contracting state in the same circumstances may be subjected. 
 
Despite Art. 1 of the Model Estates, Inheritance and Gifts tax treaty, which provides that the treaty 
applies to “estates and inheritances where the deceased was domiciled, at the time of his death, in one 
or both of the Contracting States”, the expression “wherever they are domiciled” in Art. 10 implies 
that the non-discrimination provision is accorded stand-alone status within the treaty. This is 
consistent with the general understanding of the non-discrimination principle of the OECD Tax 
Committee, which takes the position that this principle should apply to nationals of contracting states, 
irrespective of their residence.727 
 
                                                 
725 See also Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and Canada With Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital Signed at Washington on September 26, 1980, as amended by the Protocols Signed on June 14, 1983, March 
28, 1984, and March 17, 1995. 
726 See Treaty Art. XXIX B.6. 
727 Juilhard p. 201  
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The wording of the provision is not as explicit as that of Art. 24 of the OECD Income and Capital 
Model text. As laid out above in this study, the non-discrimination provision in the Income and 
Capital MC applies to “taxes of every kind and description”, which appears to include also estate, 
inheritance and gift taxes. A taxpayer may thus seek to obtain discrimination protection under the 
Income and Capital MC where no treaty in the area of estate and gift taxes was concluded, or where 
such treaty does not contain a non-discrimination provision.728 Moreover, the scope of the non-
discrimination provision in estate, inheritance and gift taxes is often limited to residents under the 
treaty.729 Some treaties contain a non-discrimination provision that is only applicable to taxes targeted 
by the treaty.730 
 
Unlike cases involving substantive scope, the object and purpose of non-discrimination provisions in 
principle seems to permit overlaps of both Models, so that taxpayers may invoke discrimination 
protection under either the Income and Capital MC or the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC. 
Nationals of a country that has concluded an income tax treaty whose non-discrimination provision 
applies to non-residents may thus benefit from this principle not only for income tax purposes, but 
also in estate, inheritance and gift tax matters. Nevertheless, the OECD Tax Committee has stated that 
it is necessary to insert a non-discrimination clause in estate, inheritance and gift tax treaties because 
the respective income tax treaty may not be applicable in certain instances, e.g. where a treaty is 
unilaterally terminated by a contracting party. 
 
 
Interpretive results and outlook 
 
The thesis focused on the structure and content of Art. 2 of the OECD Model Conventions with 
respect to taxes on income and capital as well as taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts. The objective 
was to draw a clearer picture of he “taxes covered” by tax treaties worldwide that have adopted the 
Model texts.   
 
A basic thread throughout the study is the view that bilateral treaties that adopt the OECD Model 
formulations express a basic common international consensus. An interpretation of the Model texts 
that takes into account the international context and is therefore equally informed by textual, 
systematic, historical and teleological factors is the key to determining the substantive scope of tax 
treaties. Courts worldwide have increasingly recognized the existence of an “international tax 
language”, especially in cases where undefined treaty terms have no equivalent in a treaty party’s 
domestic tax system. 
 
The “interpretive” provision in Art. 3(2) has sparked controversy about its application from early on; 
representatives of the OECD Member countries addressing the Fiscal Committee during a 1965 
Session noted that “the Committee has created a source of difficulty that it must now remove.” While 
the provision has to date not been removed, it is clear from the object and purpose of international tax 
treaties that it cannot support instant recourse to domestic tax law concepts. 
 
The Model Commentaries, while certainly a primary resource in interpretation, merely display 
interpretive conclusions, without a hint as to the grounds from which they were derived. The thesis 
therefore draws on Reports and Minutes documenting the drafting history of Art. 2 to shed light on 
the concepts underlying formulations that have remained virtually unchanged throughout tax treaty 
history. The thesis argues that the fact they were originally classified as “restricted” and thus not 
readily accessible to the public at large in no way disqualifies them, from the perspective of 
international law, as a valuable resource in interpretation.  
 
                                                 
728 This is the case with several treaties concluded by Austria, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. 
729 See e.g. regular practice in estate, inheritance and gift tax treaties concluded by Spain. 
730 This is the case in some treaties concluded by Canada, Spain and the Philippines. 
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International agreements entered into by the contracting parties in the areas of world trade law and 
international social security law as well as the law of the European Communities may need to be 
factored in when interpreting a given treaty. While EC law explicitly acknowledges the importance of 
bilateral treaties for the prevention of double taxation, tax treaties as between EC Member States need 
to be interpreted consistently with the requirements of EC law. Moreover, tax treaty law is closely 
interlinked with international trade law. Provisions of the GATT and WTO Agreements play a vital 
role, particularly in the area of non-discrimination. Treaty practice would benefit from further 
research regarding the intersection of international tax law and international trade law.  
 
The same is true for the relation between tax treaties and bilateral agreements concluded in the area of 
social security coordination, sometimes called “totalization agreements”. The treatment of social 
security payments under tax treaties is still to a large extent unresolved, causing a host of uncertainties 
for the expatriate taxpayer. As between EU Member States, a Regulation coordinating rights to 
impose social security levies as between the payments applies to any payment that in effect finances a 
social security scheme. The thesis argues that such payments should not be seen to come within the 
scope of tax treaties between EU Member States, as any other approach would be in breach of the law 
of the European Communities. Often, the parties to a tax treaty have also concluded a bilateral social 
security agreement (“totalization agreement”). Such agreements “totalize” any benefits and aim to 
relieve double imposition of social security payments on the same income in the case of 
residents/nationals of one country that perform work in another. Considering the fact that countries 
increasingly finance their social security systems by way of general taxation, coverage of a social 
security payment under either treaty appears plausible. The thesis suggests that a levy that does not go 
to the government’s general budget, being linked to the financing of social security, should in general 
be seen not to come within treaty scope since the co-ordination rules of the social security agreement 
may come into conflict with the distributive rules of the tax treaty concluded by the same parties. 
Government authorities concluding tax treaties usually do not coordinate with authorities concluding 
social security agreements; more dialogue between these authorities of the contracting parties is 
therefore desirable.   
 
The matter is complicated by the fact that most social security agreements as well the EC Regulation 
apply to “present or future” legislation, which is comparable in its effect to Art. 2(4) of the OECD 
Model. Unclear cases thus arise where a state replaces its contributory social security system by a 
system that is financed out of general taxation. In the case of such substantial changes, arguably the 
social security agreement respectively, the Regulation should no longer apply and it needs to be 
examined whether the tax treaty may be applicable. Where a state has attributed competences over 
certain levies to government bodies other than the bodies associated with taxation, there is a strong 
argument that these levies should not be seen to be within the scope of tax treaties. 
 
Contentious cases have arisen among contracting parties primarily as to the meaning of the general 
description in paras. 1 and 2 in the light of a merely illustrative enumeration of taxes in para. 3 on the 
part of each contracting party. While the 1969 Report of OEEC Working Party No. 30 concedes that 
“the general descriptions given in paragraphs 1 and 2 are not too precise and might probably be called 
to be rather vague”, it is stressed that both paragraphs together are determinative of the taxes to which 
the Convention applies, while the list in para. 3 merely illustrates the general description. Therefore, 
where the parties decide to incorporate a general description into their treaty, such description has 
stand-alone value and provides for broad coverage. As OEEC Working Party No. 30 stated, “taxes not 
enumerated in paragraph 3 but qualifying for a test under paragraphs 1 and 2 are – under the present 
O.E.C.D. concept – nevertheless within the scope of the Convention.”  Furthermore: 
 
The omission of paragraphs 1 and 2 would primarily affect the position of paragraph 3: under the present scheme, 
the ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the determination of the subject of the Convention goes with paragraphs 1 and 2; 
… [L]eaving out paragraphs 1 and 2 would mean that the scope of the Convention is determined solely by the list 
of taxes in paragraph 3; and this would imply that the enumeration of taxes therein must be exhaustive. 
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On the other hand, the list in para. 3 can go beyond what would be seen as “taxes on income and on 
capital” in terms of a common international consensus, as the list is a direct expression of the parties’ 
intent. OEEC Working Party No. 30 commented that 
 
there might exist fiscal charges, fees or other levies with respect to which it could be doubtful whether they are 
‘taxes on income (capital)’ within the meaning of the general definition given in paragraphs 1 and 2.… If those 
levies shall be brought under the Convention then it is – in the opinion of the Working Party – sufficient to 
enumerate such taxes by name in the list of taxes in paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 has quite obviously the power 
(although being principally an illustration to paragraphs 1 and 2) to amplify the scope of the Convention so that 
taxes and charges might be included in the Convention even if they were not considered to be ‘taxes on income 
(capital)’ within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
Where there is no general description of the taxes covered, a tax not named in the exhaustive list can 
only come within treaty scope via the provision in Art. 2(4), i.e. where a tax is imposed in addition to, 
or in place of, the taxes existing at the time the treaty was signed, and such tax is “substantially 
similar” to the taxes existing at the time of signature. The wording “in addition to, or in place of” is 
derived from the formulation “new taxes, or taxes replacing those to which the Convention applies” 
used in the 1957 Report of OEEC WP No. 3. Taking into consideration the purpose of para. 4 to 
prevent the treaty from becoming inoperative, it is clear that coverage should apply not only to newly 
created taxes but equally to substantial changes of existing taxes. From the perspective of 
international law, para. 4 is extraordinary, as it expresses a general commitment of the parties also 
with regard to future events; this flexibility is vital in the fast-paced world of taxes. OEEC WP No. 30 
interpreted para. 4 in the light of paras. 1 and 2 in that “under the present O.E.C.D. concept, taxes 
being introduced after the signature of the Convention are automatically subject to the Convention, 
provided they are taxes on income (capital) within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2.”   
 
Working Party No. 30 further commented that “a subsequently introduced tax is considered to be 
‘identical or substantially similar’ if it is a tax on income (capital) in the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 
2. If, however, paragraphs 1 and 2 were omitted, the criterion ‘identical or substantially similar’ could 
be interpreted only in respect of the taxes enumerated in the list of taxes.” The Working Party’s 
analysis confirms that in accordance with the purpose of the treaty, it is necessary to look to the taxes 
listed by both states together as one single unit when determining whether a subsequently imposed tax 
by either party is substantially similar per para. 4.   
 
Neither the Model Conventions nor the Commentaries thereto specify by what parameters taxes may 
be classified to be “identical or substantially similar”. The League of Nations Draft Conventions of 
Mexico and London, whose formulations have influenced the OEEC’s drafting process, referred to 
taxes “upon substantially the same bases” in the corresponding provision. The designation of a 
subsequently introduced tax is irrelevant to the determination of its substantial similarity to a tax 
covered under the treaty. The concept of similarity in para. 4 rather looks to the taxable object, as the 
treaty as a whole ties in with existing tax burdens of a character laid out in Art. 2(1) and (2) and/or 
listed in Art. 2(3). The reference in para. 4 to the “time of signature” might have been chosen 
purposely so as to bring within treaty scope changes occurring during the time period between 
conclusion and signature of the treaty, thus taking account of the fact that in practice there may be a 
significant gap between these time periods. While this supposition could not be substantiated via 
reference to the historical drafting materials, it is certainly in line with the object and purpose of tax 
treaties. 
 
The application of a treaty to “substantially similar” taxes as per para. 4 is automatic and independent 
of the requirement laid out in the second sentence of para. 4 for the competent authorities of the 
contracting parties to “notify each other of any significant changes that have been made in their 
taxation laws.” No mechanism is provided in the treaty to compel the parties to meet this notification 
requirement. However, even without express insertion into the treaty this obligation can be seen to 
exist under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, i.e. the requirement for legally binding treaties to be 
adhered to in good faith. Some of the oldest treaties concluded in the 1920s did not provide for a list 
of taxes covered but instead incorporated the requirement for periodical exchange of lists of the 
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existing taxes in each of the treaty partners, an approach that has since been dismissed for its 
impracticability. 
 
The purpose of tax treaties warrants a typological, flexible term of “tax” the elements of which can be 
concretized in bilateral negotiations. Awareness of common international elements of the concept of 
“tax” can constitute substantial support in the negotiation and application of tax treaties. The most 
basic common element of the concept of tax in tax treaties was expressed by E. R. A. Seligman, one 
of the League of Nations Technical Experts who drafted a report for submission to the League of 
Nations Fiscal Committee which served as a basis for the first Draft Double Taxation Conventions, 
noted that whenever the payment secures concrete government action or the concession of certain 
commodities to the individual payer, it is not a “tax” but rather a fee in character and will generally be 
outside the scope of tax treaties. “Taxes” within the meaning of tax treaties modelled on the OECD 
texts are involuntary pecuniary burdens imposed by way of government’s sovereignty on all 
taxpayers, regardless of whether taxpayers make use of a certain good or service provided by 
government. As identical terms used in both the OECD’s Income and Capital Tax Model Convention 
and the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax Model Convention should in principle be seen to have the 
same meaning, the basic concept of “tax” is identical as used in both Models.  
 
The term “tax” has a key function not only in the treaty article on substantive scope but also in the 
provisions on non-discrimination, exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes. 
The non-discrimination provision are is by its very nature designed to apply to any taxes, irrespective 
of whether they are within the substantive treaty scope, as the purpose of avoiding discriminatory tax 
treatment goes beyond the allocation of jurisdiction to tax to eliminate double taxation. Similarly, Art. 
26 on exchange of information refers to “taxes of every kind and description”; therefore, the extent of 
information exchange cannot be curtailed by the parties via a narrow provision on substantive scope. 
However, payments that are not “taxes” within the meaning of the treaty are not covered by the 
reference in Art. 26. A stringent approach calls for the same conclusions in the context of Art. 27, 
which provides for assistance in the collection of taxes and broadly refers to “revenue claims”.   
 
A tax treaty requires “more than a mere exchange of paper” in order for treaty protection to apply, as 
tax treaties tie into taxation events in the sense of an actual tax burden. Whereas the allocation 
provisions of the OECD Models use words like “paid” and “derived”, too literal a reading would go 
against the purpose of tax treaties. Income that is deemed to be paid or derived under domestic tax 
laws (“fictitious income”) and thus causes “real” tax burdens can in principle come within the specific 
income allocation provisions of tax treaties. “Fictitious” elements of taxes are thus generally 
creditable under tax treaties. 
 
Nevertheless, tax treaties do not prevent double burdens in situations where one country taxes 
“fictitious” income, but a subsequent change in circumstances concerning that same taxable base 
leaves the other state with taxing rights under the treaty that are exercised upon actual realization. 
Such “economic double taxation” can only be prevented by way of unilateral action. There are no 
adequate measures available at international level, however, to ensure that a country will take such 
action. 
 
The notion of taxes on “income and capital” and taxes on “estates, inheritances and gifts” is premised 
on the basic concept of “tax” in the OECD Model Conventions. An observation that can be made as to 
the character of “income” in the tax treaty context is that it primarily comprises cash-basis market 
transactions that effect dominion or control of the taxpayer over the item of income. 
 
The express reference to “recurrent” taxes in the OECD’s Income and Capital Model Commentary 
apparently aims to delineate taxes on income and capital from taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts. 
Taxes covered by the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Model Convention are “one time”- type events 
rather than recurring impositions, and are imposed on transfers of property by reason of death, on the 
one hand, and taxes on transfers for no, or less than full, consideration.   
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The phrase “by reason of death” is very broad, but appropriately so in that it captures situations where 
countries add gifts that are made within a certain period of death to the value of the decedent’s assets 
for purposes of estate and inheritance taxes. The phrase “for no, or less than full, consideration” 
describing gifts indicates that transfers that are really in consideration of services provided cannot 
come within the scope of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts Tax Model, but would be governed by the 
Income and Capital Tax Model. 
 
Inferences should be drawn from the scope of application of the Income and Capital MC to determine 
the scope of the Estates, Inheritances and Gifts MC, and vice versa. As mentioned, income is “earned” 
and most commonly derived on the market. A distinctive factor of income was identified by the 
League of Nations Technical Experts, Profs. Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Stamp, discussing the 
allocation of taxing rights under the League of Nations Model, the principles of which remained 
constant through today’s OECD-based treaty network: “[t]he origin of income is where the 
intellectual element among the assets is to be found…. The yield or acquisition [of wealth] is due … 
not only to the particular thing but to the human relations which may help creating the yield.” 
 
A key factor to delimit taxes on capital from estate, inheritance and gift taxes is to recognize that the 
common characteristic of the latter is the transfer of value, measured by the diminution in value of the 
transferor’s property or estate, or, in some countries, by the increase in value of the transferee’s 
property. Taxes on capital, on the other hand, are typically based on the possession of wealth rather 
than its transfer. While the donor’s intent may influence the analysis, its core is the determination that 
there is an accretion to wealth to the beneficiary (and corresponding decrease in wealth on the part of 
the donor). The accretion occurs gratuitously, i.e. it is not “earned” by the recipient. Payments under 
life insurance or pension plans, for example, would qualify as gifts if paid to a third party beneficiary. 
Where the recipient is the person paying premiums, the payments are not gifts for tax treaty purposes 
and their treatment under income tax treaties versus social security conventions should be discussed. 
 
The provision on substantive scope carries the weight of the treaty and, given its history of stability in 
structure and wording as well as the widespread adherence in tax treaty practice, it seems that Art. 2 
in its present form in the OECD Model texts is here to stay – as evidenced also by the fact that the US 
Income and Capital Model Tax Treaty has approximated its wording of the provision on substantive 
scope to that of the OECD Income and Capital Model Convention.   
 
The determination of the substantive scope of tax treaties should follow coherent principles that take 
account of the fact that the widespread use of the Model terms has its basis in common international 
concepts. Much can be gained from a negotiation and subsequent application of tax treaties that 
entails awareness of the interconnectedness of paras. 1 through 4 of Art. 2, as the decision to give 
exhaustive character to the list of taxes covered in para. 3, or not to include or to reduce a general 
description in paras. 1 and 2, is of defining consequence to the scope of treaty protection.    
 
While the thesis has dealt with a variety of issues arising in the context of determining the substantive 
scope of tax treaties, and sought to derive sustainable principles with a view to common international 
concepts that have formed the present wording of the provision, it is to be expected that the dynamic 
field of taxation will bring about ever more and different issues for this key article. To paraphrase 
Prof. Lang – whose article on “Taxes Covered” inspired this thesis –  Art. 2 deserves more attention.  
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Annex I: The Substantive Scope throughout History 
 
League of Nations Double Taxation and Tax Evasion Report, Geneva, April 1927 
 
Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation 
 
Article 1 
 
The present Convention is designed to avoid double taxation in the sphere of direct impersonal or 
personal taxes, in the case of the taxpayers of the Contracting Parties, whether nationals or otherwise. 
For the purposes of this Convention the following shall be regarded as impersonal taxes: 
 
(a)_ 
(b)_ 
(c)_ 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be regarded as personal taxes: 
 
(a)_ 
(b)_ 
(c)_ 
 
I. Draft Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of 
Succession Duties 
 
Article 1 
 
The purpose of the present Convention is to prevent taxpayers of the Contracting States from being 
subjected to double taxation in the matter of succession duties.  
For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be regarded as succession duties: 
 
(a)_ 
(b)_ 
(c)_ 
 
 
League of Nations Double Taxation and Tax Evasion Report, Geneva, October 1928 
 
I. Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of Direct 
Taxes  
 
Draft Convention NO.Ia  
   
Article 1 
The present Convention is designed to prevent double taxation in the sphere of direct impersonal or 
personal taxes, in the case of the taxpayers of the Contracting Parties, whether nationals or otherwise. 
For the purposes of this Convention the following shall be regarded as impersonal taxes: 
 
(a)__ 
(b)__ 
(c)__ 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be regarded as personal taxes: 
 
(a)__ 
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(b)__ 
(c)__ 
 
Draft Convention NO.Ib 
 
The present Convention is designed to prevent double taxation as regards the following specified 
taxes, in the case of the taxpayers of the Contracting States, whether nationals or otherwise. 
(a)__ 
(b)__ 
(c)__ 
 
Draft Convention NO.IC 
 
The present Convention is designed to prevent double taxation as regards the following specified 
taxes in the case of the taxpayers, whether nationals or otherwise, of the Contracting States: 
 
(a)__ 
(b)__ 
(c)__ 
 
II. Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter of 
Succession Duties 
 
Article 1 
 
The purpose of the present Convention is to prevent taxpayers of the Contracting States from being 
subjected to double taxation in the matter of succession duties. 
For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be regarded as succession duties: 
 
(a)__ 
(b)__ 
(c)__ 
 
 
League of Nations, 1943 Mexico Draft Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of 
Double Taxation of Income 
 
Article I  
 
1. The present Convention is designed to prevent double taxation in the case of the taxpayers of the 
contracting states, whether nationals or not, as regards the following taxes:  
 
a. With reference to State A: ...  
b. With reference to State B: ... 
 
2. It is mutually agreed that the present Convention shall apply also to any other tax, or increase of 
tax, imposed by either contracting state subsequent to the date of signature of this Convention upon 
substantially the same bases as the taxes enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this Article. 
 
 
League of Nations, 1943 Mexico Draft Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the 
Double Taxation of Successions 
 
Article I 
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1. The present Convention, the purpose of which is to prevent the double taxation of successions, 
applies to all duties and taxes levied, by reason of death, on the estate, or on the transfer of, or the 
succession to, the estate, of a person who, at the time of his death, had his domicile in one of the 
two contracting states, whether or not he was a national of that State or the other State, and on the 
part of such estate that accrues to each heir or legatee. 
 
2. The duties and taxes to which this Article refers are: 
 
a. In the case of State A: ... 
b. In the case of State B: ... 
 
 
League of Nations, 1946 London Draft model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of 
the Double Taxation of Income and Property  
 
Article I  
 
1. The present Convention is designed to prevent double taxation in the case of the taxpayers of the 
contracting states, whether nationals or not, as regards the following taxes:  
 
a. With reference to State A: ...  
b. With reference to State B: ... 
 
2. It is mutually agreed that the present Convention shall apply also to any other tax, or increase of 
tax, imposed by either contracting state subsequent to the date of signature of this Convention 
upon substantially the same bases as the taxes enumerated in the preceding paragraph of this 
Article. 
 
 
League of nations, 1946 London draft model bilateral convention for the prevention of the 
double taxation of estates and successions 
 
Article I 
The present Convention, the purpose of which is to prevent the double taxation of estates and 
successions, applies to the following duties and taxes: 
  
a. In the case of State A: ... 
b. In the case of State B: ... 
 
 
OEEC, Draft Convention submitted by the Italian Delegate of Working Party No. 3 of the 
Fiscal Committee, Paris, 10 January 1957  
[FC/WP3 (57) 1, p. 2] 
 
Article I 
 
1. This Convention shall apply to:  
(a) Taxes on total income, on the elements of income and on income derived from the alienation 
of elements of capital (capital profits); and – 
(b) Taxes on total capital, on the elements of capital and on increment to capital (excluding taxes 
which are in the nature of extraordinary non-recurring levies on capital); 
Being taxes imposed on the signature of this Convention, or subsequently thereto, on behalf of 
the contracting States or on behalf of their political subdivisions and local authorities. 
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2. The term “tax”, as used in this Article, means the principal duty of tax, surcharges, interest, costs 
and all other accessory additional duties, irrespective of the manner in which the same are levied. 
 
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention is to apply are, in particular: 
 
(a) In the case of……………….. 
(b)  In the case of……………….. 
 
4. If either of the contracting States, after the signature of this Convention, should make substantial 
alterations to the taxes specified in paragraph 3 of this Article or impose further taxes on income or 
capital, then the competent authority of that State shall notify such alterations or further taxes to 
the other contracting State within a period of six months. 
 
5. It is agreed that the competent authorities of both states shall consult together in order to clarify 
any doubts arising in practice as to the taxes to which the Convention applies, and, in particular, to 
determine the nature and character of any alterations or further taxes to which the last foregoing 
paragraph applies. 
 
 
OEEC, Draft Convention submitted by the Swiss Delegate 
[FC/WP3 (57) 1, p. 12]  
 
 
A. Draft Clauses for a Convention 
 
I. With respect to taxes on income and capital 
 
1. The object of this Convention is to avoid the double taxation which might result from the 
concurrent application in relation to taxpayers of both States, of  (State A) and (State B) 
legislation relating to ordinary and extraordinary taxes on income and capital. 
 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, there shall be regarded as taxes on income and capital all 
taxes imposed, under (State A) and (State B) taxation legislation, on total income, on total capital, 
or on the elements of income or of capital, including taxes on profits derived from the alienation 
of movable or immovable property (capital profits and profits on real property), as well as taxes 
on increment values or on enrichment. 
 
3. This Convention shall apply to taxes imposed on behalf of one of the two States, of its political 
subdivisions (constituent States, regions, provinces, cantons, districts, “arrondissements”, circles 
[“Kreise”], etc.). 
 
4. The existing taxes to which this Convention is to apply are in particular:  
A. In the case of (State A) 
B. In the case of (State B) 
The taxes specified in the foregoing sub-paragraph comprise, in addition to the principal duty 
of tax, all additions, interest, costs, and other accessory duties. 
 
5. This Convention shall also apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed 
in future in addition to or in place of the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the taxation 
authorities of the two States shall notify to each other any amendments which have been made to 
their respective taxation legislations. 
 
6. The taxation authorities of the two States shall consult together in order to clarify any doubts 
which may arise as to the taxes to which the Convention ought to apply. 
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II. With respect to taxes on estates and inheritances 
 
1. The object of this Convention is to avoid the double taxation which might result from the 
concurrent application in relation to taxpayers of both States, of (State A) and (State B) legislation 
relating to ordinary and extraordinary taxes on estates and inheritances imposed on the occasion 
of the death of a person who at the time of his death was domiciled in one of the two States, as 
well as to taxes on donations mortis causa. 
 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, there shall be regarded as taxes on estates and inheritances 
all taxes imposed on the occasion of death, under (State A) and (State B) taxation legislation, in 
the form of tax on the corpus of the estate, of tax on inheritances or of transfer duties. 
 
3. This Convention shall apply to taxes imposed on behalf of one of the two States, of its political 
subdivisions (constituent States, regions, provinces, cantons, districts, “arrondissements”, circles 
[“Kreise”], etc.), and of its local authorities (municipalities or groups of municipalities, etc.), 
irrespective of the manner or form in which such taxes are levied (direct assessment, deduction at 
the source, surtaxes or surcharges, additional taxes [“centimes additionnels”], etc.). 
 
4. The existing taxes to which this Convention is to apply are:  
 
A. In the case of (State A) 
B. In the case of (State B) 
 
The taxes specified in the foregoing sub-paragraph comprise, in addition to the principal duty of 
tax, all additions, interest, costs, and other accessory duties. 
 
5. This Convention shall also apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed 
in future in addition to or in place of the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the taxation 
authorities of the two States shall notify to each other any amendments which have been made to 
their respective taxation legislations. 
 
6. The taxation authorities of the two States shall consult together in order to clarify any doubts 
which may arise as to the taxes to which the Convention ought to apply. 
 
 
OEEC, Draft Article adopted by the Fiscal Committee on 4th June 1957, on the basis of the 
proposals included in the Report of WP No. 3  
[FC/WP 3(57)2 of 2nd May 1957] 
 
A. Taxes on income and capital  
 
(1) This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and capital imposed on behalf of each of the two 
States or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in which they 
are levied. 
 
(2) There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital all taxes imposed on total income, on 
total capital, or on the elements of income or of capital, including taxes on profits derived from the 
alienation of movable or immovable property (capital profits and profits on real property), taxes on 
the total amounts paid on wages or salaries by undertakings, as well as taxes on increment values. 
 
(3) The existing taxes to which this Convention is to apply are in particular:  
(a) In the case of State A: ……………………….. 
(b) In the case of State B: ……………………….. 
 
 130 
 
(4) This Convention shall also apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed in 
future in addition to or in place of the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the competent 
authorities of the two States shall notify to each other such amendments as have been made to their 
respective taxation legislations. 
 
(5) The competent authorities of the two states shall by mutual agreement clarify any doubts which 
may arise as to the taxes to which the Convention ought to apply. 
 
B. Taxes on estates and inheritances 
 
(1) This Convention shall apply to taxes on estates and inheritances imposed on behalf of each of the 
two States or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in which 
they are levied. 
 
(2) There shall be regarded as taxes on estates and inheritances all taxes imposed on the occasion of 
death in the form of tax on inheritances, of tax on the corpus of the estate or of transfer duties, as 
well as taxes on donations mortis causa. 
 
(3) The existing taxes to which this Convention is to apply are in particular:  
(a) In the case of State A: ………………. 
(b) In the case of State B: ……………….. 
 
(4) This Convention shall also apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed in 
future in addition to or in place of the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the competent 
authorities of the two States shall notify to each other such amendments as have been made to their 
respective taxation legislations. 
 
(5)  The competent authorities of the two States shall by mutual agreement clarify any doubts which 
may arise as to the taxes to which this Convention ought to apply. 
 
 
OECD, 1963 Model Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
 
Chapter I 
Scope of the Convention 
Article 2 
Taxes covered 
 
1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and on capital imposed on behalf of each 
Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in 
which they are levied. 
  
2. There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital all taxes imposed on total income, on 
total capital, or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of 
movable or immovable property, taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by 
enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation. 
  
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are, in particular: 
 
(a) In the case of (State A): 
(b) In the case of (State B): 
  
4. The Convention shall also apply to any identical or substantially similar taxes which are 
subsequently imposed in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the 
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competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify to each other any changes which have 
been made in their respective taxation laws. 
 
 
OECD, 1966 Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to 
Taxes on Estates and Inheritances 
 
Chapter I 
Scope of the Convention 
Article 2 
Taxes covered 
 
1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on estates and inheritances imposed on behalf of each 
Contracting State or one of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner 
in which they are levied. 
  
2. There shall be regarded as taxes on estates and inheritances all taxes imposed on the occasion of 
death in the form of tax on the corpus of the estate, of tax on inheritances, of transfer duties, or of 
taxes on donations mortis causa. 
  
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are, in particular: 
 
a) in the case of (State A): ... 
b) in the case of (State B): ... 
  
4. The Convention shall also apply to any taxes on estates and inheritances which are subsequently 
imposed in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall notify to each other any changes which have been made 
in their respective taxation laws. 
 
 
OECD, 1977 Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital 
 
Chapter I 
Scope of the Convention 
Article 2 
Taxes covered 
 
1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and on capital imposed on behalf of a Contracting 
State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in which they 
are levied. 
  
2. There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital all taxes imposed on total income, on 
total capital, or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of 
movable or immovable property, taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by 
enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation. 
  
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are, in particular: 
(a) (in State A): …………. 
(b) (in State B): …………. 
  
4. The Convention shall apply also to any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed in 
addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. At the end of each year, the competent authorities of 
 132 
 
the Contracting States shall notify each other of changes which have been made in their respective 
taxation laws. 
 
 
OECD, 1983 Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to 
Taxes on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts 
 
Article 2 
Taxes covered 
 
1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on estates and inheritances and on gifts imposed on behalf of a 
Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in 
which they are levied. 
 
2. There shall be regarded as taxes on estates and inheritances taxes imposed by reason of death in the 
form of taxes on the corpus of the estate, of taxes on inheritances, of transfer duties, or of taxes on 
donationes mortis causa. There shall be regarded as taxes on gifts taxes imposed on transfers inter 
vivos only because such transfers are made for no, or less than full, consideration. 
  
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are: 
 
a) (in State A) ...  
b) (in State B) ... 
 
4. The Convention shall apply also to any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed 
after the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. At the 
end of each year, the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of 
changes which have been made in their respective taxation laws. 
 
 
OECD, 2005 Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital 
 
Article 2 
Taxes covered 
 
1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and on capital imposed on behalf of a Contracting 
State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in which they 
are levied. 
 
2. There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital all taxes imposed on total income, on 
total capital, or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of 
movable or immovable property, taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by 
enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation. 
 
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are in particular: 
 
a) (in State A): .......................................... 
b) (in State B): .......................................... 
 
4. The Convention shall apply also to any identical or substantially similar taxes that are imposed after 
the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. The 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of any significant changes 
that have been made in their taxation laws. 
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Annex II: [TITLE] 
 
The treaties used to prepare Annex II were obtained from the IBFD Tax Research Platform, accessed 
at http://online.ibfd.org/. All existing tax treaties in the area of taxes on income and capital concluded 
between 1921 and 1938 are listed. 
 
 
Parties and 
Year of 
Conclusion 
Provision on Taxes Covered 
 
Czechoslovakia 
Germany, 
1921 
 
General description of taxes covered (income and property), reference to future 
taxes, agreement of the parties in unclear cases as to the taxes covered. 
 
Austria  
Czechoslovakia, 
1922 
 
General description (income and property), future Czechoslovakian tax referred 
to in the capital article, agreement of the parties in unclear cases. 
 
Austria  
Germany, 
1922 
 
Direct taxes (income and property), reference to future taxes, excess profits and 
increase of capital mentioned, agreement in unclear cases. 
 
Czechoslovakia 
Hungary, 
1923 
 
General description of taxes covered (income and property), agreement in unclear 
cases. 
 
Germany 
Hungary, 
1923 
 
General description (property and revenue, profits), agreement in unclear cases. 
 
Czechoslovakia 
Italy, 
1924 
 
General description (income) with distinction between direct impersonal taxation 
on income and direct personal taxation on income, distributive rules regarding 
specified taxes on capital. 
 
Austria  
Hungary, 
1924 
 
General description (property and revenue), extraordinary capital taxes 
mentioned, agreement in unclear cases, distributive rules regarding specified taxes 
on capital. 
 
Czechoslovakia 
Poland, 
1925 
 
No express provision on taxes covered, but reference to direct taxation as well as 
some specific taxes in the various distributive articles; only taxes on income. 
 
Germany 
Italy, 
1925 
 
General description (income) with definition of income: direct taxation which is 
levied direct on income, gross or net, or on personal capital; distinction between 
direct impersonal taxation on income and direct personal taxation, defined:  
Direct taxation levied in respect of single objects liable to taxation and on the 
basis of their economic connection with the territory of the state, shall be regarded 
as “impersonal taxation”. Direct taxation levied on the whole body of objects 
liable to taxation – income or property – and based on the fact that they belong to 
a single taxable person or on that person’s nationality, residence or sojourn, shall 
be regarded as “personal” taxation. Non-exhaustive list with regard to impersonal 
taxation. 
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Hungary 
Italy, 
1925 
General description (income and capital); non-exhaustive list, separate article on 
increment. 
 
Austria 
Switzerland, 
1927 
 
General description (direct taxes on income and capital). 
 
Germany 
Sweden, 
1928 
 
General description (income and capital), reference to inclusion of future taxes, 
increments excluded from coverage. 
 
 
Belgium 
Luxembourg, 
1931 
 
 
Exhaustive list (income). 
 
Finland 
Sweden, 
1931 
 
General description (income and capital) with gain explicitly included and 
increment taxes explicitly excluded, non-exhaustive list of taxes covered. 
 
Belgium 
France,  
1931 
 
General description (income) and exhaustive list, imputed rent included and 
business profits excluded in the distributive rules. 
 
Belgium  
Italy, 
1931 
 
General description (income) and exhaustive list, imputed rent included and 
business profits excluded in the distributive rules. 
 
France 
Italy, 
1931 
 
General description (income) and exhaustive list, imputed rent included and 
business profits excluded in the distributive rules. 
 
Austria 
Poland, 
1932 
 
General description (income and capital). 
 
Hungary 
Romania, 
1932 
 
Exhaustive list with explicit exclusion of Hungarian property tax. 
 
France 
United States, 
1932 
 
Exhaustive list (taxes on income). 
 
Denmark 
Sweden, 
1932 
 
General description (income and capital) with explicit mention of gain; non-
exhaustive list. 
 
 
Belgium 
Netherlands, 
 
 
Exhaustive list (taxes on income and capital), imputed rent included and business 
profits excluded in the distributive rules.
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1933 
 
Germany 
Switzerland, 
1934 
 
General description (income and capital), increase in capital explicitly included;  
non-exhaustive list. 
 
Netherlands 
Sweden, 
1935 
 
Exhaustive list (taxes on income and capital). 
 
Finland 
Germany, 
1935 
 
General description (income and capital) with gain included; non-exhaustive list. 
 
Hungary 
Sweden, 
1936 
 
General description (income and capital) with gain included; non-exhaustive list 
with taxes on increments excluded on the Swedish side. 
 
France 
Sweden, 
1936 
 
General description (income and capital); consultation in case of changes. 
 
Hungary 
Romania, 
1937 
 
General description (income); non-exhaustive list. 
 
Germany  
Romania, 
1937 
 
General description (income);  Non-exhaustive list 
 
France 
Switzerland, 
1937 
 
General description (income and capital); non-exhaustive list. 
 
 
Belgium 
Germany, 
1938 
 
 
Exhaustive list (income taxes). 
 
Italy 
Romania, 
1938 
 
General description (income); exhaustive list. 
 
Denmark 
Germany, 
1938 
 
No express provision on taxes covered, but distributive rules on taxes on income 
and capital (excluding gains from immovable property); other income provision; 
property taxes include increment of property. 
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